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“The Bird is the Feeling: Romantic Natural History and its Subjects” argues that Romantic 
natural history writers and the nonhuman objects of their work are mutually constitutive subjects.  
Unlike eighteenth and later nineteenth-century forms of natural history that consider the natural 
world as a set of discrete objects and species available for collection and cataloguing, the texts 
considered in this dissertation are primarily concerned with unexpected encounters and fleeting 
natural phenomena.  The writers addressed express these unrepeatable encounters as a form of 
natural history that does the work of designating significant subjects and articulating their 
presence within distinct, subjectively constituted and construed environments.  In reading the 
“natural history” journals, letters, and poems of Dorothy and William Wordsworth, John Clare, 
and Henry David Thoreau, this dissertation frames the Romantic turn to nature not as a turn 
away from sociality and history but towards alternative forms of both.  Intervening in a number 
of established strands of Romantic literary criticism and ecocriticism that read the Romantic 
speaking subject’s treatment of the natural world as primarily an instrument of ego-formation, 
“The Bird is the Feeling” celebrates the largely private, idiosyncratic efforts of Romantic authors 
to consider nature, history, and subjectivity in both human and nonhuman terms.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The “New” Nature Writing 
In 2008 the literary magazine Granta published an issue of commissioned articles on 
what it called “The New Nature Writing.”  In his opening letter to the issue, editor Jason Cowley 
described what the publishers were looking for: 
[W]e were interested less in what might be called old nature writing—by which I 
mean the lyrical pastoral tradition of the romantic wanderer—than in writers who 
approached their subject in heterodox and experimental ways. We also wanted the 
contributions to be voice-driven, narratives told in the first person, for the writer 
to be present in the story, if sometimes only bashfully. The best new nature 
writing is also an experiment in forms: the field report, the essay, the memoir, the 
travelogue. If travel writing can often seem like a debased and exhausted genre, 
nature writing is its opposite: something urgent, vital and alert to the defining 
particulars of our times.1 
For Cowley, the defining particulars of our time are, to a great extent, determined by our 
existence in a kind of ecological end-times:  “We know how our world is changing and what is 
being lost and yet we are powerless to prevent the change.”  As such, many of the pieces 
collected in the issue can be read as elegies, and Cowley’s new nature writing is prospectively 
nostalgic:  innovative in its forms and immediate in its perceptions, but wistful in its themes.  
Though compelling, Cowley’s description of the new nature writing as heterodox, experimental, 
urgent and “alert to the defining particulars” of the times makes it sound less like “new” nature 
writing than it does like an old form of nature writing—not the “lyrical pastoral tradition of the 
romantic wanderer” Cowley imagines, perhaps, but rather romantic natural history writing (a 
new tradition of its own).  Romantic natural history writing—characterized by its heterodoxy, its 
                                                
 
1 Jason Cowley, “Editor’s Letter,” Granta 102:  The New Nature Writing, Summer, 2008, unpaginated, 
<http://www.granta.com/Magazine/102/Editors-Letter>. 
2 
 
necessary experimentalism, its attendance to particulars, and its first-person (sometimes bashful) 
narrators—was also responsive to a world that seemed to be both radically expanding and 
slipping away, and to an experience of time as both unimaginably extensive and finite.  For the 
old nature writing as for the new, the only possible approach to this world is one that emphasizes 
the subjective, the particular, the momentary.  As Cowley puts it (in terms that once again echo 
romantic evocations of nature as much as they do contemporary ones), this writing is “about the 
discovery of exoticism in the familiar, the extraordinary in the ordinary.  [It is] about new ways 
of seeing.” 
This dissertation reads new ways of seeing and describing in the journals, letters and 
poems of Dorothy and William Wordsworth, John Clare, and Henry David Thoreau.  Beyond 
simply observing and describing features of natural objects, these “natural histories” record the 
meetings of mutually constitutive subjects, through which the unique forms of subjectivity 
available to natural phenomena inform and are informed by those available to the romantic poet, 
diarist, and naturalist.  In this introduction, I present a brief sketch of natural history writing in 
the late eighteenth century before describing the preoccupation of romantic naturalists with 
unexpected encounters and fleeting natural phenomena.  The writers I address in this dissertation 
express these unrepeatable encounters, I argue, as a form of natural history that does the work of 
designating significant subjects and articulating their presence within distinct, subjectively 
constituted and construed environments.  This introduction also implicitly tracks the evolution of 
the dissertation project, which moved from an interest in the practice of natural history to an 
exploration of the ways it encouraged resonant and distinct forms of attention to and engagement 
with natural phenomena during the romantic period.  Each chapter investigates the particular 
legacy of these forms of attention and engagement in a different author.      
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Natural History Notes  
The title of Ashton Nichols’ anthology Romantic Natural Histories is instructive in two 
ways:  it periodizes natural history and, in its plural form, it suggests that natural history is not a 
simply categorized, or single, art (or science).2  Characterized by a resistance to systemization 
and a sharply particularized, yet deeply contextualized, form of engagement with the material 
world, romantic natural history writing is distinguished by its multifariousness:  sometimes 
private, sometimes public, sometimes amateur, sometimes professional, it participates in a 
number of different literary genres, often in the space of a single text.  Common to natural 
history writing is a lively and diverse form of viewing, thinking, and writing about the local, like 
that inaugurated by Gilbert White, whose Natural History of Selborne has shaped the approach 
of countless writer-naturalists in England and America since its publication.  White’s letters, 
written over the course of fourteen years, developed natural history as a material literary practice.  
At the heart of this practice is a commitment to authentic engagement with and faithful 
description of the natural world, with widely varying degrees of contextualization of the insects 
and flowers it describes.  The witnessing of a particular flower or a particular animal can 
constitute an event in itself in romantic natural history writing.  The natural history journals and 
letters that are the most frequent records of these events highlight their embedment in diurnal and 
seasonal patterns while nevertheless marking them as singular not only within the order of 
natural things, but also within the order of their observers’ lives. 
Close, sustained contact with a particular locale became one of the hallmarks of natural 
history after White’s Natural History of Selborne (published for the first of many times in 1789).  
White opens his “Advertisement” to the letters of Selborne by explaining his conception of 
                                                
 
2 Romantic Natural Histories: William Wordsworth, Charles Darwin, and Others, ed. Ashton Nichols 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004). 
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“parochial history” as consisting of “natural productions and occurrences as well as antiquities,” 
and he urges “stationary men” to “pay some attention to the districts on which they reside” and 
to “publish their thoughts respecting the objects that surround them.”3  Although some of the 
naturalists who published their letters, journals, and observations thereafter expressed 
reservations about the usefulness of their subjective observations of limited areas, most also 
rested their claims to authority upon their regular engagement with the world in their immediate 
vicinity.  In Country Rambles in England, or, The Journal of a Naturalist John Knapp testifies to 
the influence of White’s Selborne on his own confidence in this regard:  “[Selborne] early 
impressed on my mind an ardent love for all the ways and economy of nature, and I was thereby 
led to the constant observance of the rural objects around me. Accordingly, reflections have 
                                                
 
3 Gilbert White, The Natural History of Selborne, (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 3.  “Parochial” 
natural history—practiced without specialized knowledge or terminology—had many advocates during 
this period.  In his 1777 “Essay On the Application of Natural History to Poetry” John Aikin notes that 
his use of the term “naturalist” is not “confined to the adept in systems and proficient in names,” but is 
“intended to comprise every one who surveys natural objects with a searching and distinguishing eye; 
whether he consider them singly, or as parts of a system, whether he call them by their trivial or learned 
appellations.” (Printed by W. Eyres for J. Johnson, 1777), 48. As Theresa M. Kelley and Lynn L. Merrill 
point out in their studies of taxonomies, botanists and naturalists throughout the nineteenth-century made 
a practice of citing both the Linnaean and the “vulgar” or common names of plants and animals, usually 
by presenting the different appellations side by side, and sometimes by attaching indices to the back of 
their texts (Theresa M. Kelley, “Romantic Exemplarity,” in Romantic Science: The Literary Forms of 
Natural History, ed. Noah Heringman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).  Lynn L. 
Merrill, The Romance of Victorian Natural History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)).  Some 
naturalists and poets, however, lobbied for the common names of plants and animals as especially 
evocative in a way systematic taxonomies of naming could never be.  In his 1829 Country Rambles, John 
Knapp praised the “names given of old to plants,” for the soothing effect they might have on the sick: 
“What pleasure it must have afforded the poor sufferer in body or in limb, what confidence he must have 
felt for relief, when he knew that the good neighbor who came to bathe his wounds, or assuage his inward 
torments, brought with him such things as ‘all-heal, break-stone, bruise-wort, gout-weed, fever-few’ . . 
why, their very names would almost charm away the sense of pain!” And while John Clare’s most famous 
defense for using the common names of plants in his poetry was that he thought these best because he 
knew no others, elsewhere in his letters and journals he makes compelling arguments for the identity of 
local plants and flowers as bound up with their local, commonly used names, an issue I take up in chapter 
three. 
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arisen, and notes been made, such as the reader will find them.”4  For Knapp, Selborne leads to a 
love of nature, which leads to a “constant observance” of surrounding objects, which leads 
seamlessly to the spontaneous production of reflections, their inevitable rendering in notes, and 
the reading of these notes by readers who find them.  Knapp thus lightly glosses with an air of 
inevitability a notion of natural history as a material practice that leads to the production of 
literary texts.5   
In practice, field naturalists often split their time between observation and the all-
important collection of specimens, which Anne Larsen defines in “Equipment for the Field” as: 
objects of natural origin that had been prepared in ways that allowed them to be 
examined, compared to similar objects and described in a concise, informative 
manner.  They were manageable pieces of the natural world that could be bought, 
sold, exchanged, transported, catalogued, displayed and consulted by many 
people.  Specimens were not, however, natural objects:  they were artificial things 
designed and constructed by naturalists to answer various scientific needs.6 
 
                                                
 
4 John Knapp, Country Rambles in England, or, The Journal of a Naturalist (Phinney: Buffalo, 1853).  
Digitized by the Canadian Libraries’ Internet Archive, not paginated.  
5 It might seem odd that Knapp’s account of the production of his natural history notes omits a period of 
reflection or systemization, during which the naturalist might be expected to weigh evidence, conduct 
experiments, etc.  However, Knapp’s account is in keeping with the emerging separation in the nineteenth 
century of “field naturalists” (who spent their days combing beaches and woods and describing their 
encounters with natural phenomena) and “closet naturalists” (who spent them indoors, contemplating 
specimens and producing reports).  At least, this is how Georges Cuvier hoped naturalists would see the 
distinction.  Cuvier was dismayed by the tendency of amateur naturalists, or field naturalists, to keep the 
interest of their readers in mind.  He argued that the naturalist (at least, the professional one) had a right to 
bore his readers in the interests of scientific utility.  But as Jean-Marc Drouin and Bernadette Bensaude-
Vincent point out in their essay “Nature for the People,” the textual productions of amateur and 
professional naturalists were typically quite similar.  The work of professional natural historians was as 
likely to contain narratives as the work of popular ones, and popular texts were scarcely less detailed and 
capacious than their professional counterparts.  Despite this similarity in the textual productions of field 
and closet naturalists, the division between them widened as a response to the emergence of professional 
positions for natural historians at museums and universities, and to the rapidly expanding, increasingly 
global field available to naturalists for exploration, which necessitated a division of labour. 
6 Anne Larsen, “Equipment for the Field,” Cultures of Natural History, 358.  Larsen goes on in her article 
to describe the various “guidebooks” for beginners to natural history such as John Lettsom’s Naturalist’s 
and Traveller’s Companion (1774) and Edward Donovan’s Instructions for Collecting and Preserving 
Various Subjects of Natural History (1799) which provide detailed, stomach-churning accounts of how to 
skin and protect small dead animals from putrefaction.   
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Specimen collecting is indeed one of White’s main activities in The Natural History of 
Selborne (readers acquainted with his reputation for benevolence toward all creatures might be 
surprised by the number of death warrants for certain birds that White distributes to his 
neighbours).  White frequently shuttled such specimens, sometimes somewhat “mutilated” (for 
which he apologized) through the mail for the benefit of his correspondents.  Not all natural 
history exchanges were so time-sensitive in this particular regard.  While White and others did 
send decomposing specimens through the mail, they also sent lively accounts of specimens of a 
different sort:  descriptions of encounters with natural phenomena that were differently time-
sensitive. 
 
Something More than Natural:  Natural History as Phenomenology 
A route of evanescence 
With a revolving wheel; 
A resonance of emerald, 
A rush of cochineal; 
And every blossom on the bush 
Adjusts its tumbled head,— 
The mail from Tunis, probably, 
An easy morning's ride.7   
 
Over the course of several years, Emily Dickinson sent the above poem to about six 
different recipients (the poem was sometimes titled, sometimes not).  In two of the letters, she 
prefaces the lines with a short, suggestive query or phrase that offers up the poem as an object or 
specimen of sorts.  For the version she sent to Sarah Tuckermann, she included the question “I 
send you only a Humming Bird—/ Will you let me add a few Jasmin in a few days?”  To Mabel 
                                                
 
7 Numbered 1463 in The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. Johnson (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1961). 
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Todd, she wrote:  “I cannot make an Indian Pipe but please accept a Humming Bird—.”8  Both 
notices play on the poem’s status as the representation of a hummingbird, a bird whose flight—
figured so enigmatically in the poem and in its very name (“humming” bird)—could never make 
it through the mail.  Instead, the hummingbird Dickinson introduces is a live object in motion 
along “A Route of Evanescence / With a revolving wheel—,” its very color (that brilliant 
cochineal) registered as a “rush.”  Dickinson’s poem thus presents not merely the representation 
of an object, but rather a representation of its movement and its lively being.    
As Judith Pascoe explains in the opening chapter of her book A Hummingbird Cabinet:  
A Rare and Curious History of Romantic Collectors, this rare thing—the humming bird in 
motion—was a much coveted object of naturalists in the late eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries.  
Native only to the Americas, hummingbirds had a special allure for British naturalists, who 
usually encountered only their skins, stuffed tight with cotton, sometimes fastened with a bit of 
glue to the stem of a branch for exhibition purposes (the preservation of these skins was itself a 
significant advancement, as Pascoe points out; new practices in taxidermy made it possible).  
The brilliant colors of the stuffed hummingbirds were still bright, but they lacked the 
“Resonance of Emerald” Dickinson describes, created by the reflection of light on a moving 
object (though, in his display for the London Zoological Gardens in 1851, John Gould attempted 
a rotating case of the stuffed birds, hoping that the light might catch their wings as they passed, 
mimicking this effect).  For Pascoe, whose book explores “resonant objects” and cultures of 
collecting during the romantic period, the stuffed hummingbirds that were the stars of nineteenth 
century cabinets epitomize “the romantic pursuit of perfect and permanent beauty . . . intertwined 
with collectors’ materialistic pursuits,” which were realized only in “a diminished fashion—not 
                                                
 
8 Notes to the poem in The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Variorum Edition, ed. R. W. Franklin (Cambridge, 
Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). 
8 
 
levitating in glittery splendor, but stuck on a branch or stiffly prone in a cabinet drawer.”9   
The “stiffly prone” humming bird might seem emblematic not only of collecting practices 
during the romantic period, but also of late eighteenth and nineteenth-century natural history 
practices more widely.  Indeed, with its traditions of cataloguing and display, of categorization 
and accounting, the dead bird is an apt emblem of one kind of natural history during this period, 
but Dickinson’s “rush of cochineal”—the humming bird in motion—is perhaps a figure for a 
different kind.  Unlike forms of natural history that considered the natural world as a set of 
discrete objects and species available for collection and cataloguing, many romantic writers and 
naturalists were interested in cataloguing—through extended written description—unrepeatable 
events and experiences in the natural world.  The flight of the humming bird (ephemerality 
embodied) could not be reproduced, but it could be described, and many romantic writers and 
naturalists (like Dickinson) lingered over these descriptions, carefully recounting the fleeting 
appearance of natural phenomena in specific moments of encounter.  This interest in 
phenomenality can be linked, perhaps, to the transition of romantic natural history from its early 
endeavours to catalogue natural objects  in cabinets of curiosities and to account for the rapidly 
increasing number of known species of plants and animals on earth to a concern with their 
relationships within a system of uncertain bounds.  During this period natural history became, as 
W.J.T. Mitchell puts it, “truly historical for the first time.”10  Like Mitchell, Tilottama Rajan 
links this shift to the discovery of fossils as documents of the history of nature, forms of “animal 
visibility” in Foucault’s words, that introduce “memory into nature, entwining future potential 
                                                
 
9 Judith Pascoe, The Hummingbird Cabinet:  A Rare and Curious History of Romantic Collectors (Ithaca 
and London:  Cornell University Press, 2006), 52. 
10 W.J.T. Mitchell, "Romanticism and the Life of Things: Fossils, Totems, and Images," Critical Inquiry, 
Vol. 28, No. 1 (Autumn, 2001), 175. 
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with the traces of trauma and loss.”11  Naturalists began to gain a sense for the traces of earth’s 
past in its present forms and began reading these forms of “animal visibility” as documents of its 
non-anthropological history.12 
This investment in the history of nature brought with it an appreciation for naturalists’ 
and writers’ own experiences in the field as history:  natural history journals and poems of the 
romantic period read as histories of encounter, careful records of the fleeting appearance of 
particular phenomena in specific, unrepeatable moments that resist categorization.  The 
enthusiasm of Romantic naturalist-writers for these moments is akin to what Rei Terada has 
named, in her recent book Looking Away, "phenomenophilia."  Terada defines phenomenophilia 
as the cultivation of "particularly ephemeral perceptual experiences" that "figure the possibility 
of fleeting relief from the pressure to endorse what Kant calls the world 'as is.'"13  Terada’s 
phenomenophile lingers in object perception, “looking away at something too slight to present a 
demand—some wavering reflection or trick of light” about which one might only say that it is 
“not nothing.”14  Terada’s ideas are applicable to the “looking away” practiced by romantic 
writers and naturalists, who often linger in the space before, or beside, the determination of what 
a particular appearance “really” is, preferring instead the appearance as appearance. In this 
dissertation, I describe a version of romantic natural history that records the perception of natural 
phenomena that seem both unearthly and untimely.  As Dorothy Wordsworth puts it, these 
                                                
 
11 Tilottama Rajan, "Spirit's Psychoanalysis: Natural History, The History of Nature, and Romantic 
Historiography," European Romantic Review Vol. 14 (2003) 189. 
12 For example, Charlotte Smith practices this kind of reading in Beachy Head in her speculation about 
the origins of “the strange and foreign forms / Of sea-shells.”  In lines 370-90 (including a long footnote) 
Smith posits several different possibilities as rhetorical questions, preferring their open-endedness to the 
explanations attempted in the natural history books to which she had access.  Beachy Head, in 
Romanticism: an Anthology, edited by Duncan Wu (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 131-32. 
13 Rei Terada, Looking Away:  Phenomenality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno, (Cambridge and 
London:  Harvard University Press, 2009), 3-4. 
14 Terada, 18. 
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episodes are "something more than natural." 
A memorable instance of phenomenophilia appears in a 1775 letter to naturalist Daines 
Barrington sent by Gilbert White and published in The Natural History of Selborne.  In the letter, 
White recalls a scene he witnessed one late summer day more than thirty years previous.  Despite 
its distance in time, White recalls the scene vividly and at length:   
I rose before daybreak:  when I came into the enclosures, I found the stubbles and 
clover-grounds matted all over with a thick coat of cobweb, in the meshes of 
which a copious and heavy dew hung so plentifully that the whole face of the 
country seemed, as it were, covered with two or three setting-nets drawn one over 
another . . . As the morning advanced the sun became bright and warm . . . About 
nine an appearance very unusual began to demand our attention, a shower of 
cobwebs falling from very elevated regions, and continuing, without any 
interruption, till the close of the day . . . On every side as the observer turned his 
eyes might he behold a continual succession of fresh flakes falling into his sight, 
and twinkling like stars as they turned their sides towards the sun.15   
In the first part of the letter above, White preserves the morning as visual fantasia.  Though he 
acknowledges that the appearance of the land on the morning he remembers is due to an 
unusually heavy preponderance of cobwebs, he emphasizes the scene as a changing spectacle for 
“the observer” by figuring the webs alternately as nets, rain, snow and stars, all glittering in the 
sun on that particular morning; “Neither before nor after was any such fall observed.” He 
reserves the remaining two short paragraphs of the letter for a reflection upon the production of 
gossamer by small spiders that is more in keeping with many of his other letters, but even then 
he cannot help but wonder why the spiders should have taken “that day such a wonderful aerial 
excursion.” Throughout the letter, he “toggles” between a conception of the scene as a glittering 
and wonderful apparition and one as a rare, but explicable, illusion.  The spectacle allows White 
the luxury of dwelling within an unusual appearance, without pressure to resolve or explain it.  
At the same time, White does not strenuously resist his consideration of the small spiders’ whose 
                                                
 
15 Selborne, 175-56. 
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handiwork produced the spectacle.  The two considerations persist beside one another as distinct, 
but equally worthwhile, ways of observing and describing the phenomenon.  In this dissertation, 
I argue that phenomenal appearances invite their observers to experiment with unusual ways of 
observing and describing.  These unusual modes of observation and description afford, in turn, a 
glimpse of the infinite variety of ways of being (and of being a subject) in the world.      
 
Natural History and its Subjects 
This dissertation considers the multiple ‘subjects’ of Romantic natural history: the 
subjects observed, the subjects observing, and the nature of subjectivity itself.  In emphasizing 
the subjects of natural history I take the focus off its objects, its potential objectification of 
nature, and the notion of objectivity itself.  The literary forms of Romantic natural history I read 
in this dissertation instead bring to prominence the challenges of the observing subject and the 
difficulty of defining and describing natural subjects that refuse to stand still or to remain 
constant over time.16  These natural histories stage meetings between observing subjects and 
other nonhuman subjects that have taken up residence in the world.  In considering these 
nonhuman others as themselves actors and subjects, the Wordsworths, Clare, and Thoreau create 
worlds that are not bifurcated along the lines of active subjects and inert, static objects.  At the 
same time, these authors do not collapse the differences between themselves as subjects and the 
subjects they observe.  Their natural histories are still very much about the lives of selves and the 
lives of others—variations on the “privacy of a life in nature” that Thoreau contemplates in “A 
                                                
 
16 I provisionally define a subject in this dissertation as any being, thing, or place capable of asserting 
itself as an individual whose particular history and characteristics prevent its ever being entirely ‘subject’ 
to definition by any other. 
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Natural History of Massachusetts.”17  
What Onno Oerlemanns describes in Romanticism and the Materiality of Nature as the 
central paradox of the Romantic interest in the physical during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries was also a central paradox of natural history:  even as it was “spurred by 
advances in geology, biology, medicine, and travel, it led also to the contrasting awareness that 
the physical world was less comprehensible and more alien than [romantic authors] hoped it 
would be.”18  Conversely, natural history exposed the possibility that our sensory experiences, 
our emotions even, had naturalistic explanations common to all animated nature, a possibility 
that inspired a new sense of community between all beings (think of the human pleasure 
Wordsworth cannot help but see in the birds and twigs around him in “Lines written in early 
spring” and Coleridge’s “one Life within us and abroad”).  But as John Berger points out in his 
essay “Why Look at Animals?” romantic natural history also heralded a new era of animal 
invisibility.  “Until the 19th century,” he writes, “anthropomorphism was integral to the relation 
between man and animal,” but with the disappearance of animals in our daily lives and our 
acceptance of animals as objects apart from ourselves—without spirit, experience, and secrets—
they became increasingly marginalized, increasingly irrelevant.19  In drawing the Romantic 
subject both further from and closer to its natural subjects, various forms of natural history 
                                                
 
17 Privacy is key to the notion of human and non-human subjectivity I will develop in this dissertation.  
The notion that non-human creatures and even landscapes could cultivate privacy may subscribe to an 
anthropomorphic notion of subjectivity, but the varieties of privacy cultivated by these natural subjects, I 
argue, consists in forms of (non)communication, secrecy, and separateness specific to nonhuman others.  
This privacy is different from but related to that described by Pierre Hadot in The Veil of Isis: An Essay 
on the History of the Idea of Nature.  In the essay, Hadot tracks the notion of a hidden or secret nature 
from Heraclitus’ aphorism, “What is born tends to disappear,” through Goethe, who believed that the veil 
of Isis serves not to hide, but to reveal, through a diffusion of transcendental light, the secrets of nature  
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006):  259.     
18 Onno Oerlemans, Romanticism and the Materiality of Nature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2004). 
19 John Berger, “Why Look at Animals?,” About Looking (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 11. 
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became agents of distance and proximity.   
The writers and texts I engage in this study take this paradox as a keystone of their work, 
aiming to engage animals, plants, landscapes and ecosystems that seemed both more and less like 
ourselves than ever before (the more we discovered about the natural world the more we 
discovered our commonalities with it, but these discoveries necessitated the removal of nature 
from ourselves as an object of study and coincided with a period of decreased daily contact with 
nature).  I argue that certain forms of romantic natural history strove to bring nature back into 
prominence for us by highlighting its distance, by emphasizing its most mysterious aspects, and 
by accepting that the terms of our engagement with it cannot be determined entirely by 
ourselves. They do this in part by entertaining the possibility that what we do not know about the 
natural world is key to its continued significance for us:  it pulls us back to it, pursues us, and 
forces an engagement that, in Geoffrey Hartman’s formulation, amounts at times to a “nature 
haunting” akin to that experienced by the boy of The Prelude, who is pursued by “huge and 
mighty Forms” in his dreams the night following his stealing of a boat.  
Focusing on romantic natural objects as potential subjects allows me to develop a reading 
of the romantic “turn to nature,” a movement I believe is neither a simple turn away from the 
problems of culture and history nor always an attempt to track the growth of the self (one’s own 
personal history) in or through nature.  The power and pervasiveness of these readings in 
romantic criticism has generated a conception of nature as either a screen for social concerns or a 
blank space for the formation or projection of the romantic subject/poet, resulting in widespread 
acceptance of Alan Liu’s claim that there is no nature.  While Liu means to refer to the fact that 
the nature of “nature” is culturally constructed, the belief that “there is no nature” also seems to 
betray an insensitivity to the existence of others and to nature as the NOT ME, what Emerson has 
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ranked as “all that is separate from us.”20  In their journals and poems, romantic naturalists 
advance and recede from their object/subjects, recording their successes, failures, and encounters 
with forms of subjectivity no less strange (and active) than their own.  In doing so, they 
necessarily reformulate their own power and significance as acting and observing subjects, and it 
is for this reason, I argue, that their natural histories are also personal histories.   
 
Carriers of Significance:  Nature, History, and Environment 
In broadening the focus of natural history to include personal histories, I deliberately 
open up the potential of the word “natural.”  My attempt to redefine the sense of nature in natural 
history is caught up in attempts by some ecocritics to eliminate the use of nature as a categorical 
term in favour of more precise, or at least less vexed, terms.   Lawrence Buell, for example, 
prefers “literature of the environment” to nature writing, and Angus Fletcher and Timothy 
Morton prefer the “environment poem” and “ambient poetics,” respectively, to nature poetry or a 
poetics of nature.  While I sympathize with their desire to do away with a problematic term and 
to practice ecocriticism and “Ecology Without Nature” (the title of Morton’s book), the idea of 
nature and the province of the natural are as suggestive as they are confounding.   
Robert Pogue Harrison’s conceptualization of nature is perhaps most promising in 
helping reimagine “nature” in relation to natural history.  In an essay on Wallace Stevens, “Not 
Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself,” Harrison proposes that nature refer to the relation 
that emerges through the meeting of sense imagination and phenomenon (thus “nature” is 
                                                
 
20 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Nature,” Emerson’s Prose and Poetry edited by Joel Porte and Saundra Morris 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company: 2001), 28. 
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wherever and whenever this meeting takes place).21  For Harrison, nature is a “correlative 
matrix” and nature is not one term of the correlation, but the correlation itself.  Harrison’s 
specific goal is to identify this as an American form of nature where that correlation is always 
originary (between an American Adam and his Eden), but it resonates more generally for me 
with natural historical practices in which the meeting of sense imagination and phenomena is 
always felt to be in some sense originary (the meeting producing an instance of nature for the 
first and last time).   
Harrison’s account of nature as a correlative matrix, as responsive to and defined through 
meetings of sense imagination with phenomena, resonates with more recent formulations of 
vitality and the environment by theorists including Jane Bennett (whose work I address in the 
second chapter) and Giorgio Agamben.  In The Open:  Man and Animal, Agamben discusses the 
work of early ecologist Jakob von Uexküll, who believes that “[n]o animal can enter into relation 
with an object as such.”22  As I discuss in chapter three (on John Clare’s understanding of 
creatures within distinct literary, historical, and natural contexts), Uexküll believes that no 
animal can enter into any such relation because there is no object as such or even any objectively 
fixed environment.  Instead, Uexküll imagines an infinite variety of perceptual worlds.  Each 
sensing creature has its own perceptual world, which is populated only by those things that are 
“carriers of significance” for it.  These carriers of significance are not “objectively and factically 
isolated, but rather constitute a close functional—or, as Uexküll prefers to say, musical—unity 
with the animal’s receptive organs that are assigned to perceive the mark (Merkogen) and to 
                                                
 
21 Robert Pogue Harrison, “‘Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself,” New Literary History, 30.3 
(1999), 661-73. 
22 Uexküll, quoted in Giorgio Agamben’s The Open:  Man and Animal, translated by Kevin Attell 
(Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2004), 39. 
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react to it (Wirkorgan).”23 
Uexküll’s Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans (a founding text of 
biosemiotics), includes many lengthy descriptive forays into a number of discrete animal worlds.  
In one, Uexküll describes a blind and deaf tick who awaits the arrival of her prey, signalled only 
by her registration of the scent of butyric acid given off by all animals.  For the tick, the scent of 
butyric acid is a carrier of significance.  The precise temperature of mammalian blood, and the 
texture of mammalian skin are others.  These are, in fact, the only significant markers Uexküll 
believes the tick is capable of registering.  Agamben comments that the tick is “united to these 
three elements in an intense and passionate relationship the likes of which we might never find in 
the relations that bind man to his apparently much richer world.  The tick is this relationship; she 
lives only in it and for it.”24  As Uexküll puts it, “[e]very subject spins out, like the spider’s 
threads, its relations to certain qualities of things and weaves them into a solid web, which 
carries its existence.”25   
Directly after his discussion of the tick and its environment (radically constrained in 
perceptual space and time from a human perspective), Uexküll reflects that “we comfort 
ourselves all too easily with the illusion that the relations of another kind of subject to the things 
of its environment play out in the same space and time as the relations that link us to the things 
of our human environment.  This illusion is fed by the belief in the existence of one and only one 
world, in which all living beings are encased.  From this arises the widely held conviction that 
there must be one and only one space and time for all living beings.”26  Despite Uexküll’s belief 
                                                
 
23 The Open, 41. 
24 Ibid., 47. 
25 Jakob von Uexküll, Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans:  with a Theory of Meaning, 
translated by Joseph D. O’Neil (University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 53. 
26 Foray, 54. 
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that all beings exist in separate environments with distinct experiences of space and time, his 
forays into the lives of others (“excursions in unknowable worlds”) demonstrate a willingness, 
even eagerness, to imagine inhabiting these environments and perspectives. 
In a 2011 plenary speech for a conference on “Romanticism and Evolution,” Gillian Beer 
described a similar eagerness on the part of Charles Darwin to imagine a plant’s experience of 
time.27  She referenced, in particular, notes for Darwin’s descriptions of the slow movements of 
tendrils, which he prepared for his study of “The Movements and Habits of Climbing Plants.”  
Beer was particularly taken with Darwin’s thirty-six hour study of the progress of a single tendril 
as it extended out to curl around a post, a progression Darwin painstakingly detailed.  While Beer 
acknowledged that she could not be sure Darwin was present with the plant the entire thirty-six 
hours of its extension, she was nevertheless struck by his incredible and singular act of 
patience—his willingness to “subject himself to the temporality of the plant,” observing its 
unfolding, waiting patiently for its vegetative embrace of the post.  Darwin, Beer memorably 
proposed, “accompanied the plant on its slow process through time.” 
In the following chapters, I track this notion of an observer’s accompaniment of various 
creatures and natural phenomena through time and space.  The challenge to that accompaniment 
arises out of the dissonance of human and nonhuman experiences of the world.   For Agamben, 
this dissonance means that “the fly, the dragonfly, and the bee that we observe flying next to us 
on a sunny day do not move in the same world as the one in which we observe them, nor do they 
share with us—or with each other—the same time and the same space.”28  Despite not sharing 
the same times and spaces, this dissertation suggests that there is nevertheless a sense in which 
                                                
 
27 Gillian Beer, “Plants, Analogy and Perfection:  Loose and Strict Analogies,” Romanticism and 
Evolution Conference, University of Western Ontario, Canada, 12 May, 2011. 
28 The Open, 40. 
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we can accompany one another in the way Beer imagines—an accompaniment that implies as 
little as adjacency or coincidence, and as much as sympathy or love.  If we take the meetings 
between sense imagination and phenomena, between receptive organs and carriers of 
significance, and between individual creatures with others as the “nature” in natural history, then 
natural history becomes, in effect, a record of encounter.29 
Against pervasive formulations of the natural world as a more or less unchanging 
background to our dynamic, human one, the versions of natural history I develop through 
readings of the Wordsworths, Clare, and Thoreau present a continually shifting social, 
environmental, and personal landscape where background and foreground are difficult to 
distinguish.  These natural histories address the problem Sharon Cameron raises in Writing 
Nature of constructing a “history” of poetic images—images that change over time and with the 
perspective of an observer unable to perceive the same subjects in the same way as time passes.30 
I address the extent to which the natural histories of the Wordsworths, Clare, and Thoreau 
attempt to conserve their meetings of subjects as poetic images or as what Saree Makdisi has 
called, with reference to Wordsworth’s spots of time, “imagistic space-times that might . . . 
rescue from the backdrop of a developing landscape those frames or images that defy 
transformation through their ability to remain as images.”31  Though the natural histories I 
describe may catalogue these spots of time with some hope of their preservation, I do not believe 
their projects fit as neatly into conservationist models as Jonathan Bate has suggested in The 
                                                
 
29 According to Timothy Morton, this type of shifting natural history might be considered without nature: 
“Ecological thinking that was not fixated, that did not stop at a particular concretization of its object, 
would…be ‘without nature.’”  Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics 
(Cambridge, Mass:  Harvard University Press, 2007), 24.  
30 Sharon Cameron, Writing Nature: Henry Thoreau’s Journal (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985), 35.  
31 Saree Makdisi, Romantic Imperialism:  Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 49. 
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Song of the Earth.  Over the course of this dissertation, I address the feasibility and value of 
various forms of conservation within the context of the natural histories I develop, which spring 
from meetings of subjects that can never be repeated and may only be partially catalogued, 
recorded, or represented.  
I take my evaluation of the subjects of Romantic natural history as a unique opportunity 
not only to re-imagine the subjectivity of natural objects but also to revisit the Romantic 
observing subject, who has been both celebrated and maligned for his interiority.  As Theresa 
Kelley points out in “Romantic Interiority and Cultural Objects,” Romantic interiority has been 
read negatively “as the guarantor of self-absorption or philosophical solipsism” and positively as 
the guarantor of the “freedom and difference from nature” achieved through the Kantian 
sublime.32  Depending upon our reading of the Kantian sublime and its portrayal in Romantic 
poetry, however, even this “positive” reading fails to redeem Romantic interiority because the 
freedom and difference from nature achieved is at the cost of the subjection of nature:  as 
Frances Ferguson points out, “[t]he sublime . . . established nature as the instrument for the 
production of individuality.”33  In my chapter on Clare especially, I undertake a re-evaluation of 
the role of nature in the sublime production of individuals and subjects, such that nature is not 
conceived as a mere instrument.  This “ecological sublime”34 might indeed be founded upon the 
possibility of natural objects as subjects; the “terror” Burke associated with the sublime may be 
connected to what Stanley Cavell has called the “terror of the independent existence of other 
                                                
 
32 Theresa M. Kelley, “Romantic Interiority and Cultural Objects,” in Romanticism and Philosophy in an 
Historical Age, edited by Karen Weisman (August 1999) for the Romantic Circles Praxis Series, edited 
by Orrin N.C. Wang, web, accessed April 2008. 
33 Frances Ferguson, Solitude and the Sublime (New York, 1992), 130. 
34 Christopher Hitt, “Toward an Ecological Sublime,” New Literary History, 30.3 (1999), 603-23. 
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minds,” whether or not those minds are human.35 
 
The Bird is the Feeling 
In The Country and the City Raymond Williams discusses a shift from what he calls the 
descriptive natural history of Gilbert White and other eighteenth-century naturalists to the rich 
lyricism of the Romantic poets, a shift he believes brought about the “green language” of 
Wordsworth and Clare.  Williams’s emphasis is on the “lonely creative imagination” of the late 
eighteenth century poet, who sets out to transform through “his own natural perception and 
language” nature and man.  In reading a verse of Clare’s on a lark, Williams describes the 
transformation the poet achieves through description as “the investment of nature with a quality 
of creation that is now, in its new form, internal; so that the more closely the object is described, 
the more directly, in a newly working language and rhythm, a feeling of the observer’s life is 
seen and known, and the bird is the feeling, in the created poem.”36  Williams’s description of 
this transformation seems remarkable to me in its elegance and nuance, but it also seems 
unfortunate, presenting the bird as useful for little more than giving the poet back an image of 
himself.  
Despite my reservations about this aspect of Williams’s argument, I remain invested in 
green language conceived somewhat differently—in the idea of a “newly working language and 
rhythm,” as Williams puts it, that might simultaneously evoke the life of a bird and the life of a 
feeling while avoiding the use of the bird as merely another disposable natural resource.  This 
dissertation explores how the bird’s depiction in that green language might convey less a feeling 
                                                
 
35 Stanley Cavell, quoted in Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and 
Posthumanist Theory (University of Chicago Press, 2003), 4.  
36 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1973), 133-34. 
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of the observer’s life than a feeling of the shared, but dissonant, experience of life between bird 
and poet in a moment of fleeting encounter.  
  
Chapters 
My first chapter, “‘A love for things that have no feeling’:  Dorothy Wordsworth’s 
Significant Others,” develops a theory of love as an ethical relation to human and nonhuman 
others.  In readings of the Alfoxden and Grasmere journals, I explore the various ways in which 
Wordsworth is responsive to objects and things that seem to distinguish themselves to her, 
standing out from their surroundings to catch her attention as individuals worthy of careful and 
extended engagement.  Through the terms of this engagement, a tree is not simply an elm tree 
but what she calls “a creature by its own self”; a waterfall not only stands “upright by itself,” but 
also is “its own self.”  Drawing on the post-humanist discourse of authors including Donna 
Haraway, I identify these objects and things in Wordsworth’s work as “significant others.”  I also 
propose that Wordsworth’s work is less about fixity or even the conservation of experience, as 
some readers have claimed, than it is about the evolution of ethical relationships between beings 
that are inter-subjectively constituted.  In this chapter I bring the aesthetic and natural historical 
discourses of the Romantic period into conversation with current post-humanist and ecocritical 
ones, illuminating the ways in which Dorothy shapes herself as a writing subject in relation to 
nonhuman others.   
 William Wordsworth’s relation to a world he peoples largely with “rocks, and stones 
and trees” is the concern of a chapter entitled, “The Influence of Natural Objects:  Wordsworth 
and the Poetry of Nature.”  In readings of the two-part Prelude and poems from Lyrical Ballads, 
I consider the status of objects, things, animals, and immaterial natural phenomena such as 
echoes and reflections in Wordsworth’s poetry.  Wordsworth’s own emphasis on the accidental 
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nature of these things—their role as everyday, “collateral objects,” quotidian and unremarkable 
parts of experience—might seem to suggest that the objects themselves are insignificant or 
interchangeable.  However, while the objects and things that play roles in his poetry are not 
always remarkable in themselves, they are nevertheless vital, affective agents with the ability to 
speak to the poet through the passage of time, doubling and redoubling their affective power and 
vitality.  Drawing on the complexity of Wordsworth’s treatment of agency, subjectivity, and 
responsiveness with regard to nonhuman creatures and things, I develop a reading of what 
political theorist Jane Bennett might call “vital materiality” in Wordsworth’s work.  Against 
readings of Wordsworth’s work that focus on the steady ascent of Wordsworth’s imagination 
over natural objects, I engage moments in the poetry that dwell upon communications from the 
natural world that playfully engage, trouble, and disturb the poet as they miss their mark, fail to 
be transmitted, or are deeply reticent of interpretation.   
My third chapter, “Shadows of Taste:  John Clare’s Tasteful Natural History” argues that 
John Clare’s distinctive form of natural history is based upon a nuanced understanding of the 
tastes and instincts of creatures within shifting contexts and upon their presentation by a 
naturalist-poet Clare refers to in his poetry and natural history letters as the “man of taste.”  My 
discussion differs from much work by Clare scholars inspired by John Barrell’s The Idea of 
Landscape and the Sense of Place, and it also extends, complicates, and departs from ecocritical 
readings that foreground Clare’s rooted sense of self and place.  Instead, I emphasize Clare’s 
sense of the fluidity of human and nonhuman subjects,  arguing that “taste,” for Clare, concerns 
the sublime adaptation and persistence of literary and ecological communities through time, a 
“joyous heritage” of change in which all creatures share.   
In my final chapter, “Natural History in a New Sense,” I read Henry David Thoreau’s 
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early natural history writing—including “The Natural History of Massachusetts” and A Week on 
the Concord and Merrimack Rivers—as an effort to come to terms with his brother’s death and 
to imagine the place of loss in natural histories of multi-layered time scales.  I read the Week, in 
particular, as an attempt to weave together varied personal, national, anthropological and 
ecological histories that, despite unfolding along different timelines, are all a part of the evolving 
fabric of natural history.  Together with readings of loss in Emerson’s essay “Experience” and 
Wordsworth’s sonnet “The world is too much with us,” this chapter explores environmental 
losses that are equally difficult to recognize and adequately experience.  
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CHAPTER 1 
“A love for things that have no feeling:”  Dorothy Wordsworth’s Significant Others 
 
 
 
I would not circumscribe your love 
 Dorothy Wordsworth, “Loving & Liking: Irregular Verses  
  Addressed to a Child”37 
 
 
Because truths we don’t suspect have a hard time 
making themselves felt, as when thirteen species  
of whiptail lizards composed entirely of females 
stay undiscovered due to bias 
against such things existing, 
we have to meet the universe halfway.  
Nothing will unfold for us unless we move toward what  
looks to us like nothing:  faith is a cascade. 
  Alice Fulton, “Cascade Experiment”38 
 
The speaker of Dorothy Wordsworth’s poem “Loving & Liking:  Irregular Verses 
Addressed to a Child,” “would not preach . . . Yet would . . . give some plain directions, / To 
guide your speech and your affections” (ll. 2-3). These directions concern the distinction we 
should make between “loving” the creatures we look at and “liking” the creatures we eat, but the 
larger concern of the poem is the bounds of love, which the speaker steadfastly refuses to draw:  
“I would not circumscribe your love,” she says: 
It may soar with the eagle and brood with the dove 
May pierce the earth with the patient mole 
                                                
 
37 Dorothy Wordsworth, “Loving and Liking: Irregular Verses Addressed to a Child,” in Dorothy 
Wordsworth and Romanticism, edited by Susan M. Levin (Jefferson, North Carolina:  McFarland and 
Company, 2009).  Levin notes that William published the poem in 1832, 1835, and 1836, and dated its 
composition 1832.  Levin presents a working copy of the poem from Dorothy’s Commonplace Book, as 
well as the version presented in this chapter, which was published in 1836 with “Poems Founded on the 
Affections.”    
38 Alice Fulton, “Cascade Experiment,” Powers of Congress (Sarabande Books, 2001). 
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Or track the hedgehog to his hole 
Loving & liking are the solace of life 
They foster all joy, & extinguish all strife. (ll. 50-54) 
The boundlessness of this love, I believe, reflects the natural history Dorothy develops in her 
Alfoxden and Grasmere journals.  This form of natural history describes without circumscribing 
a series of appearances that are rarely classifiable and often something “more than natural.”  I 
will begin by tracing out what Mary Ellen Bellanca has called a “lost context” for the journals—
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century cultures of natural history—and then discuss the 
ways in which Wordsworth’s natural history is both more expansive and more peculiar than 
these. 
I am particularly interested in investigating the ways in which Dorothy’s writing is not 
simply about nature, but is suffused by a concern to elaborate a polite relation to the environment 
that does not depend upon the static being of discrete living creatures or even upon herself as a 
static human subject.  Instead, hers is “[a] love for things that have no feeling,” things that invite 
and sustain her attention through natural accidents that reveal them as other-worldly, something 
more than the sum of the parts that have distinguished them, including light, wind, and 
geographical situation.   
Though Wordsworth’s life and writing have long been spoken of as relational (built upon 
her relationships to Grasmere, to William, to human neighbours and vagrants, and upon the 
physical relation of her body to the earth in walking and to house-hold objects during house-hold 
chores), few critics have considered her relationships to particular trees, sheep, and other natural 
appearances as meaningful in themselves.  Although romanticists including Susan Levin and 
Anne Mellor have spoken of Wordsworth’s construction of herself as a subject in relation to the 
world generally and critics including Elizabeth Fay and John Worthen have written at length on 
the relation of her writing to William’s and Coleridge’s work, Dorothy’s relationship to her 
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environment—one that exhibits a finely developed environmental consciousness—has too rarely 
been specifically analyzed outside the discourse of the picturesque and sublime, despite general 
agreement that Wordsworth’s writing is not at its best when it most clearly strives to evoke these 
categories.  Moreover, despite the prominence of nonhuman creatures and things in the journals, 
critical conversation tends to pool largely around Wordsworth’s homemaking, her relationship to 
her brother, and the marriage plot of the Grasmere journal, edging out Dorothy’s attention to 
birds, trees, sheep, and other nonhuman phenomena.  I am interested in the ways Dorothy 
designates these things within the Grasmere landscape as what Donna Haraway has called 
“significant others.”  Drawing on a variety of psychoanalytic, post-human, and vital materialist 
discourses,  I read Dorothy Wordsworth’s remarkable ways of looking as an ethical praxis she 
might refer to as “love.”   
 
The Naturalist’s Eye 
In Daybooks of Discovery, a study of eighteenth and nineteenth century nature diaries, 
Mary Ellen Bellanca points to the characteristics Wordsworth’s journals share with “natural 
history writing and topographical works; with poetry, science primers, and other books by 
women interested in botany; and with other nature diaries.”39  These characteristics include a 
“fascination with the facticity of nature” that asserts itself in startlingly matter-of-fact prose; a 
careful recording of what living things do, or simply are; an itemization of particular things seen 
in the field; and an unceasing interest in the weather and seasonal change.  Perhaps most 
helpfully, Bellanca points out that Dorothy’s validation and celebration of the quotidian is of a 
piece with the forms of natural history popular at the time.  Most notably, Gilbert White called 
                                                
 
39 Mary Ellen Bellanca, Daybooks of Discovery:  Nature Diaries in Britain, 1170-1870, (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2007) 109. 
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upon “stationary men” to “pay some attention to the districts on which they reside[d],” and 
hoped, with The Natural History of Selborne, to induce his readers to “pay a more ready 
attention to the wonders of the Creation, too frequently overlooked as common occurrences.”40 
The detail of Dorothy’s journals and the vigour of her descriptive prose also, some would 
say primarily, served to feed her brother’s poetry—a process through which the common 
occurrences Dorothy describes are converted or revealed as wonders of William’s creation.  In 
Becoming Wordsworthian Elizabeth Fay describes this tandem composition as one through 
which Dorothy’s “collection of details and words, impressions, and rhythms feeds William’s 
imagination; when he rereads the journals, the literal helps him imagine what Dorothy saw in his 
absence or what he did not notice.  He then turns the literal into the abstract . . . ”41  Fay 
describes Dorothy’s entries as “disturbingly particular, “ and “oddly objective,” but the language 
she uses to describe the material Dorothy provides her brother—a “collection of details and 
words, impressions, and rhythms”—gives away its necessarily subjective, if not abstract, 
character.  Like all naturalists, Dorothy is the curator of the details she presents:  her entries are a 
“collection” of appearances and occurrences depicted in words that, despite their simplicity, bear 
the fine impress of those appearances upon an observer’s mind and echo in the rhythm of 
language the rhythm of the walks Dorothy, her brother, and Coleridge took together as they 
talked, observed, and worked.  Thus, between the surface “literalness” of Dorothy’s journal 
entries and the abstraction of her brother’s poems, there is space for creative play. 
The particular mode of seeing and collecting detail valued by Dorothy echoes that of 
natural historians following Gilbert White.  It required neither a Claude glass nor a microscope, 
                                                
 
40 Selborne, 3. 
41 Elizabeth Fay, Becoming Wordsworthian:  A Performative Aesthetic (Amherst: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1995), 206. 
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but instead searched openly and broadly for whatever might catch and keep its notice, whether it 
be a particular flower or a pattern in the clouds.  The very first entry of the Alfoxden Journal 
begins with this mode of seeing and documenting: 
Alfoxden, 20th January 1798.  The green paths down the hill-sides are channels for 
streams.  The young wheat is streaked by silver lines of water running between 
the ridges, the sheep are gathered together on the slopes.  After the wet dark days, 
the country seems more populous.  It peoples itself in the sunbeams. The garden, 
mimic of spring, is gay with flowers.  The purple-starred hepatica spreads itself in 
the sun, and the clustering snow-drops put forth their white heads, at first upright, 
ribbed with green, and like a rosebud when completely opened, hanging their 
heads downwards, but slowly lengthening their slender stems.  The slanting 
woods of an unvarying brown, showing the light through the thin net-work of 
their upper boughs…42 
Writing on this passage, Sarah Zimmerman notes the roving eye of the observer, and Dorothy’s 
arrangement of the scene in paragraph form.  Zimmerman associates this arrangement with the 
picturesque mode, but the passage is more characteristic of the field naturalist’s assortment of 
objects and observations in a text that concerns a particular locale.  Both Gilbert White and John 
Knapp begin their natural history letters and journals with an opening prospect of their 
hometowns.  And while, as Zimmerman says, arrangement of the prospect requires Dorothy’s 
“authorial distance from the objects of her attention,”43 almost every detail she remarks upon 
also implies her close and sustained familiarity with the landscape and the particular objects 
mentioned in the scene.  Such familiarity is a requirement of the type of Romantic natural history 
initiated by White’s Selborne.  The give-away of the speaker’s embeddedness in the scene she 
describes is the cottage garden, which appears mid-way through the section, apparently just 
beneath her feet, from which she can get a view of the hills and, more minutely, of the white 
                                                
 
42 Dorothy Wordsworth, Dorothy Wordsworth:  The Grasmere and Alfoxden Journals, edited by Pamela 
Woof (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2002).  
43 Sarah Zimmerman, Romanticism, Lyricism and History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1999), 125. 
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heads of the snow-drops in the garden.  We are also subtly cued into Wordsworth’s long-
standing familiarity with the scene she describes by her astute rendering of this particular 
seasonal period, one that is not yet spring, but a “mimic” of it as the atmosphere transitions out 
of the “wet dark days” preceding it.   Just as Dorothy’s familiarity with the landscape has earned 
her the freedom to look alternately between far objects and near ones, her familiarity with the 
place over time allows her to look backwards and forwards through the seasons, and to sense in 
the present notes of what has been and what is yet to come. 
The freedom to play with appearances, mingling the familiar and the unexpected, the 
literal and the abstract, is one that John Worthen suggests may have been opened up through 
Coleridge’s and Dorothy’s mutual interest in the relationships between natural history, 
observation, and figurative language.  As Worthen observes in The Gang:  Coleridge, the 
Hutchinsons & the Wordsworths in 1802, Dorothy’s journals were a portion of the larger poetic 
project of Coleridge and William, which coalesced as an inter-mixture of the natural and 
supernatural in their Lyrical Ballads, but which was built upon innumerable walks, 
conversations, and correspondences to which Dorothy was integral.44  How to treat scientific or 
naturalistic knowledge was a concern they all shared.  Coleridge, in hoping to “improve [his] 
stock of metaphors” by attending lectures on chemistry and physiology, may at first have shared 
the opinion of John Aikin (to whose Monthly Magazine Coleridge contributed).45  Aikin argued 
in his 1777 “Essay on the Application of Natural History to Poetry” that the “insipidity of 
Modern Poetry” was owed largely to its authors’ lack of interest in and knowledge about the 
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natural world, whose animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms (especially the animal kingdom, 
he believed), might “afford matter for pleasing and even sublime speculation . . . give animation 
to the objects around them; and, viewed in comparison with human kind . . . suggest amusing 
and instructive lessons.”46  Before 1797 and 1798, Coleridge’s entries did indeed include 
observations of nature culled to “suggest amusing and instructive lessons” regarding human 
kind.  These were composed in zen-like metaphorical quips, through which “owls that wake all 
night to catch mice” were impressed into service as “[m]en anxious for this world.”47   
But around the same time Dorothy began her first journal, Worthen observes, Coleridge’s 
notebooks began to include “genuine observations of the natural world.”48  Worthen quotes one 
such entry, which Coleridge made in early spring, 1798:  “The subtle snow in every breeze rose 
curling from the Grove, like pillars of cottage smoke.”  In its attention to a particular natural 
event—to the action of wind on snow and its relation to another homely appearance—this entry 
seems closer in spirit to Dorothy’s Alfoxden Journal than it does to some of Coleridge’s other 
entries and the work of other Romantic naturalist poets, such as Charlotte Smith, whose poems 
on animals and insects are highly humanistic.  Eschewing arguments regarding the directionality 
of influence, Worthen concludes, at the least, that Dorothy’s “Journal was conceived as her own 
exemplary account of how to look at the world.”49  Coleridge’s well-known appraisal of Dorothy 
as a “perfect electrometer,” whose information was “various” and whose eye was “watchful in 
minutest observation of nature,” indicates his impression of the subtlety of her responsiveness to 
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the astonishing variety of things she encountered.50  One gets the sense that, while Coleridge 
looked on their walks for the material of metaphor and Wordsworth walked, lost in composition, 
Dorothy walked with the attention of one who expects to meet some—though not some 
particular—thing.  
 
A Natural History of Encounter 
Because Dorothy did not expect to meet something in particular, the things she did meet 
were always unexpected, and sometimes inexplicable.  They were often things as simple and 
unrepeatable as the appearance of a reflection of light on water.  On an August evening in 1800 
recorded in the Grasmere Journal, for example, John and Dorothy separated from their brother, 
William, who was composing, and walked further on: 
We walked over the hill by the firgrove.  I sate upon a rock & observed a flight of 
swallows gathering together high above my head they flew towards Rydale.  We 
walked through the wood over the stepping stones . . . We had a very fine walk by 
the gloomy lake.  There was a curious yellow reflection in the water, as of corn 
fields—there was no light in the clouds from which it appeared to come.51 
Dorothy’s slight narrative trajectory suggests, despite the fact that the party originally set off to 
Rydale for letters, that John and Dorothy were pulled toward Rydale by the swallows, and were 
rewarded for following them by the “curious yellow reflection” without a source, an appearance 
that is as inexplicable as it is unrepeatable.  The mildness of the entry, like most of those in the 
journals, indicates a willingness that the event remain unexplained.  It is simply recorded.  
Indeed, Dorothy’s expectations in the field were not quite the same as the professional or even 
recreational expectations of the 18th-century field naturalist, who might set out each day in 
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anticipation of gaining some particular new knowledge about the world.  With respect to what 
she wished to see and what she wished to report, Dorothy makes no note.  Her walks are instead 
often purposive in unrelated ways:  they are made to get the mail (as above), to gather sticks, or 
to accompany Coleridge, her brother, or a visitor.  In the retrospective space of the journals, the 
accomplishment or disappointment of these tasks receives some note, but the daily entries 
evidently exist, nevertheless, to record the accomplishment, or disappointment, of meetings with 
unexpected creatures, events, and turns in the weather.  It is Dorothy’s openness to meeting these 
phenomena half-way (using her attention and perspective to engage them), that allows her to 
create a natural history of encounters that is determined by the relationship of subjects and 
objects over time, where those subjects and objects are not pre-determined entities.  On March 
1st, 1798, for example, Dorothy records in her Alfoxden Journal  the curious relationship of the 
“shapes” of things over the course of a morning: 
We rose early.  A thick fog obscured the distant prospect entirely, but the shapes 
of the nearer trees and the dome of the wood dimly seen and dilated.  It cleared 
away between ten and eleven.  The shapes of the mist, slowly moving along, 
exquisitely beautiful; passing over the sheep they almost seemed to have more of 
life than those quiet creatures.52 
Here, over the course of several hours, a landscape’s inhabitants shift and change, come and go.  
The shapes of the trees and the “dome of the wood” stand out in relief against an obscured 
background.  Their presence as distinguishable objects in the foreground allows Dorothy to 
decipher that the mist is composed of discrete “shapes” as well, shapes that in their lively 
contrast with and proximity to the sheep, take on and even outshine the creatureliness of those 
sheep.  The relationships of shapes in the scene—the trees, the wood, the mist, the sheep—
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determine those shapes and also determine how Dorothy sees and describes their evolution 
through time as they slowly move and clear away. 
Precisely through their evolving relationships to one another, these very different 
elements (wood, air, moisture, mammal) come to be distinct shapes:  they take up space in the 
world; they move and change; they capture the attention of a viewer.  In Dorothy’s radical 
natural history, these “shapes” take on the individual character and significance of active 
subjects, without taking on the traditional characteristics associated with the subject in Western 
philosophy—subjects who are free, autonomous, self-sovereign, rational and, most of all, human.  
Instead, subjects in Dorothy’s natural history exist through their relationships to one another.  
Dorothy, like these other subjects, designates or describes spaces for their interaction.  In 
contemporary terms, these spaces and systems of relationality might be called “ecosystems,” but 
even that term seems to undercut the capaciousness of Dorothy’s particular form of ecology, 
which takes into account not only living creatures, whom we might call after animal rights 
philosopher Timothy Regan, “subjects-of-a-life,” but also non-living phenomena that move with 
and affect the world of appearances as surely as do their living, animate counterparts. 
To consider objects and non-living things as subjects might strain both metaphysical and 
aesthetic boundaries, but this is clearly a project Dorothy engages in the journals, which are alive 
to the possibilities of chance, perspective, and the uncanny.  Her writing reveals an abundant 
faith in the significance of the world of appearances; what might look like nothing to others is 
revealed in her writing as a rapidly changing environment that loses itself as quickly as it is 
formed.  She records its natural history—even when that history is nothing more, and nothing 
less, than the relationship of shapes as she witnesses it. 
 
Describing Relations to Significant Others 
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Many readers have noticed the extent to which Dorothy formulates herself as a subject in 
relation to other entities and have admired and spoken eloquently about her writing of 
relatedness without necessarily regarding it eco-critically.  In particular, Anne Mellor in 
Romanticism and Gender has theorized the difference between William’s construction of a 
disembodied, poetic self “rendered possible . . . only by the arduous repression of the Other in all 
its forms,” and Dorothy’s “self writing,” through which an embodied self that is “interactive, 
absorptive, constantly changing, and domestic” is produced in profound connection to its 
environment.53  But we might pursue the nature of this profound connection more rigorously if 
we are willing to take seriously not only Dorothy’s “self writing,” but also her attempts to 
elaborate the peculiar self-hood of nonhuman others and even non-living others and phenomena 
that come about as a compound effect of light, air, and matter.  On May 4th, 1802, for example, 
Dorothy and William walk towards a waterfall:  “It is a glorious wild solitude under that lofty 
purple crag.  It stood upright by itself.  Its own self & and its shadow below, one mass—all else 
was sunshine.”54  Here, again (as in the passage about the shapes of trees and mist, above), 
Dorothy distinguishes the waterfall and its shadow as a discrete thing:  a “mass” in relation to 
“all else” in the scene.  The effect of sunlight and shadow on Dorothy’s observation is the 
appearance of a mass that is “its own self” in relation to everything else.  The slight difficulty of 
designating the referent for “it” throughout the passage seems deliberate.  The anomalous 
appearance that is its own self is not quite crag, not quite waterfall, not quite shadow, not even 
“solitude;”  conditions conspire, along with Dorothy’s perspective, to highlight and differentiate 
                                                
 
53 Anne K. Mellor, Romanticism and Gender (London:  Routledge, 1993), 156.  In the chapter following 
this one, on William Wordsworth, I challenge Mellor’s characterization of William’s poetic self, 
suggesting that he goes to great lengths to engage, rather than to repress, nonhuman others within his 
environment. 
54 Grasmere and Alfoxden Journals, 95. 
35 
 
a suddenly distinct and singular figure from its background even when that figure is not 
nameable. 
Filmmaker Werner Herzog has commented upon the “mysterious stardom” of such 
phenomena with reference to scenes from his film Grizzly Man that stand out with sharp and 
unusual distinction despite not featuring either Timothy Treadwell, the “grizzly man,” or any 
grizzlies.  Herzog saved these scenes from hundreds of hours of footage shot by Treadwell.  He 
comments that, in many cases, they seem to have been captured simply because Treadwell left 
his camera on too long, having forgotten to turn it off.  One of the most memorable of these 
scenes presents a group of long grasses on a rainy day, battered intermittently by strong and 
unpredictable gusts of wind.  Similarly, Dorothy’s journals seem to be the result of an eye that 
never closes, and of a commitment to present even the most quietly inscrutable scenes she 
witnesses.  The world of Dorothy’s journals is peopled by animated flora, wind-blown banks of 
trees, and flocks of sheep, and the passages quoted most from the journals have that unplanned-
for stardom:  a kind of critical impenetrability that nevertheless invites—even insists upon—our 
rapt and patient attention in part because of their inscrutableness.  In reading Dorothy’s spare 
descriptive passages, our experience is reminiscent of the experience Dorothy describes of 
meeting and engaging nonhuman phenomena.  The reader or observer in each case is, in a certain 
sense, star-struck.  This may explain why these passages of the journals are almost universally 
praised by readers, but left curiously untouched.  Much critical discussion of particularly 
enigmatic passages from the journals slips into rapt restatement and paraphrasing and then, 
respectfully, refrains from further inquiry or turns to passages of the Grasmere Journal in which 
interactions between humans are described.   
However, we need not read only those passages concerning humans in Dorothy’s journals 
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to get a sense of the particular kinds of sociality she develops through her descriptions of the 
land around the Wordsworth cottage.   That “description” includes both her daily walks as 
“descriptions” of the terrain and her written “descriptions” of those walks in the journals.  Both 
varieties of description—the kinetic and the literary—designate significant others without 
circumscribing the boundaries of what those others can do and be.  What might seem to be 
limiting activities and attempts to circumscribe the boundaries of a domestic space by walking 
the same trails day after day and writing about roughly the same activities, are in fact attempts to 
engage the world on its own terms, looking for difference in what might appear to an impatient 
eye to be sameness, and inviting that difference into an ever-expanding and permeable domestic 
sphere that is designated not by four walls or even a series of familiar walking pathways, but by 
a congenial openness to the unexpected.  Thus Dorothy’s writing and walking do not so much 
“affirm a unity of interest and experience . . . by confirming boundaries,” as Robin Jarvis 
suggests in Romantic Writing and Pedestrian Travel, as they continually look for ways of 
opening experience and its boundaries up, tracing the outlines between the external and the 
internal, the alien and the familiar.55  
In “Dorothy Wordsworth: Grounds of Writing,” Meena Alexander is concerned to 
explore how “[Wordsworth’s] sense of her own body might have required her to frame the 
landscape in a certain fashion, to suggest how gender might be constitutive in what she saw.”56  
Alexander points out, first, that Dorothy often walked behind William and Coleridge when the 
trio walked together, and that their conversation would float back to her without the necessity of 
her participation.  She also contrasts the energy of William’s walking with Dorothy’s own.  For 
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Alexander, William’s walking is characterized by its tendency to crowd out perception in favour 
of creation.  Famous for composing while walking, William pushes aside Nature to make room 
for his poetic creations, and to “[cross] out what came first” as he crosses the ground, marking it 
with his footsteps and cancelling Nature’s status as “originative existence.”  Taking up Derrida’s 
reading of Freud, Alexander calls William’s “demonic” walk “pathbreaking:”  an activity 
through which “[w]hat exists must be cut through, crossed out, so that with the track of 
difference, meaning can come into play.”57  William’s walk and his composition, as Alexander 
describes it, is thus jointly destructive and creative, and both these actions serve the psyche and 
act as assertions of the freedom of the poetic imagination.   
Dorothy’s walks, Alexander points out, do not assert the self so strongly.  Alexander 
reads Dorothy’s walks as “escape routes, covert flights from the societal bounds set upon her 
domestic being;” they are “an edge of freedom from domestic and psychic enclosures.”58  At the 
same time, Alexander believes that Dorothy is compelled by an innately feminine need to find 
shelter outside the home, safe places to ride out storms and retreat from “the burden of a social 
self, female and irremediably subsidiary to her brother’s authorship.”59  Ultimately, Alexander 
does not believe that Dorothy’s walks in nature, her relationship with William, and the cottage at 
Grasmere provide her with a firm ground for writing and describes Dorothy’s later madness as 
“groundlessness.” 
I view Dorothy’s “flights” from the cottage somewhat differently.  I believe Dorothy 
envisioned her project in the journals as part of, but distinct from, William’s project.  Because 
the image of Dorothy at William and Coleridge’s heels presented by Alexander stands out so 
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vividly within her article, we may forget in reading it that Dorothy frequently walked alone and 
that even when she did walk with William, she often departed from him so he could compose 
and she could continue walking, a physical enactment of the split in their endeavours.60  While it 
seems clear that what Virginia Woolf described as the “one being” of Dorothy + Nature + 
William did not provide Dorothy with the grounds of her writing (as, perhaps, it did for 
William), I think we can view Dorothy’s walking and her writing as distinct from, though part 
of, that “one being.”   
The Grasmere Journal had its beginning in May 1800 with Dorothy’s desire to “give 
Wm pleasure,” upon returning from a trip to visit Mary at Gallow Hill with John.   The decision 
to write takes its form as a resolution:  “I resolved to write a journal of the time till W & J return, 
& I set about keeping my resolve because I will not quarrel with myself, & because I shall give 
Wm Pleasure by it when he comes home again.”61  The opening entry is emblematic of the 
Grasmere Journal as a whole, as the opening entry of the Alfoxden Journal is of that series of 
reflections.  Both tell us something about the balance of description and detail in that particular 
journal, and hint at the roles of persons and things in each.  The Alfoxden Journal memorably 
begins with a lush, detailed description of the landscape, whereas the Grasmere Journal begins 
with the above statement of purpose, a lament upon John and William’s departure, an account of 
the flowers growing in the wood, and a mention of two women she encountered separately that 
day.  This mixture of reflection, declaration, and description is characteristic of the Grasmere 
Journal, as is the attention it pays to both persons and things. 
Dorothy’s resolution to write her journal during William’s absence is a lure for many 
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readers, one that tends to provoke readings of the journal as primarily “for” William.  These 
readings are often helpful in elaborating the joint labour of writing in the Wordsworth household, 
and in teasing out their larger poetic and domestic projects.  Nevertheless, Dorothy in fact makes 
the resolution for herself.  Indeed, there is something delightfully resistant about Dorothy’s 
resolution and the entry as a whole.  The entry is propelled not so much by Dorothy’s resolve to 
give William pleasure as it is not to “quarrel” with herself; Dorothy resolves to resist resistance 
and keep a journal of her days.  Shunting aside her quarrelling self, the resolution manifests itself 
in the curious absence of a self-reflective voice throughout the journal.  This continues the 
transparent narration of the Alfoxden Journal, but it also introduces the narrator as a split self, 
capable of division and also capable of choosing not to recognize itself as such.  I believe this 
may be the foundation for Dorothy’s success as an environmental writer.  The self who 
quarrels—the reflective, the self-critical, the posturing self—is summarily dismissed from the 
journal and in her place is a perceiver with a mysterious, sometimes stubborn tendency not to 
think or write herself through descriptions of the natural world.  The first entry begins: 
May 14 1800 [Wednesday].  Wm & John set off into Yorkshire after dinner at ½ 
past 2 o’clock—cold pork in their pockets.  I left them at the turning of the Low-
wood bay under the trees.  My heart was so full that I could hardly speak to W 
when I gave him a farewell kiss.  I sate a long time upon a stone at the margin of 
the lake, & after a flood of tears my heart was easier.  The lake looked to me I 
knew not why dull and melancholy, the weltering on the shores seemed a heavy 
sound.62 
The first part of this opening—Dorothy’s description of William and John’s departure and her 
subsequent sadness—is straightforward.  Though Dorothy did not often describe her emotional 
states so explicitly, the stark loneliness, the fullness of heart, and even the flood of tears seem 
natural here.  The turn in the passage comes only in the last sentence, in the four words “I knew 
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not why.”  To any reader of sensibility or of William and Coleridge, it seems clear that the 
reason the lake looked dull and melancholy to Dorothy is that she herself was dull and 
melancholy owing to the departure of her brothers.  Yet, Dorothy resists this reading of the 
scene.  It is that resistance that makes her a particularly effective environmental writer and that 
propels her approach to the nonhuman world.  Resisting a reading of the natural world that 
simply gives her back herself, Dorothy is open to the potential oddity of environmental 
experience and to the non-identity of nature with herself. 
In “Unspeakable Weather, or the Rain Romantic Constatives Know,” Anne-Lise François 
reflects upon the paratactic lists of Dorothy’s journal entries, in which “weather conditions that 
might normally be experienced as iterative, continuous states of being—the moon shining on the 
water—acquire the ‘finished feeling’ of datable, completed, non-repeatable actions.”63  François 
also remarks upon the “absence of any deictic shifters cotemporal with a protagonist’s 
consciousness,” and “the absence of all explicit emotive address, appeal to or demand made on a 
second person:  they show no interest in engaging in argument, in making their report the basis 
for a debatable claim or the beginning of a story or conversation.”64  Indeed, it is that absence of 
an interest in making a debatable claim that may enable another feature of Dorothy’s writing 
upon which François remarks:  the way in which the entries sustain a sense “of the ordinariness 
or naturalness of  . . . close nonrelation by the acuity with which they sometimes note the 
disjuncture between simultaneous, coincident experiences of the natural world.”65  Dorothy notes 
this disjuncture by not remarking upon it at all, by instead simply putting alongside one another 
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the “simultaneous, coincident” experiences she describes.  She rarely provides any connective 
tissue in these paratactic lists, eschewing even minimal assertions of cause and effect, of 
difference and sameness, or of any relationship at all.  This is true not only of her remarks upon 
the weather, but also upon her remarks regarding her own mood, which receive the same 
treatment François describes (they, too, “acquire the ‘finished feeling’ of datable, completed, 
non-repeatable actions”).  We can therefore come away from the journals feeling that Dorothy 
has endeavoured to communicate very little about herself and her own internal states even 
though her entries are littered with references to her mood (“I was afraid of being disappointed,” 
“I was quite out of spirits,” etc.). 
If Dorothy’s journals do not assert herself strongly, they do nevertheless render a  self in 
relation to many others.  Dorothy’s perspective informs every aspect of the journals without 
seeming to be its sole or even necessarily central subject.  Just as she is able to survey the 
landscape and distinguish within it multiple points of interest, multiple centers for reflection and 
orientation, she is also able to see herself within a larger human and nonhuman community 
whose members are variously engaged with one another.  In both the Alfoxden Journal and the 
Grasmere Journal, Dorothy sketches individuals within intersecting communities.  She is 
concerned to identify how these people and things relate to each other (however oblique or 
minimal these relations may sometime be), and also how they generate and sustain one another 
within specialized systems of partnership, domesticity, and politeness.  The ecologies of 
significant others Dorothy identifies populate the journals.  Their intersections may at times be 
more apparent to Dorothy than they are to her journal’s readers (who often wonder at the lack of 
explicit transitions in her entries between accounts of her cooking and health, descriptions of the 
landscape, and concern for William).  
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 Indeed, Dorothy’s journals play out an obsession with how to consider individuals 
and communities, the relationship of parts to wholes, specimens to species, waves to water, etc.  
Dorothy memorably spatialized her fascination with the transitivity of interpersonal relationships 
in a diagram she drew on May 15th, 1802 of the names of each individual in their circle: 
S T Coleridge 
Dorothy Wordsworth  William Wordsworth 
Mary Hutchinson  Sara Hutchinson 
William  Coleridge Mary 
Dorothy Sara 
16th May 
1802 
John Wordsworth 
 
We can imagine tracing lines of relation between these various names, marking brothers, sisters, 
friends, men, women, collaborators (significant others, all).  I imagine Dorothy’s pathways and 
walkways, those travelled well and those travelled little, the seats and observation points, the 
landmarks and the buildings in much the same way.  In walking between them, Dorothy is 
connecting them, exploring their boundaries, describing potential relationships, reinscribing 
favourite paths and places with the power of attention and regard in the journals.  In this way, 
contrary to Alexander’s reading of the Wordsworths’ walks, her excursions are neither demonic 
creative erasures of the landscape nor flights from a beloved cottage in search of an alternate 
refuge, but rather attempts to describe on foot various intersecting rings of relation between 
persons and things.   
In fact, Dorothy’s walks and their tendency to connect or blur the lines between the 
domestic and the wild, the private and the openly visible, have elements in common with the 
activities she describes of two local women.  On Saturday the 19th of June, 1802, Dorothy 
remarks in her journal upon a number of solitary human figures in the Grasmere landscape.  
Wordsworth hears about the first, a Quaker woman, from Coleridge, who reports during a visit 
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that, “there being no quaker meeting held at Keswick,” the woman “used to go regularly alone 
every Sunday, to attend the meeting-house & there used to sit & perform her worship, alone, in 
that beautiful place among those fir-trees, in that spacious vale, under the great mountain 
Skiddaw!!!”66  The repeated exclamation points indicate a kind of gleeful consternation and also 
applause for this solitary worship.  As Coleridge and Dorothy conceive it, the vale, its fir-trees, 
and the mountain are as much the setting for this worship as the meeting house.  The woman’s 
visitation, in fact, seems to orient them around it, as witnesses to her pilgrimage. 
Dorothy reports in the same entry that a Miss Hudson of Workington would plant flowers 
far beyond her home’s garden:  “She said ‘O! I love flowers! I sow flowers in the Parks several 
miles from home & my mother & I visit them & watch them how they grow.”67  Miss Hudson, 
Wordsworth points out, “was a very ordinary young woman, such as in any town in the North of 
England one may find a score.”68  (That being the case, Dorothy reasoned, it would be wise for 
botanists not to be deceived upon finding garden flowers far afield.) 
The two activities Dorothy describes exemplify a rural expansion of domestic and sacred 
space well beyond the home.  Both Miss Hudson and the Quaker woman inhabit the space 
beyond their homes as though they are responsible for it, despite being outside the clear 
responsibilities of their own homes or the judgment of human neighbours.  Despite being alone, 
the Quaker woman performs her worship every week, and although the flowers she has planted 
are far from her household, Miss Hudson travels to “visit” them and watch their progress.  Their 
visits speak to a kind of responsibility to place that is arresting, and an extension of domestic 
labours and recreation beyond the space of the home.  As Kurt Heinzelman suggests in his essay, 
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“The Cult of Domesticity:  Dorothy and William Wordsworth at Grasmere,” Dorothy and 
William admired what William calls in the Prelude the “ancient homeliness” of Lake District 
families, who worked both inside and outside the home, literally carrying the objects of their 
labour from the inside, out and vice versa in the days and evenings (William would 
commemorate that labour in “Michael”).  Dorothy and William’s version of that homeliness 
included the transport of poetry from the outdoors (where it often found its source and was 
composed) to the indoors (where it was transcribed).  Reading, of course, was both an indoor and 
an outdoor activity as the light and the weather demanded.  When an outside one, it would often 
take place in familiar spots or “seats” in the landscape, to which William and Dorothy returned 
with the fondness and the ease with which one might settle into an old sofa.  
I am tempted to call the visitations of Miss Hudson and the Quaker woman missions or 
excursions, but the words imply a willingness to leave home and not come back again, and 
overshadow their simple regularity.  Instead, these visitations are undertaken as just that:  as 
meetings from which the women will return again.  Coincidentally, Dorothy hears the stories of 
the visits during visits to her own home.  During one, Coleridge tells the Quaker woman’s story, 
and Miss Hudson herself relates her story to Dorothy during another.  Their visits form a part of 
the network of neighbourly meetings between people and things she describes throughout the 
journals. 
To describe that network as a purely human one would be a mistake.  Instead, it is just a 
part of the unique community Wordsworth constructs of places, objects, and persons in the 
journals.  The “visit” is both an overture of friendliness and proximity, and an acknowledgment 
that the closeness extended is defined by its transitoriness and by the separability of the parties 
concerned.  The “polis of many simultaneously possible households” Kurt Heinzelman 
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highlights in his essay is, I argue, a polis of both persons and things.  
The power of descriptive walking and writing for Dorothy is akin to what Susan Stewart 
has described as the “capacity of narrative to generate significant objects and hence to both 
generate and engender a significant other,”69 but Wordsworth’s relation towards significant 
others is better evoked in the comparatively passive action of describing those others than in 
generating them.  “To describe” can be “to form or trace by motion” (OED), a nice ambiguity 
that suggests that the thing described is partially generated and also partially found or 
distinguished by the describer.  The world described is similar to William’s “mighty world / Of 
eye, and ear,—both what they half create, / And what perceive,”70 but Dorothy’s eye and ear 
seem slightly better (or at least, differently) attuned than her brother’s to the existence of other 
subjects in the world, capable of doing the same.   Dorothy recalls a particularly comical 
example of her awareness of the existence of animal minds in an entry in the Grasmere Journal, 
in which she remembers walking through the fields of Rydale vale, and then stopping and sitting 
“for an hour afraid to pass a cow.  The cow looked at me, and I looked at the cow, and whenever 
I stirred the cow gave over eating.”71 
Dorothy’s most extended consideration of particular animals occurs in early summer 
1802, just before Dorothy and William travel to Calais to meet Annette Vallon and to Gallow 
Hill to bring Mary Hutchinson home to Grasmere.  In this often cited series of entries, Dorothy 
reflects upon the activity of a pair of swallows residing at the Wordsworth cottage.  It is tempting 
to read Dorothy’s account of the swallows’ endeavours to build a nest as a metaphor for her own 
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hopes and fears regarding the Grasmere household.  She first mentions the swallows on June 
16th, a typical day in Dorothy and William’s household, which they spent walking to Rydale for 
letters, reading them, writing replies, and sitting in the orchard.  Dorothy has been watching for 
signs of the changing season—the “first ripe strawberries” and the honeysuckle.  She notes that 
two swallows have been flying near the sitting-room window, and muses that they may be 
“wishing to build.”  Even more boldly, she guesses (rightly) that they will “not have courage for 
it,” but will build at her own room window.  Following these surmises, Dorothy indulges in more 
characteristic descriptive prose, an account of their activity: 
They twitter & make a bustle & a little chearful song hanging against the panes of 
glass, with their soft white bellies close to the glass, & their forked fish-like tails.  
They swim round & round & again they come.   
She will revive this description later in the narrative of the swallow’s endeavour, as a kind of 
lament, but at this time takes pleasure in their progress, a slight, repetitive and playful activity 
that Dorothy mimics in the rhythm of her prose, “round & round & again,” and in the generation 
of a swimming metaphor out of her description of the birds’ tails as “fish-like.”  In describing 
their movement as a swimming “round & round,” Dorothy evokes an enclosed fish tank, turning 
the window inside out such that it is not just a window onto the world outside, but also a window 
into a second, domestic space. At next mention, the swallows are indeed building very busily 
under Dorothy’s window, and we hear of them again, perhaps, as the “little Birds” whose 
twittering sounds “very gloomy” to her one still morning as she awakes. 
On the 24th of June, disaster strikes:  the nest the birds built collapses.  Heinzelman 
believes the “rebuilding of this nest becomes the metaphorical ground upon which Dorothy 
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stages her anxieties about the coming changes in the Wordsworths’ domestic arrangements.”72  
Indeed, we can read Dorothy’s account of the birds’ tentative visits to the cottage, their scouting 
of a location for the nest, and their decision to build upon Dorothy’s own ledge as a kind of 
analogy for the domestic activities of Dorothy and William settling at Grasmere.  Their decision 
to rebuild their nest after it falls is analogous to Dorothy’s and William’s agreement that they 
should reconstitute the domestic space at Grasmere to include Mary after the wedding. 
Yet, this reading, so satisfying in its own way, and perhaps comforting to Dorothy as well 
(if indeed it occurred to her), is unique in its mere possibility:  most other episodes Dorothy 
records in the journals regarding birds, trees, geographical landforms, and the weather are not so 
easily read as projections of her own feelings or situation.  These things are never simply 
analogies for Dorothy’s interior states or for her experiences.  They do not perform her anxieties.  
The swallows in this case are emotionally touching because they literally touch the Grasmere 
cottage and the domestic space within it, and that proximity seems to force from Dorothy an 
uncharacteristic and unexpectedly direct outpouring of sympathy towards the birds when she 
notices that their nest has collapsed.  Dorothy records the events of the morning: 
When I rose I went just before tea into the Garden, I looked up at my Swallow’s 
nest & it was gone.  It had fallen down.  Poor little creatures they could not 
themselves be more distressed than I was I went upstairs to look at the Ruins.  
They lay in a large heap upon the window ledge; these Swallows had been ten 
days employed in building this nest, & it seemed to be almost finished—73 
The appropriative “my” in the first line is characteristic of Dorothy’s tendency to claim only 
those things and persons with whom she has sustained contact and upon whom she has lavished 
special attention as her own.  It also draws a ring around the nest, including within a concentric 
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circle the home-space of the Grasmere cottage and the broken nest outside the window-pane.  
Ruined, the nest calls up for Wordsworth a full awareness of its significance.  The two journals 
themselves seem to do this kind of commemorative work for the households at Alfoxden and 
Grasmere.  Here, as in the journals as a whole, the potential for the loss of a household and its 
loved objects inspires a special attention to detail and to the power of description to hold and 
enliven them.  The “forked fish-like tails” of Dorothy’s first description of the birds reappears 
here, as does the description of their “soft white bellies.”  The “many & many a time” Dorothy 
recalls watching the birds since their first visit even echoes in its phrasing the “round & round & 
again” of the birds’ activity in her first description of them.  Here, in remembrance, she describes 
them:   
I had watched them early in the morning, in the day many & many a time & in the 
evenings when it was almost dark I had seen them sitting together side by side in 
their unfinished nest both morning & night.  When they first came about the 
window they used to hang against the panes, with their white Bellies & their 
forked tails looking like fish, but then they fluttered & sang their own little 
twittering song.  As soon as the nest was broad enough, a sort of ledge for them 
they sate both mornings & evenings, but they did not pass the night there.  I 
watched them one morning when William was at Eusemere, for more than an 
hour.  Every now & then there was a feeling motion in their wings a sort of 
tremulousness & they sang a low song to one another.74 
The forked tails and the white bellies of the birds are the two most vivid details Dorothy relates 
about them, repeated in both accounts.  Their vividness in her visual memory is partially due to 
the fact that, as she points out, the birds would “hang” against the glass, “close to the glass,” the 
most vulnerable portion of their anatomy literally pressing up against their attentive observer’s 
vision.  The cheerfulness of the birds’ song to one another mutates into a lower, more tentative 
one in the second passage, as if in recognition of the loss to come.  In the passage, Dorothy 
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comes as close as she ever does in the journals to ascribing feelings and a narrative tale to 
nonhuman creatures.   
It is also one of the only opportunities Dorothy takes to describe at length an extended 
relationship with particular creatures in her environment.  Dorothy’s prose takes on the 
transitional effects of a constantly changing environment so well in part because she is herself 
continually in motion.  Her visitation to various sites in the area is regular, but not continuous, 
and most of the phenomena she records are necessarily short-lived:  the appearance of a single 
wave, the particular gesture of a tree in the breeze, or the sheen of a plant in the sun.   In some 
ways, the lives of the birds that build outside her windowpane are not significantly different 
(they, too, are transitory), but in others they are distinctly different.  We might read, in Dorothy’s 
description of the birds’ white bellies and forked, fish-like tails, what Timothy Morton, 
borrowing a term from Derrida, has called a “re-mark,” a “very small flicker” in an 
environmental text that “flips an ‘objective’ image into a ‘subjective’ one.”75  The re-mark, 
Morton explains, is minimalistic—it does not shout “metaphor!”  The re-mark  instead simply 
“makes us aware that we are in the presence of (significant) marks.”76  In this passage, the 
window seems to inspire in Dorothy a slight flicker from her generally objective observations of 
nature to this slightly more subjective one.  The particular details she repeats—the birds’ 
pressing themselves against the glass, their coming into view “round & round & again” within its 
closed frame—are details that call up not just the birds, but also the glass window, a portal to the 
birds’ lives that is also a barrier to it.  Her sympathy for the birds’ vulnerability and their failure 
is similarly a part of, but also apart from, her sense of the changes at the Grasmere household. 
When the birds appear again in the journal, it is without an explanation for where or how 
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they have rebuilt.  Nevertheless, they do appear again, in a nest, singing low to one another.  
They are also mentioned among the things that Dorothy regrets leaving when she departs for 
Calais:  “I must prepare to go—The Swallows I must leave them the well the garden the Roses 
all—Dear creatures!! they sang last night after I was in bed—seemed to be singing to one 
another, just before they settled to rest for the night.  Well I must go—Farewell.—”77  The new 
nest and the birds’ communications are a synecdoche for the Grasmere household and the 
brother-sister pair within it, her farewell to them collapsing into a larger farewell to the place and 
the time.  Yet, Dorothy’s appropriation of the pair of swallows in this way is characteristically 
gentle.  The birds, their lives, and their song remain distinct from hers.  Their song seems to be to 
one another (not to her), and Dorothy does not try to interpret it further or use it to ventriloquize 
her own emotion. 
The Swallows’ nest, when it rested precariously upon the window ledge, might be as apt 
a figure as any for the potential metaphoricity of the creatures and things Dorothy describes in 
the journals.  The birds’ lives press upon Dorothy’s own, and she responds with an attentive care 
mindful to the ways in which those lives are different from her own and largely inscrutable to 
her.  Despite this partial inscrutability, she is open to the ways in which their lives relate to hers 
in a series of physical and metaphorical ways.  The birds are good to think about and also good 
to think—and feel—with. 
 
Patience and Perspective: Distinguishing Invitations for Engagement 
The subtlety of Dorothy’s engagement with nonhuman animals and appearances is akin 
to the “politeness” Donna Haraway believes is possible within “ecologies of significant others,” 
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where the matter of “responsiveness” does not depend upon whether or not nonhuman creatures 
are capable of “responding” to humans (as opposed to reacting to them), but upon whether or not 
humans are capable of “responding” to invitations extended by nonhuman others to participate in 
“alternative forms of engagement.”78  Dorothy’s journals develop an extended praxis of polite 
engagement with significant others, one that recognizes and accepts the invitations of nonhuman 
others for such engagement.  This openness to an alternate form of engagement is the “love” 
described in loving and liking.  The viability of this form of politeness depends upon Dorothy’s 
ability to distinguish invitations for engagement (an activity she describes throughout the 
journals), and her capacity to sustain that engagement through an extended period of present and 
retrospective perspectival patience. 
Dorothy’s gaze often begins by looking in the abstract, looking into a scene where there 
is “nothing distinguishable,” whether because the sky is for a time “spread over with one 
continuous cloud” or because the sea is “at first obscured by vapour.”   Conditions within or 
conditions without, however, often shift to allow her to distinguish something in particular:  the 
“moon burst[s] through” an “invisible veil,” a single sheep appears among a flock lying down, 
or, among continuous birdsong, she “distinguish[es] the notes of a blackbird or thrush.”  
Dorothy’s “distinguishing” combines in one action perception and differentiation, while also, 
and importantly, noticing particularly and “honouring with special attention”79 the things that 
have largely distinguished themselves to her, hailing her regard.  Elaine Scarry has described this 
as the power of beautiful things.  In On Beauty and Being Just Scarry muses:  “At the moment 
one comes into the presence of something beautiful, it greets you.  It lifts away from the neutral 
back-ground as though coming forward to welcome you—as though the object were designed to 
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‘fit’ your perception.”80  Scarry’s greetings are not unlike the “invitations” Haraway believes 
become apparent within ecologies of significant others.81  Scarry and Haraway believe that 
beautiful things and significant others always, in Scarry’s words, “carry greetings from other 
worlds within them.”82  While Haraway’s attention is most often upon living animals, Scarry 
considers the invitations for attention and corresponding ethical demands of objects, persons, 
creatures, and creative works that she says exchange the “gift” of aliveness through their 
interaction with a perceiver.  “Beauty,” she says, “seems to place requirements on us for 
attending to the aliveness or (in the case of objects) quasi-aliveness of our world.”83  The 
aliveness or quasi-aliveness of the world suffuses Wordsworth’s journals, where everything 
seems to be in perpetual motion, constant only in the sense that it is always changing.  Dorothy’s 
vision is marked by a patient faith that any scene, any thing, might at any moment distinguish 
itself for attention, a creature not only of space, but also of time. 
Dorothy’s unique sense of the temporality of beings might explain the oddity of number 
in many of her journal passages.  Dorothy often employs methods of accounting for water and 
air, for example, that make those elements numerable.  Thus, when she recounts seeing a heron 
in the water, she describes it this way:  “It beat and struggled amongst the water, when it flew 
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away, and was long in getting loose.”84  Here, the water seems to be made up of many parts, and 
it is “amongst” these parts that the heron seems to struggle in getting loose.  Similarly, in the 
Grasmere Journal, she describes “watching the breezes.”  The breezes become visible and 
countable in their effect on the lake: 
We amused ourselves for a long time in watching the Breezes some as if they 
came from the bottom of the lake spread in a circle, brushing along the surface of 
the water, & growing more delicate, as it were thinner & of a paler colour till they 
died away—others spread out like a peacocks tail, & some went right forward this 
way & that in all directions.  The lake was still where these breezes were not but 
they made it all alive.85 
The aliveness of the lake in the breeze, the death of the breezes as they become spindly—all 
demonstrate a patience on their observers’ part (as usual, the Wordsworths watch for “a long 
time”) and a concept of life and being that is not limited to “life” traditionally conceived, but is 
rather an effect of disparate elements acting upon one another.  Life, for Dorothy, is energy, and 
this energy moves between things for the patient observer through time. 
For Wordsworth the observer, perspective is often a matter of patience through time; 
recognizing an invitation for engagement can involve abstention from a rush to judgment about 
what an appearance is.  Many descriptive passages in the journals seem to depend for their 
interest upon what Emily Dickinson might call a “certain Slant of light,” or some other 
strangeness in the scene that prevents the observer from making out exactly (at least in ordinary 
terms) what it is that is being observed.  Onno Oerlemans points to this aspect of Dorothy’s 
writing in a chapter from Romanticism and the Materiality of Nature on travel writing.  
Oerlemans’ argument regarding Dorothy’s journals is that their perspectival difference from her 
brother William’s works is not so much due to gender as it is to genre, and that Dorothy is most 
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of all engaged with the genre of travel writing in her journals.  Those features of Dorothy’s 
writing Oerlemans cites as markers of travel writing include her faithfulness to detail and her 
ability to “communicate the sensation of discovery or personal revelation—the reality, we might 
say of moving through unfamiliar landscape—through the reproduction of detail.”86  But these 
features of Dorothy’s Recollections of a Tour Made in Scotland are also prominent in the 
Alfoxden and Grasmere Journals and are also markers of some natural histories.  A recurrent 
theme among the popularizers of natural history during the late eighteenth and nineteenth-
centuries was that the discoveries to be made in the natural world were simply boundless, and 
that, as Gilbert White famously insisted, “[m]en that undertake only one district are much more 
likely to advance natural knowledge than those that grasp at more than they can possibly be 
acquainted with.”  Indeed, one of the most wonderful and perhaps most Romantic procedures of 
the practice of natural history writing is to make that with which we are best acquainted—in 
Dorothy’s case the sheep of Grasmere—most strange:  
Thursday 29th [April] . . . As I lay down on the grass, I observed the glittering 
silver line on the ridges of the Backs of the sheep, owing to their situation 
respecting the Sun–which made them look beautiful but with something of 
strangeness, like animals of another kind–as if belonging to a more splendid 
world.87 
Dorothy is straightforward in citing the position of herself, the sheep, and the sun as the cause of 
the particular effect she sees, but her patience with the scene, and her appreciation of its accident, 
is such that the meeting—the observation, the reflection, and the recollection—is permitted to 
stretch to unusual length, while the description revels in, rather than foreshortens or explains 
away, its strangeness.  The creatures observed emerge in the passage as “animals of another 
kind,” constituted as that other kind through the relation of the reclined observer and the 
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“situation” of the creatures “respecting the sun.”  The other-worldliness of the scene marks it as 
one of special relation and Dorothy’s ability to see it as such also marks the acceptance of an 
invitation to engage the sheep at Grasmere as something other than the sheep at Grasmere:  as 
creatures capable of provoking a response.  Donna Haraway might describe the provocation of 
the scene as a “possible invitation, a possible introduction to other-worlding.”88 
The Alfoxden and Grasmere Journals catalogue these invitations to other-worlding.  
Oftentimes, they come from elements within the broader landscape.  At other moments, a well-
known tree introduces itself as a new creature, a creation of light and wind and distance.  
Dorothy’s often-quoted description of a “favourite birch tree” stands as a particularly striking 
example.  Dorothy and her companion are stopped short by it, as it yields to the wind in the sun: 
Tuesday 24th [November] . . . as we were going along we were stopped at once, at 
the distance perhaps of 50 yards from our favourite Birch tree it was yielding to 
the gusty wind with all its tender twigs, the sun shone upon it & it glanced in the 
wind like a flying sunshiny shower—it was a tree in shape with stem & branches 
but it was like a Spirit of water—The sun went in & it resumed its purplish 
appearance the twigs still yielding to the wind, but not so visibly to us.  The other 
Birch trees that were near it looked bright & chearful—but it was a Creature by its 
own self among them . . . 89 
The tree becomes a “creature by its own self” among other trees in the moment Dorothy 
describes through a confluence of factors:  the sun shines, the wind blows, and, most 
importantly, the Wordsworths have caught and accepted an invitation to witness its individuation 
from the other trees at a distance of fifty yards.  They are “stopped at once” and have the 
patience to acknowledge a favourite birch as “a spirit of water”:  another unique specimen for a 
natural history that tracks an alternative, “more splendid world.” 
Dorothy’s interest in a world that is “more splendid” than our own and that is “more than 
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natural” amongst her descriptions of birds and flowers conveys an interest in the world of 
appearances and the significance of her looking.  This significance is both metaphysical and 
ethical; it has the power to distinguish subjects and the ethical obligation to get them right, in a 
sense, and to consider them justly.  Dorothy’s entry of February 26th, 1798 in the Alfoxden 
Journal is as a complex play of competing appearances and descriptive impulses: 
A very clear afternoon.  We lay sidelong upon the turf, and gazed on the 
landscape till it melted into more than natural loveliness.  The sea very uniform, 
of a pale greyish blue, only one distant bay, bright and blue as a sky; had there 
been a vessel sailing up it, a perfect image of delight.  Walked to the top of a high 
hill to see a fortification.  Again sat down to feed upon the prospect; a magnificent 
scene, curiously spread out for even minute inspection, though so extensive that 
the mind is afraid to calculate its bounds.  A winter prospect shows every cottage, 
every farm, and the forms of distant trees, such as in summer have no 
distinguishing mark.  On our return, Jupiter and Venus before us.  While the 
twilight still over powered the light of the moon, we were reminded that she was 
shining bright above our heads, by our faint shadows going before us.  We had 
seen her on the tops of the hills, melting into the blue sky.90 
Dorothy’s writing in this passage shows her characteristic scrupulousness in accounting for the 
position of the viewers of the scenes she describes:  she and William lie “sidelong upon the turf;” 
they walk; sit again; walk again.  As they do, their gaze shifts from one that looks straight upon a 
landscape tilted on its side, to one looking out, searching for an edge, to one that looks ahead to 
get a sense of what is above.  Each perspective challenges its viewers, offering a different form 
of disorientation, requiring time and some imaginative energy to reach any kind of resolution.  
The only perspective that does not seem to reach such a resolution is the one that yields in fear 
(this is the view from the top of the hill, which is “so extensive that the mind is afraid to 
calculate its bounds”).  Here Dorothy calls up the discourse of the sublime, but only half-
heartedly.  More interesting to her is the effect of winter, which has stripped the scene bare and 
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made it “curiously spread out for even minute inspection.”91  We get the sense that Dorothy 
craves that effect, that she does in fact have the patience and interest necessary to catalogue 
“every cottage, every farm, and the forms of distant trees, such as in summer have no 
distinguishing mark.”  Distinguishing, as I have argued, is a primary activity of the journals.  The 
act of looking, for Dorothy, is the act of distinguishing and to distinguish is partially to call 
something into being,92 to people a “more splendid” world with appearances that are “more than 
natural” because they are a collaboration between subjects, objects, and conditions.  In her 
careful accounting of the position of herself, the sun, the moon, and the season, Dorothy 
accounts for the appearance of specific things under specific circumstances, including the 
direction of her gaze.  Her creatures and landscapes also seem to push gently back against that 
gaze:  to make her think about where the moon was, and where it might be at a later time; to 
think that a scene might be improved by a “vessel sailing,” but to be reminded that there is not 
one in it; to submit to a sky that does not hold its shape.  Her patience, discrimination, and 
openness, I argue, are markers of her ethical relation to a world that does not exist solely for or 
by virtue of her viewership, but that arises in concert with it.  Perception and description, for 
Dorothy, enable the being of individuals that would not otherwise exist.  As Karen Barad notes 
in the preface to Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
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Matter and Meaning: “Existence is not an individual affair.  Individuals do not pre-exist their 
interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled intra-relating.”93  
The kinds of polite relations Dorothy catalogues and extends in her journals allow for the 
fulfilment of that “entangled intra-relating.”       
 
Finely Aware and Richly Responsible 
Though Dorothy fairly frequently indulged in some imaginative juggling of the landscape 
and its built elements during her walks, her conclusion near the end of the Alfoxden Journal—
“Happily we cannot shape the huge hills, or carve out the valleys according to our fancy”—
seems best to describe her opinion of the modification of natural spaces.  It also seems to bear on 
her descriptive representations of her environment, which labor for accuracy in ways that many 
readers find disturbing.   In a close reading of Dorothy’s revisions, Pamela Woof finds a pattern 
of additions, substitutions, and deletions that suggest “a habit of mind, a concern, even to 
obsession, with truth.”94  Dorothy’s “pedantically truthful eye,” as Woof describes it, is highly 
invested in the accuracy of her descriptions of events and natural objects.  This level of accuracy 
and detail, by contrast, rarely occurs in Dorothy’s correspondence.  Woof believes the difference 
is attributable to audience:  a letter to Mary, for example, would rightly include few details about 
the landscape, whereas a journal entry written with William’s composition in mind would.  
Indeed, William did mine Dorothy’s entries for material for his own verse, selecting some of her 
most enigmatic details and phrasings for his use.  Dorothy in her letters is a human, social being 
conveying deaths, births, illnesses, and publications.  As part of William’s poetic project and as 
part of her own natural history, Dorothy’s journals record a different sector of life altogether, one 
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both more and less remarkable, and one that lived in its details. 
Nevertheless, Dorothy’s awareness of the uniqueness of the things she sees is directed not 
simply towards the objects themselves, but towards her relationship to them.  That is, the details 
she presents in the journals are as much about her perception of an object as they are about the 
object itself.  Although Virginia Woolf is right in reflecting that Dorothy’s “plain statement 
proves to be aimed so directly at the object that if we look exactly along the line that it points we 
shall see precisely what she saw,”95 she is right not because the object itself is revealed in some 
way, but because Dorothy’s perception of it is.  Indeed, the details of her description come not so 
much from a superfluity of information about the colour, size, fragrance, or feel of particular 
objects as it does from her subtle delineation of her experience of those characteristics.  In her 
reading of Dorothy’s description of the daffodils beside the lake, for example, Pamela Woof 
finds that Dorothy’s revisions highlight her sense of the interaction of elements in the scene, 
elevating the wind “into a conscious partner of the dancing flowers.”  Dorothy does this by 
making additions to her initial description of the wind as a “furious” one that “seized [their] 
breath.”  The additions specify that the flowers “laughed with the wind that blew upon them over 
the lake.  This wind blew directly over the lake to them.”96  The additions, without plainly stating 
that the wind is a “conscious partner of the dancing flowers” (as Woof does), nevertheless show 
the reader how to see the relation of the wind and the flowers the way Dorothy does.  
In this way, then, the reader of Dorothy’s journals is treated to an awareness of what it is 
like to experience Grasmere without Dorothy herself announcing in plain terms precisely what 
she feels, or precisely what it is like to be her as she walks.  What Virginia Woolf calls 
Dorothy’s “point[ing]” seems to be a very graceful form of environmental writing requiring, or 
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inspiring, a reader who learns through the text how to imagine the possibility of inhabiting 
another’s subjectivity.  In “What is it like to be a bat?” Thomas Nagel suggests that it is not 
possible for us to imagine experience from another being’s perspective.  He chooses as his 
example a bat largely because the echolocation of bats allows them to experience the world 
differently than any human can.  No matter how hard we try, he claims, we will never get further 
than imagining what it would be like for ourselves—our own consciousnesses—to inhabit the 
mind and body of a bat; we will not get much further, in other words, than dressing ourselves up 
in a bat suit.  What Dorothy’s writing suggests to readers is that that act of imagination is 
nevertheless worthwhile.  Knowing precisely and conveying precisely how she sees, Dorothy 
gives the reader the opportunity to see as she does.  Additionally, her investment in perception 
and description and her awareness of their possibilities and limitations lead her to an appreciation 
of the variety of phenomena in the world around her.   She is only able to describe these 
phenomena as she experiences them.  Nevertheless, she does not artificially circumscribe the 
bounds of her own experience.  Instead, she opens her awareness as widely as possible, 
entertaining even those appearances and details that are inexplicable to her.    
The accumulation of accurate detail in the journals is a significant aspect of her felt 
responsibilities toward the community of persons and things she constructs in the journals.  
Distinguishing the invitations of nonhuman others for attention is the foundational act of 
Dorothy’s ethical natural history.  The second is giving that attention, and the third is describing 
it justly.  In her article, “‘Finely Aware and Richly Responsible’:  Literature and the Moral 
Imagination,” Martha Nussbaum reads Henry James’s The Golden Bowl as a work of moral 
philosophy, one that examines the nature of moral attention and knowledge, and the possibility 
of improvising what we are morally required to do without relying on rules of duty.  James’s 
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characters are, of course, human, and Nussbaum’s argument is directed towards moral human 
subjects.  Nevertheless, Nussbaum describes the constraints of the Jamesian artist in terms that 
resonate with the constraints Dorothy seems to feel in recording her observations of nonhuman 
beings.  Nussbaum’s comments on James’s moral philosophy stress moral knowledge as a 
product of precise perception and rendering: 
Moral knowledge, James suggests . . . is perception.  It is seeing a complex, 
concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is 
there, with imagination and feeling . . . A responsible action, as James conceives 
it, is a highly context-specific and nuanced and responsive thing whose rightness 
could not be captured in a description that fell short of the artistic.97 
In these passages, Nussbaum speaks about the moral duties of the characters James creates and 
the responsibilities of the writer as he crafts them.  Her reading of James has inspired ethicists 
interested in the treatment of nonhuman animals, such as Michael Allen Fox and Lesley McLean, 
who consider what it means to be “finely aware and richly responsible” in a world made up of 
humans and animals in “Animals in Moral Space.”98  It seems to me that Nussbaum’s reading of 
James is also applicable to the moral space Dorothy Wordsworth describes.  The duties of the 
Jamesian artist as Nussbaum describes them are ones we can feel the pressure of  in her journals.  
Moral knowledge as perception and moral action as its correct expression is at the heart of 
Dorothy’s environmental ethic.  Like the artist Nussbaum describes, she does not “feel free to 
create just anything at all:  [she] imagines [herself] as straining to get it right, not to miss 
                                                
 
97 Martha Nussbaum, “’Finely Aware and Richly Responsible’: Literature and the Moral Imagination,” in 
Love’s Knowledge:  Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),  
152, 154. 
98 Michael Allen Fox and Lesley McLean, “Animals in Moral Space,” in Animal Subjects: An Ethical 
Reader in a Posthuman World, ed. Jodey Castricano (Waterloo, Ontario:  Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press, 2008).  There are also traces of Nussbaum’s reading of James’s conception of moral responsibility 
in her own writing on justice for nonhuman animals. 
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anything, to be keen rather than obtuse.”99  At the same time, Dorothy’s treatment of natural 
subjects departs from Nussbaum’s aesthetic, one in which objects demand a very particular, and 
especially “artistic,” response.  The artistic response presumably involves extensive, detailed 
descriptions.  Dorothy’s descriptions—spare, minimal, often merely constative—might seem to 
fall short of this artistic response.  They are nevertheless often highly “context-specific,” 
“nuanced,” and “responsive.” 
Indeed, a large portion of Dorothy’s keenness seems to lie in her fairly low interest in 
species classification and description or in generalized natural historical knowledge.  Instead, the 
knowledge Dorothy is interested in collecting is about the specific organisms and phenomena she 
encounters.  Where Gilbert White might write, for  example, “Query. -Does each female cuckoo 
lay but one egg in a season, or does she drop several in different nests according as opportunity 
offers?”100 (a question that refers not to a specific female cuckoo but to all females of the 
species), Dorothy will ask instead, “Observed some trees putting out red shoots.  Query:  What 
trees are they?”101  Thus, even when Dorothy is interested in learning a name for a species as a 
whole, her interest is generated by a regard for individual plants or creatures she has seen.  Both 
Nussbaum and Scarry reflect upon the extent to which seeing and engaging things and people as 
individuals determines our ethical relation to them.  “Within the confined circumference of 
beholder and beheld,” Scarry writes, there is “a reciprocal salute to the continuation of one 
another’s existence . . . and of one’s own responsibility for the continuity of existence.”102  
Similarly, in an endnote on “particularity” in “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible,” Nussbaum 
describes “love” as an “attachment to the particular” that contains the thought that “this person is 
                                                
 
99 Nussbaum, 163. 
100 Selborne, 120. 
101 Dorothy Wordsworth, Alfoxden, February 5th, 1798. 
102 Scarry, 92. 
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not replaceable, is the only one who will occupy exactly this relation.”103  Dorothy, in her 
capacity to distinguish creatures, things, and appearances as individuals, recognizes that they are 
not replaceable and that their relationship to her is singular and not repeatable.  That is, it is not 
the “thing itself” that is important to Dorothy, but her particular, unrepeatable relationship to it.  
A sudden awareness of the particularity of an individual flower and its relation to herself, for 
example, seems to motivate one of the most strange and memorable actions Dorothy records in 
the journals, on a day in mid-winter in Grasmere: 
I found a strawberry blossom in a rock, the little slender flower had more courage 
than the green leaves, for they were but half expanded & half grown but the 
blossom was spread full out.  I uprooted it rashly, & I felt as if I had been 
committing an outrage, so I planted it again—it will have but a stormy life of it, 
but let it live if it can.104 
The strawberry flower, braving what must have been a warm period in late January (not yet 
spring), catches Dorothy’s eye, as any harbingers of coming seasons seemed to.  It distinguishes 
itself from the green leaves around it, the attention-grabbing blossom apparently calling out to be 
plucked.  Though it might seem an odd comparison, we can associate the “outrage” Dorothy 
feels her action to be with William’s “merciless ravage” of branch and bough in “Nutting.”  
William attributes the “sense of pain” he feels upon this ravage (or upon reflecting upon it) to  a 
somewhat lame “spirit in the woods,” which he beseeches a “dearest Maiden” to heed in her 
pathways through the trees.105  Dorothy’s regret and her subsequent decision to restore the flower 
                                                
 
103 Nussbaum, 167. 
104 Grasmere and Alfoxden Journals, 61. 
105 In lines that William would eventually attach to Nutting, it is less a spirit in the woods that William 
designates as a monitor of one’s behaviour towards nonhuman creatures than it is a spirit of attachment, 
and in that respect the siblings’ accounts of ethical relationships between human and nonhuman others 
comes closer.  The lines (first written in late 1798) also foreshadow the “rash,” almost accidental, 
uprooting Dorothy would describe: 
 
   I would not strike a flower 
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to the ground, however, seems motivated not by some supervising spirit, but by a sudden 
awareness that the same qualities that caused her to uproot the flower—its striking appearance 
and its seeming invitation for attention—are what require her to allow it to continue its existence. 
Years later, Dorothy seems to associate her noticing of the “little slender flower” in very 
late winter/early spring and her belated decision to save and restore it to the ground after she 
unthinkingly uprooted it, with “love.”  The action of noticing, uprooting, re-rooting, and 
recording the act in the journal, is an extension of the ethical obligation she commemorates in 
“Loving and Liking.”  Indeed, we can hear echoes of that episode in the poem’s second stanza, 
where she entreats her child auditor to make a distinction between loving and liking “things that 
have no feeling”: 
[Do not] blush if o’er your heart be stealing 
A love for things that have no feeling: 
The spring’s first rose by you espied, 
May fill your breast with joyful pride;  
And you may love the strawberry-flower, 
And love the strawberry in its bower; 
But when the fruit, so often praised 
For beauty, to your lip is raised, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
As many a man will strike his horse, at least 
If from the wantonness in which we play  
With things we love, or from a freak of power, 
Or from involuntary act of hand 
Or foot unruly with excess of life, 
It chanc’d that I ungently used a tuft 
Of meadow-lillies, or had snapp’d the stem 
Of foxglove bending o’er his native rill, 
I should be loth to pass along my way 
With unreprov’d indifference,–I would stop 
Self-question’d, asking wherefore that was done. 
 
William’s turning between possibilities for the same behaviour Dorothy would describe (is snapping the 
foxglove an act of “wantonness,” a “freak of power,” an “involuntary” act?) suggest that there is a certain 
undecideability about the reasons we treat things ungently, even when (or because) we love them.  Lyrical 
Ballads and Other Poems, 1797-1800, eds. James Butler and Karen Green (Ithaca and London:  Cornell 
University Press, 1992), 312, ll. 1-12. 
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Say not you love the delicate treat, 
But like it, enjoy it, and thankfully eat.  (ll. 27-38) 
“Spring’s first rose” here seems to take the place of the strawberry flower.  It too, appears as a 
first mark of spring and steals the heart of the observer.  Moreover, the rose inspires in the 
observer’s breast a “joyful pride,” a kind of ownership or guardianship of the flower by virtue of 
its sighting.  The strawberry fruit, on the other hand, is destined for consumption.  The contrast 
between loving and liking here, in its division between those things we eat and those we do not, 
may strike us as somewhat absurd, but embedded within the poem’s monotonous rhyme and 
pedantic tone is the scene Dorothy described on January 31st and much the same lesson:  the 
things we love are unique, and they require our attention, patience, and care.  The things we like 
and the things we eat, by contrast, are interchangeable.   
Dorothy’s ethic of love is ultimately differentiable from Scarry’s notion of justice 
through aesthetic admiration or Nussbaum’s notion of moral knowledge through perception 
because Dorothy’s “love for things that have no feeling” provides no clear prescription for moral 
action.  Instead, “love” is defined simply by its capaciousness, its willingness to admire and to let 
the other inside, to engage it, and to live through that relation.106  
                                                
 
106 In her response to my reading of Dorothy’s passage on the uprooting of the strawberry flower, Anne-
Lise Francois points to the “brutality” of Dorothy’s final resolution to let the flower “live if it can” once 
she has transplanted it.  She wonders at Dorothy’s readiness to uproot, consume, and destroy the flower as 
well as the edibles she mentions in “Loving and Liking,” and asks what this might mean for Dorothy’s 
relevance to an environmentalist and animal-based ethics.  Though I have not addressed these important 
points directly in this chapter, I have attempted to suggest that the “love” Dorothy describes might 
include, in its capaciousness, brutality and even certain forms of indifference.  Incidentally, at the time of 
this writing a 21st-century version of “Loving and Liking” was published in the op-ed section of the New 
York Times (May 28th, 2011).  In “Liking is for Cowards.  Go for What Hurts” Jonathan Franzen posits 
“liking” (the essential activity of the Facebook user) as “commercial culture’s substitute for loving” in a 
techno-consumerist age.  Consumer products, unlike things in the natural world, are designed to be 
likable:  to be “allies and enablers of narcissism.”  They are not indifferent to us, nor do they trouble us.  
By contrast, Franzen claims, the things we love (human and natural) can be profoundly indifferent to our 
wishes and profoundly troubling (as we can be to them).  Both Wordsworth’s poem, written for children, 
and Franzen’s essay, originally presented as a commencement speech, advocate for love as an ethical 
66 
 
Dorothy’s skilful descriptions, neither literal nor abstract, neither pure matter nor pure 
meaning, describe without circumscribing a world of relations.  “Loving and liking” takes many 
forms in the Journals, resulting in a dissolution or melting of the heart that lets other, 
undetermined, beings in.  “Upon the side of Loughrigg my heart dissolved in what I saw,” she 
writes on June first, 1800, in the Grasmere Journal, “I was not startled, but recalled from my 
reverie by a noise as of a child paddling without shoes.  I looked up, and saw a lamb close to 
me—it approached nearer & nearer, as if to examine me & stood a long time.”107   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
form of engagement with the world’s inhabitants in their particularity, with an emphasis not on the terms 
of that engagement, but on the sheer necessity of it.      
107 Grasmere and Alfoxden Journals, 28. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Influence of Natural Objects:  Wordsworth and the Poetry of Nature 
 
 
 
What then does the Poet?  He considers man and the objects that surround him as acting and 
reacting upon each other . . .  
   – Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads108 
 
 
Just as a reader familiar with Dorothy Wordsworth’s journals might call up from memory 
the particular objects and things starring in her journal entries—a birch tree glinting in the 
sunlight, sheep with glowing ridges on their backs, a pair of swallows—a reader familiar with 
her brother’s poetry of the same period might also readily recall the objects and things that live 
in his poems.  They include spear-grass waving against a wall, a battered thorn and a pool three 
feet long and two feet wide, hooting owls, a sheep, a hawthorn, and a girl with a pitcher upon her 
head.  Many of these objects appear in the writing of both brother and sister:  a field of daffodils, 
the thorn, the pair of swallows, and a particular appearance of the moon, shuttling through a 
“blue-black” vault in the sky on one particular evening.  I have called the natural objects featured 
in Dorothy’s journal entries “significant others”:  things that have stepped away from their 
surrounding landscapes to invite her polite engagement.  This chapter examines the role of 
objects, things, animals, plants, sounds, and appearances in William’s work.  Without 
consistently or dogmatically referring to these things as a single class (the “nonhuman,” the 
“natural,” or the “material,” for example), this chapter nevertheless works to develop a theory of 
affect, agency and interaction between the speakers of William’s poems and  their nonhuman 
subjects.  
                                                
 
108 William Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads, in Lyrical Ballads, and Other Poems, 1797-1800, 
edited by James Butler and Karen Green (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1992), 752. 
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Many of the poems and fragments I treat in this chapter were composed in Alfoxden in 
1798, the year Dorothy began keeping a journal and the year the Wordsworths began living 
together near Coleridge.  That year, Wordsworth and Coleridge conceived the Lyrical Ballads 
project and Wordsworth began drafting The Prelude and related autobiographical poetry.  They 
also embarked upon an ambitious program of reading, which included Erasmus Darwin’s long 
treatise on the laws of organic life, Zoonomia.  Much of the experimental work Wordsworth 
produced during this period features either an object or series of objects, and proposes a theory 
of life and “the common range of visible things.”109  In the poems, Wordsworth explores the 
feeling, responsiveness, agential and even representational capacities of nonhuman things.  And 
he troubles easy distinctions between the living and the nonliving, the human and the nonhuman, 
the animate and the inanimate. 
In Wordsworth’s Poetry, Geoffrey Hartman refers to this time as the Alfoxden period, 
during which Wordsworth began to produce poems based on “various impressions in situ.”  “It is 
perhaps the first time,” Hartman proposes, that “a poet has kept his eye so steadily on the object 
(which is also a subject, himself) and attempted a direct transcription of his personal response to 
nature.”110  In recording “only insubstantial experiences, momentary spells or sensory fixations,” 
Wordsworth tests whether these things can themselves be a poem, rather than an ornament to it, 
Hartman says.  Hartman does not believe that Wordsworth’s attempts were successful, but he 
                                                
 
109 William Wordsworth, the Two-Part Prelude of 1799, in William Wordsworth:  The Prelude 1799, 
1805, 1850:  Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, edited by Jonathan Wordsworth, M.H. Abrams, 
and Stephen Gill (New York and London:  W.W. Norton and Company, 1979), l. 216.   
110 Hartman’s parenthetical assertion that the object is also a subject and that that subject is “himself,” 
assumes that the poet does not or can not consider his objects as themselves potential subjects.  This 
chapter considers the reverse:  that Wordsworth can and does imagine the potential subjectivity of his 
subjects and that this is a primary concern of his poetry during this period.  Geoffrey Hartman, 
Wordsworth’s Poetry 1787-1814 (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1964), 163.  
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does believe they led Wordsworth toward “genuine nature poetry.”111  The low value Hartman 
implicitly places on “nature poetry” and his belief that Wordsworth’s fragments are not 
successful are a  strange platform for his further reading, which more positively evaluates the 
period as a turning point in Wordsworth’s career as a poet (a statement he draws from 
Wordsworth himself).  Hartman is particularly interested in what he sees as a revelation in 
Wordsworth’s thinking about nature and history upon his return to Alfoxden, which he argues 
led Wordsworth to recognize the continuity of the present with the past and the continuity of the 
self with the natural world.  Wordsworth’s sense of these continuities, Hartman suggests, led him 
to a more generous conception of place and the self:  if nature and the self are one and 
continuous everywhere, inspiration can be found anywhere; if the past is recoverable in the 
present, Wordsworth need speak only of the present. 
Hartman associates this generous expansion of world and self with generalities and it is 
for this reason, perhaps, that he is disconcerted by Wordsworth’s attempts during this period to 
name and describe in detail particular things (over which, Hartman says, Wordsworth “lingers 
embarrassingly”).  Hartman sees Wordsworth’s interest in particular things as a step backward 
into an obsession with particular place.  In this chapter, I revise Hartman’s appraisal of 
Wordsworth’s treatment of natural objects to propose that, in describing natural objects, 
Wordsworth sought not only to record his personal response to nature, but to explore those 
objects as potential subjects (a project that does indeed produce a potentially embarrassing 
lingering over apparently insignificant objects).  Additionally, I claim that Wordsworth’s poetry 
is motivated (rather than impeded) by his fascination with the complex, interrelated lives of 
particular things on the one hand, and the sheer existence of things in general, on the other. In 
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this fragment written upon his return to Alfoxden, for example, it is the recognition of particular 
trees and hills that inspires a forgetting of those particular things and a forgetting of a particular 
self in favour of the “ebb and flow” of life: 
     To gaze 
On that green hill and on those scattered trees 
And feel a pleasant consciousness of life 
In the impression of that loveliness 
Until the sweet sensation called the mind 
Into itself, by image from without  
Unvisited, and all her reflex powers 
Wrapped in a still dream [of] forgetfulness. 
I lived without the knowledge that I lived 
Then by those beauteous forms brought back again 
To lose myself again as if my life 
Did ebb and flow with strange mystery.112 
In his deictic pointing to “that green hill” and “those scattered trees” Wordsworth begins in a 
particular place and the opening imperative, “To gaze,” suggests a repeated activity, a return to 
that green hill and those scattered trees that inspires, in turn, the experience of forgetfulness as 
repeated and called forth by those particular things.  The hill and trees, in other words, inspire 
their own forgetting as the speaker is called away from external images by the “sweet sensation” 
of life that they inspire.  This process is described as physical rather than associative; the 
“pleasant consciousness of life” is less an idea than it is an “impression” of loveliness and the 
impression is registered as a “sweet sensation.”  There is no distinction between thought and 
feeling, idea and impression.  In the second part of the fragment, the process is repeated again as 
an awareness of “beauteous forms” brings the speaker out of unselfconsciousness only to return 
him to it.  Hartman reads the fragment as an articulation of “the one Life, within us and abroad” 
as “activated by changing polar distinctions.”  As he very gracefully puts it:  “Outer and inner, 
                                                
 
112 The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, edited by E. de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire (Oxford, 
1967-72), 341. 
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active and passive, subject and object are felt as a fluctuation expressed by the doublets of 
Wordsworth’s style:  I lived I lived, again again, myself my life, ebb and flow.”113 
The phrase “those beauteous forms” (the ones that bring the speaker into and out of 
consciousness of himself) also encapsulates a continuous division or fluctuation in Wordsworth’s 
thinking during this time about the significance of particular objects and things (named and 
described) and objects and things in general, which he often refers to as “objects,” “forms,” or 
“things.”  In the phrase “those beauteous forms,” Wordsworth points to both:  “those” forms 
specifically, but as “forms” or generic shapes of things.   The specificity of Wordsworth’s 
general forms is telling.  In his return to Alfoxden (as Hartman suggests), Wordsworth sees in 
natural forms the continuity of past with present and of the individual subject with its 
environment.  In that sense, the particular objects and things he encounters are irrelevant; they 
exist primarily as a testament to what Paul Fry has called, in Wordsworth and the Poetry of What 
We Are, “the ontic unity of all things.”114  But Wordsworth also points to specific things.  He 
names, describes, recalls, and engages with them in their specificity and in these cases they are 
awarded notice simply for being what they are:  they could have been anything, but Wordsworth 
deems significant that they are the particular things they are.115  In his attentiveness to their 
                                                
 
113 Though Hartman presents this gentle fluctuation as the end-point of the fragment’s energies, he also 
reads the fragment as one in which Wordsworth “passes beyond” a specific place or object, a movement 
that is also a turning inward (177-78).  This movement is characteristic of Hartman’s reading of 
Wordsworth and is an excellent and sympathetic account of much of Wordsworth’s poetry, but its 
implicit privileging of the inner over the outer, the general over the specific, is one I challenge in this 
chapter.  
114 Paul Fry, Wordsworth and the Poetry of What We Are (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2008), 2. 
115 Wordsworth’s interest in the particular arises out of his larger exploration of memory and character 
formation.  It is also part of his interest in perception and aesthetics, as it is for Elaine Scarry, who 
believes that “beauty always takes place in the particular” because our attention is only called and held by 
specific things.  Citing Proust, Scarry also states that beauty is particular as opposed to synthetic; it can 
only be recognized when it is special, even unforeseeable (On Beauty and Being Just, 18-19).  In this 
chapter, I do not focus on the beauty of the particular things Wordsworth describes in many of his 
fragments, but (like Scarry’s beautiful things) their sheer singularity and the unexpectedness of their 
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particular existence and his fascination with their forms of interrelating Wordsworth is not unlike 
his sister Dorothy.  His experiments with Dorothy in radically open forms of perception 
(described in the previous chapter), his poetic collaboration with Coleridge, and his reading of 
Darwin’s Zoonomia all shaped his regard for and engagement with things, objects, and forms 
during this period.  In these general references, he focuses attention on the shifting, amorphous 
character of what he calls the “active principle” of things or the power of things to influence one 
another.  In other instances, he looks closely at these forms of agency at work in particular 
scenarios, describing the energies and interrelationships of wind-swept leaves, balls of snow, and 
breathing flowers.  In the processes of their active lives things, for Wordsworth, suggest patterns 
of repetition, analogy, transmission and reception that can be received as the poetry of nature, as 
well as evoked and emulated in his own verse. 
This chapter reads a selection of Wordsworth’s poetry (written at Alfoxden and, later, at 
Grasmere) to elaborate his belief in the creativity and collective agency of plants, animals, and 
nonliving things.  During this brief experimental period Wordsworth was open to a kind of vital 
materialism that has as much in common with Zoonomia as it does with contemporary 
posthumanist political theorist Jane Bennett's Vibrant Matter.  The emphasis in Vibrant Matter, 
Zoonomia, and Lyrical Ballads alike is on exploring what Bennett calls “the material agency or 
effectivity of nonhuman or not-quite-human things.”116   But Wordsworth's materialism is also 
uniquely Wordsworthian in its emphasis on things not only as effective, but as creative, 
stimulated by an impulse to "make / Some other being conscious of their life" through processes 
of enticement, expansion, and repetition.  Wordsworth favored the word “impression” to 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
appearance distinguishes them to Wordsworth as worthy of poetic treatment.  My discussion of “The 
Thorn” in this chapter elaborates on these points. 
116 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter:  A Political Ecology of Things (Durham:  Duke University Press, 2010), 
ix. 
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describe the effects of these processes.  His objects and things are impressive and impress-able, 
touching one another in both a literal and a figural sense.  Indeed, in taking up Erasmus Darwin’s 
theory that all forms of life, even plants, experience the world through sensation and that these 
sensations are registered and repeated in ideas and dreams, Wordsworth resists making a 
distinction between material, sensory experience and the world evoked through the creative 
imagination.   For Wordsworth, nonhuman things produce, through their relationships to one 
another, a poetry of daily life characterized by repetition, analogy, and expression and 
punctuated by accident, surprise, and play.   
In this chapter, I link Wordsworth’s interest in descriptive poetry to natural history 
writing and consider his engagement with Darwin’s Zoonomia in “Lines Written in Early 
Spring.”  I then move to Wordsworth’s fascination with the transformation or enchantment of 
particular objects in the world and on the page through transitory natural phenomena and the 
influence of the imagination, respectively.  Positing the relationship of natural phenomena and 
the imagination not simply as analogous, but also as richly interactive, I conclude with a reading 
of two lesser-known fragments and several spots of time episodes to evolve a theory of 
Wordsworth’s playful, creative engagement with assemblies of human and nonhuman actors and 
his evocation of these assemblies in his poetry.  This account of Wordsworth’s dynamic and 
interactive relationship with a world of “vibrant matter” counters a pervasive characterization of 
Wordsworth as a poet who merely “fill’d all things with himself / And made all gentle sounds 
tell back” his own tale.117   
                                                
 
117 In “The Nightingale: A Conversational Poem” (written for Lyrical Ballads in April, 1798), Coleridge 
describes “youths and maidens most poetical” who have fallen prey to this narcissistic mistake, calling the 
Nightingale’s song a “melancholy strain” in a reflection of their own mood, rather than of the bird’s 
actual sounds (which Coleridge deems joyful).  Coleridge’s criticism was not necessarily directed at 
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The Application of Natural History to Poetry 
 As I discussed in the previous chapter, Coleridge seemed particularly motivated to 
explore how a better understanding of natural history might inform the Lyrical Ballads, and both 
he and Wordsworth may have read John Aikin’s 1777 Essay on the Application of Natural 
History to Poetry.  In that essay, John Aikin (brother of Anna Barbauld) discusses what he 
believed to be the sad state of modern poetry in terms very similar to those Wordsworth would 
later use in his “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads, which had been charged with treating 
“uninteresting subjects.”118    Like Wordsworth, Aikin believed the “insipidity of Modern Poetry” 
was due not to any particular subject matter, but to an inept, unobservant, and unrefreshing 
treatment of subjects, particularly natural ones.  Wordsworth’s vow to “look steadily at his 
subject” might be considered a direct response to Aikin’s complaint that the description of 
natural objects had degenerated to the point that they were “faint, obscure, and ill characterized . 
. . owing to a too cursory and general survey of objects.”119  Aikin and Wordsworth’s pieces also 
hold in common a contempt for the lazy passage of particular figures, phrases, and associations 
through the work of generations of poets.  Both writers, at least in this context, see such 
borrowings as shortcuts to the work of original observation and reflection required of any poet.  
Thus, Wordsworth “[abstains] from the use of many expressions, in themselves proper and 
beautiful, but which have been foolishly repeated by bad Poets, till such feelings of disgust are 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Wordsworth, but it does seem representative of a particular version of Wordsworth we think we know.  
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “The Nightingale,” Lyrical Ballads and Other Poems, 795, ll. 20-21. 
118 Robert Southey, "Review of Lyrical Ballads, with a Few Other Poems," The Critical Review 24 (Oct. 
1798): 197-204. Rpt. in Nineteenth-Century Literature Criticism. Ed. Laurie Lanzen Harris. Vol. 9. 
Detroit: Gale Research, 1985. Literature Resource Center. Web. 23 June 2010. 
119 “An Essay on the Application of Natural History to Poetry,” 10. 
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connected with them as it is scarcely possible by any art of association to overpower,”120 and 
Aikin urges poets to drop the erroneous representations of nature that writers “of every age have 
adopted,” from “the song of the dying swan” to the “halcyon’s nest; the crocodile’s tears; the 
pelican’s feeding her young with her blood; and the whole existence of the phoenix.”121  Though 
Wordsworth is primarily concerned to eradicate trite associations and worn, ornate diction, and 
Aikin to rid descriptive poetry of tired and incorrect descriptions of the natural world, both 
authors grasp for a poetry that might more brilliantly and, in some sense, more truly express 
nature. 
Like his sister’s journal entries, the emphasis in many of Wordsworth’s descriptions is 
less on the features of natural objects than it is on their animation.  He aims for an evocation of 
their lively being even when they are not living, in a strict sense.  In a relatively lengthy 
fragment, “The wind sent from behind the hill,” Wordsworth describes in detail the appearance 
of fallen oak leaves in a hail storm. In these lines, the leaves are animated by the hailstones, 
which cause them to “skip and hop:” 
See where the heavy hailstones drop 
The withered leaves they skip and hop, 
There’s not a single breeze of air – 
Yet here, and there, and every where 
Along the smooth and spatious floor, 
Beneath the thick and verdant bower, 
The wither’d leaves jump up and spring 
As if each were a living thing. 
This long description why indite 
 Because it was a pleasant sight.122 
                                                
 
120 “Preface,” 748.  
121 Aikin, 24. 
122 This fragment and others cited hereafter are included in Lyrical Ballads, and Other Poems, 1797-1800, 
edited by James Butler and Karen Green (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1992), 283-84, ll. 13-22.  As 
the editors point out, “The wind sent from behind the hill” was likely composed in the same sitting as 
Wordsworth’s first draft of “The Thorn” on March 19, 1798. 
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Wordsworth’s imperative, “See where the heavy hailstones drop,” calls on his reader to envision 
this action and to marvel with him at the animation of the dead leaves.  Pointing “here, and there, 
and every where,” he slows the pace of the verse to the registration of three discrete points of 
contact where particular hail stones hit particular leaves.  Beyond those adjectives included in his 
description of the “smooth and spatious floor” of leaves below the speaker’s feet and the “thick 
and verdant bower” above him, the speaker uses few adjectives in his description, directing his 
reader’s attention instead to particular points in space and to the action of the hailstones and 
leaves, evoked in a succession of punchy verbs:  drop, skip, hop, jump and spring.    
Surprisingly, the last two lines of the poem offer a diffident apology of sorts for this extended 
descriptive romp and a simple explanation for it:  the sight was pleasurable.  The playful verbs 
used to describe the action of the leaves imply that their activity, too, was pleasurable.        
 In his anthology, Romantic Natural Histories (which intersperses Romantic poetry 
and prose with a variety of scientific reports, travel writing, and natural history of the same 
period), Ashton Nichols persuasively links the apparently anthropomorphic tendencies of 
Romantic poetry with a revolutionary scientific interest in the common roots of pleasure and pain 
in both human and nonhuman animals.  Nichols stresses that “pleasure,” in particular, was a 
common concern of Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, Oliver Goldsmith and Erasmus 
Darwin.123  Darwin, especially, explored pleasure as a principal of reproduction, and happiness as 
the common property of all living things.124  The poetry of Darwin’s Temple of Nature, for 
                                                
 
123 Ashton Nichols, introduction to Romantic Natural Histories. 
124 Interestingly, as Tim Fulford explores in his article “Coleridge, Darwin, Linnaeus:  The Sexual Politics 
of Botany,” in The Wordsworth Circle, 1997 Summer, 28 (3), 124-30, Coleridge himself may have 
chastised Darwin for his salacious portraits in “The Loves of the Plants.”  Coleridge seems to have been 
concerned to protect what he felt was an important distinction between human and vegetable love.  It is 
not clear, nevertheless, that Coleridge was particularly vexed by scientific inquiries into the possibility 
that all sensation and emotion might be traced to the same material causes.    
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example, describes in purple terms the “sexual Pleasures” of a series of heavily 
anthropomorphized varieties of flowers, but explains in painstaking scientific prose the source 
material for each of his wildest, most poetical articulations.  Darwin, Buffon, and others also 
discussed more generally the capacity for happiness, enjoyment, and pleasure held by all life 
forms.  Darwin extended this idea most widely by suggesting that the general economy of nature 
over time generated more and more happiness, the product of an endless cycle of death, decay, 
and reanimation, through which ever more organisms enjoyed the benefit of life.  This cycle of 
joy and happiness (as well pain), Darwin believed, included human beings.   
By the 1790’s, as Nichols points out, poetic descriptions of the natural world included 
comparisons between the human and nonhuman spheres that were not simply metaphorical, but 
that were also supported by the best observational science of the time.  The Wordsworths and 
Coleridge were aware of this science, and may have connected it to their philosophical reading.  
As Adam Potkay argues, Wordsworth and Coleridge were very likely reading Spinoza’s Ethics 
over the summer of 1796.  Potkay believes that Wordsworth absorbed Spinoza’s belief in “the 
bond between (one) life and joy,” while extending the “franchise of joy” beyond the human 
apprehension of God in nature to nonhuman creatures and things, who are also able to enjoy life 
and intuit, as Potkay puts it, “the interconnection of all things.”125  The connection between joy 
and life is expressed most prominently in the Lyrical Ballads in “Lines Written in Early Spring.”  
It is in that poem, as well, that Wordsworth most deliberately considers the value of what may, or 
may not, be a form of anthropomorphism.  In the “Lines” Wordsworth also seems to experiment 
with many of the ideas Darwin elaborates in Zoonomia, a treatise Wordsworth requested in 
                                                
 
125 Adam Potkay, “Wordsworth and the Ethics of Things,”  PMLA 2008 March; 123 (2): 390-404. 
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1798.126      
The poem begins with the speaker in an easy and contemplative posture, “reclined, / In 
that sweet mood when pleasant thoughts / Bring sad thoughts to the mind.”127  The aural 
backdrop, “a thousand blended notes” is set behind the reclining speaker like a painted curtain, 
whose figures become differentiated and animated as the poem develops. Though the basis of the 
contemplative poem is analogy, likeness, and shared sensation, the speaker separates himself 
from the natural world he describes, even as he articulates his links to it, which he describes in 
the second verse: 
To her fair works did nature link 
The human soul that through me ran; 
And much it griev’d my heart to think 
What man has made of man. (5-8)  
As Potkay points out, the word human in the phrase “human soul” is a delimiting adjective:  
while designating the particular soul it describes as a human one, it also acknowledges that there 
are other sorts of souls.  Thus, while differentiating the speaker from the “fair works” to which 
his soul is linked, it also links him to an en-souled natural world.  In its peculiar phrasing, the 
line also imagines the soul’s physical relation to the body as a fluid that runs through the speaker, 
curiously distinct from the body yet coterminous with nature’s “fair works.”   
                                                
 
126 As Richard Matlak reports in The Wordsworth Circle ("Wordsworth's Reading of Zoonomia in Early 
Spring" 21 (1990): 76-81), Wordsworth requested a copy of Zoonomia “by the first carrier” in February, 
1798 and Dorothy wrote that it “completely answered the purpose” for which Wordsworth requested it in 
mid-March (she did not specify that purpose, unfortunately).  Several articles have appeared on 
Wordsworth’s treatment of Zoonomia, but my sense is that much more could be done.  James H. Averill 
concentrates on its medical materialist influence on Wordsworth's Lyrical Ballads, citing Zoonomia's case 
studies on madness and obsession as a source for "Goody Black and Harry Gill," "The Idiot Boy," "The 
Thorn," and others ("Wordsworth and 'Natural Science': The Poetry of 1798" in the Journal of English 
and Germanic Philology 77 (1978): 232-46).   Richard Matlak rightly sees Zoonomia's influence on 
Wordsworth as extending beyond the inspiration for specific poems to Wordsworth's biological 
understanding of life.  In his very brief article in the Wordsworth Circle he sketches the influence of this 
understanding on Wordsworth's conception of nature's mental life, his ideas about the healthfulness of the 
body in relation to nature, and the "corporal texture of his inner-body imagery” (232). 
127 Lyrical Ballads and Other Poems, 76 ll. 2-4. 
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The fluidity of the soul in this formulation resonates with Erasmus Darwin’s descriptions 
of what he called the “two essences or substances” of all things.  All things, Darwin proposed, 
consist of a substance “which may be termed spirit” and another, which he termed “matter.”  
Darwin believed spirit possesses the “power to commence or produce motion,” while matter 
possesses only the power to “receive or communicate it.”128  Darwin was careful, however, not to 
associate “spirit” with the immaterial or supernatural.  In Zoonomia he makes clear that,  
By the words spirit of animation or sensorial power, I mean only that animal life, 
which mankind possesses in common with brutes, and in some degree even with 
vegetables, and leave the consideration of the immortal part of us, which is the 
object of religion, to those who treat of revelation.129 
Though Wordsworth specifies a “human soul” in the second verse of “Lines Written in Early 
Spring,” his evocation of that soul not necessarily as an immortal thing, but as a movement 
through the body suggests his interest in Darwin’s project, as does his preoccupation with the 
lively pleasures of the birds, twigs, and flowers around him.  The “spirit of animation” or 
“sensorial power” Darwin describes all beings possessing is very much at play in the “Lines,” 
where the behaviour the speaker observes in the plants and birds around him is either in 
common, or identical with, his own (the speaker’s tone suggests that he is tempted to consider 
their joy as in common with his own, rather than simply similar to it). 
This temptation is the same with which Darwin begins Zoonomia.  In his preface, he 
dramatically asserts the powerful benefits and dangers of analogical thinking: 
The great CREATOR of all things has infinitely diversified the works of his 
hands, but has at the same time stamped a certain similitude on the features of 
nature, that demonstrates to us, that the whole is one family of one parent.  On this 
similitude is founded all rational analogy; which, so long as it is concerned in 
comparing the essential properties of bodies, leads us to many and important 
discoveries; but when with licentious activity it links together objects, otherwise 
                                                
 
128 Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or, The Laws of Organic Life (London:  Printed for J. Johnson, 1794), 5. 
129 Ibid., 109.  
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discordant, by some fanciful similitude; it may indeed collect ornaments for wit 
and poetry, but philosophy and truth recoil from its combinations.130 
The speaker of the “Lines,” who hears “a thousand blended notes” in a reclined posture is 
engaged in an activity of analogy that, if not “licentious,” is nevertheless leisurely, fanciful, and 
poetical.  The charm of the speaker’s “sweet mood” is in fact a certain drift in the thinking it 
produces, through which “pleasant thoughts / Bring sad thoughts to the mind” (3-4), and this 
drifting extends also from “nature” to “man,” and from the pleasures of the birds, flowers, and 
twigs that spread around the speaker to his own.  Despite their ease, the directionality and 
plausibility of these analogies is in question throughout the poem, and it becomes unclear 
whether the analogies the speaker implicitly makes are observations of “fanciful similarity,” 
“rational analogy” or even true commonality.  Both Darwin and Wordsworth seem interested in 
these varieties of analogical thinking as segments in a process, with inevitable turns from like to 
unlike or from similar to same in a process analogous to the evolution of natural forms (which 
Darwin would describe in detail elsewhere in Zoonomia and The Temple of Nature).   
The second two lines of the second stanza initiate a tenuous division in the poem between 
feeling and thinking (and, later, divisions among sensing, thinking and doing).  In this 
articulation, the heart grieves over what the mind thinks (“And much it griev’d my heart to think 
/ What man has made of man” (7-8)).  But in their phrasing, the lines also suggest that the heart 
itself may be a thinking organ and, in particular, the organ of analogical thinking, grieving over 
“What man has made of man.”  From the tenuousness of an analogy made by a heart that thinks, 
Wordsworth moves in the middle verses to a series of variously confident, and qualified, 
assertions of the pleasures of the plants and birds around him: 
Through primrose-tufts, in that sweet bower, 
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The periwinkle trail’d its wreathes; 
And ‘tis my faith that every flower 
Enjoys the air it breathes. 
The birds around me hopp’d and play’d: 
Their thoughts I cannot measure, 
But the least motion which they made, 
It seem’d a thrill of pleasure. 
The budding twigs spread out their fan, 
To catch the breezy air;  
And I must think, do all I can, 
That there was pleasure there. (9-20) 
Wordsworth’s emphasis on the pleasures of sensation resonates with Darwin’s arguments in 
Zoonomia.  In particular, it reflects Darwin’s argument that even plants pursue, and enjoy, these 
pleasures.  Indeed, Darwin’s “vegetables” are capable of “spontaneous motion” and are endowed 
with many “organs of sense” that distinguish varying degrees of moisture, light, smell, etc.  They 
actively avoid pain, and seek out pleasure within the constraints of their limited mobility.  In this 
vein, Wordsworth’s twigs “spread out their fan, / To catch the breezy air,” and his flowers enjoy 
the breaths they take.  Actions like these imply, as Darwin puts it, “sensation or volition,” the 
basis for his belief that vegetables do not merely respond to irritants in their environment, but in 
fact have “ideas” of  the external world like the ones humans formulate through their senses.  
Moreover, Darwin concluded that vegetable life is “furnished with a common sensorium 
belonging to each bud, and that they must occasionally repeat those perceptions either in their 
dreams or waking hours, and consequently possess ideas of so many of the properties of the 
external world, and of their own existence.”131  
                                                
 
131 Darwin, 107.  An extended reading of Zoonomia with Wordsworth’s poetry, which I have not 
developed in this chapter, might explore the compelling resemblance between Darwin’s theory 
of the repetition of perceptions in “dreams or waking hours” as the source of self-consciousness 
with Wordsworth’s interest in trance states and repetition as a source of consciousness.  In a 
fragment composed at Grasmere in 1800, for example, Wordsworth writes, “when / Our trance 
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Wordsworth’s description of animal sensation and volition in the “Lines” is a great deal 
more limited than Darwin’s.  Indeed, in the fourth verse, on the motions of birds, the speaker 
confines himself to those motions and an estimation of the birds’ pleasure, declining to consider 
their thoughts:  “The birds around me hopp’d and play’d: / Their thoughts I cannot measure” (13-
14).  The punning of “measure” as the ability to understand the birds’ thoughts and as the ability 
to transcribe them in verse is a playful way of putting at arm’s reach some of the speculations 
Darwin engages in Zoonomia and also a delicate suggestion that the birds’ thoughts may truly be 
immeasurable—in some way beyond or outside the bounds of anthropomorphic analogical 
thinking, poetic fancy, or language.        
The speaker bumps up against the limitations of various forms of knowing throughout the 
poem, as he struggles to reconcile what he sees, thinks, and believes.  The middle section of the 
poem vacillates between these forms of knowing.  In the third verse, for example, it is the 
speaker’s “faith that every flower / Enjoys the air it breathes.”  In the fourth verse, the speaker 
believes that the birds hop and play with what “seem’d a thrill of pleasure,” and in the fifth verse 
the speaker “must think, do all [he] can,” that there is pleasure in the spreading twigs as they 
stretch to catch the air.  Thus the speaker moves from faith to surmise to thought (as if compelled 
to do so) in a series of observations that test the strength of what is a fundamentally 
anthropomorphic, or sympathetic, impulse.  Wordsworth ensures, however, that we think of that 
impulse in a broader context by flipping the directionality of the speaker’s analogical thinking to 
contemplate twice “[w]hat man has made of man,” based upon his observations of nature.  This 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
had left us, oft have we by aid / Of the impressions which it left behind / Look’d inward on 
ourselves, and learn’d perhaps / Something of what we are…by such retrospect we brought it 
[the “original impression of delight”] back / To yet a second and a second life, / While in this 
excitation of the mind / A vivid pulse of sentiment and thought  / Beat palpably within us, and all 
shades / Of consciousness were ours.”  Lyrical Ballads and Other Poems, 323-4, ll. 12-24. 
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move seems at once ancillary and essential to the poem’s exploration of nonhuman pleasure.   In 
the final stanza of the poem, the speaker’s lament hinges upon a strangely forceful evocation of 
the reflections that preceded it, but the verse is nevertheless consistent with the powerful 
ambivalence of the poem as a whole:   
If I these thoughts may not prevent, 
If such be of my creed the plan, 
Have I not reason to lament 
What man has made of man? (21-24) 
In this final verse and the one preceding it, thinking about the pleasure of nonhuman beings is 
something the speaker cannot avoid:  he “must” think of it, and he “may not prevent” himself 
from doing so.  Why should the speaker want to prevent these thoughts?  In the context of 
Darwin’s work, we can link such reservations to a possible unwillingness to fold “human” 
emotions such as pride, hope, and joy into the commonly available “pleasures” of all living 
beings, and emotions such as fear, anxiety, and disgust into “pains” (“all emotions,” Darwin 
claimed, “arise out of the exertions of these two faculties of the animal sensorium”).132  In the 
context of the poem, however, the resistance to believing in commonly held and available 
pleasures is expressly linked to the pain the speaker must feel, believing this, over the relative 
absence of such commonly available pleasures in human relationships.  In this way, Wordsworth 
raises the stakes of the anthropomorphic thinking that the “sweet mood” he describes at the 
outset of the poem encourages him to indulge.  He also cleverly turns the tables on critics of 
Darwin’s work, who believed that acceptance of the material basis of all emotions would 
diminish the complexity and depth of human forms of love and joy.  Instead, Wordsworth 
suggests that allowing—or requiring—ourselves to acknowledge the material, universal basis of 
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pleasure and pain may require us to acknowledge the impoverishment of its human forms in 
comparison to its animal and vegetable ones.      
Wordsworth revised the cryptic lines “If I these thoughts may not prevent, / If such be of 
my creed the plan” in 1820 to read “If this belief from Heaven is sent, / If such be nature’s holy 
plan,”133 removing the reference to a “creed” and tentatively placing responsibility for the 
speaker’s thoughts with an external, religious source.  While the 1798 version, with its “creed,” 
also identifies the poem’s logic as one depending upon a quasi-religious faith, “creed” (as the 
Oxford English Dictionary notes), may also more broadly apply to any individual or group’s 
system of belief that is capable of being expressed in a definite formula.  Wordsworth and 
Coleridge’s Lyrical Ballads, though not itself a formula, is a proof of the creed Wordsworth 
invokes in “Lines Written in Early Spring”—that nonhuman things think, feel, and act not only 
as passive registers of their surroundings, but as creative agents capable of expressing ideas, 
whether singly or in concert with others.   
 
Impressive Objects and Things, Active and Efficient 
The poem printed immediately after  “Lines Written in Early Spring” in the 1798 edition 
of Lyrical Ballads proceeds with that poem’s interest in nonhuman forms of expressivity, 
extending them to a nearly inert, “aged thorn.”  This natural object straddles the boundaries 
between the living and nonliving, the animate and inanimate.  “The Thorn” is important for our 
understanding of natural objects in the Ballads not only because it features a natural object in its 
title and is one of the collection’s featured poems (“The Thorn” was distinguished by a half-title 
page in the 1802 printing), but also because a rich store of material supplementary to the poem 
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attests to the centrality of the thorn as a compelling and creatively engaging object.  Indeed, 
although we might think of the poem as being about the story of Martha Ray or its notoriously 
“garrulous” narrator, it does not seem to have had its origin in that story.  At least, Wordsworth 
does not credit the “The Lass of Fair Wone” or any Scottish ballad (possible sources for this 
story) with inspiring its writing, and an early version of the poem presents, as Dorothy described 
them, merely “lines describing a stunted thorn”:   
[On a] summit where the stormy gale 
Sweeps through the clouds from vale to vale— 
A thorn there is which like a stone 
With jagged lichens is o'ergrown, 
A thorn that wants its thorny points 
A toothless thorn with knotted joints, 
Not higher than a two years’ child, 
It stands upon that spot so wild; 
Of leaves it has repaired its loss 
With heavy tufts of dark green moss, 
Which from the ground in plenteous crop 
Creep[?s] upward to its very top 
To bury it for ever-more.134 
This draft of the poem, like the extended version, relies upon repetition, apparent tautology, and 
cloying rhyme for its effect.  Most all of the characteristics Wordsworth presents in this version 
of the poem also appear in the published version and two of the lines (“A thorn there is which 
like a stone / With jagged lichens is o’ergrown”) appear in almost exactly the same form in the 
published poem as a frequent refrain.  Wordsworth would defend these features in a note to the 
poem included in the second edition of the Ballads as evidence of the “inadequateness of our 
own power, or the deficiencies of language” in communicating impassioned feeling.  The 
“craving in the mind” induced by consciousness of this deficiency causes speakers to “cling to 
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the same words, or words of the same character.”135  In the note to the poem, the particular 
speaker Wordsworth references is the “Captain of a small trading vessel” who he says narrates 
the story of Martha Ray, but the “craving in the mind” is evident in the draft of the poem, as well 
(though there is no reason to believe Wordsworth already envisioned that speaker as the sailor he 
would later describe).  This may be because Wordsworth was, as he explains in his Fenwick note 
to the poem, responding even in the draft version of the poem to a creative imperative to make a 
deep impression on his readers by representing a simple object.  In the Fenwick note, 
Wordsworth describes encountering the thorn and his desire to write about it:  
Arose out of my observing, on the ridge of Quantock Hill, on a stormy day a thorn 
which I had often past in calm and bright weather without noticing it.  I said to 
myself, ‘Cannot I by some invention do as much to make this thorn permanently 
an impressive object as the storm has made it to my eyes at this moment.’  I began 
the poem accordingly and composed it with great rapidity.136 
One of the “inventions” Wordsworth ultimately employed to fix the thorn as an impressive 
object in his readers’ minds was the story of Martha Ray, but in the initial version of the poem 
Wordsworth attempted only to describe the thorn and the storm.  In the descriptive draft, the 
storm opens the scene, drawing the reader’s attention as it drew Wordsworth’s on Quantock hill.  
In the final version of the poem, however, the storm drops out of the description and the story of 
Martha Ray (as told by its superstitious narrator), takes its place in enhancing the interest and 
impressiveness of the thorn for readers of the poem.  As Wordsworth describes it in the Fenwick 
note, his object in writing (and, presumably, revising) the poem was not to describe the thorn as 
it appeared in the storm, but to emulate the effect of the storm on the thorn:  to transform the 
stunted object into an impressive one for his readers in the same way that the storm transformed 
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it into an impressive one when he passed it on that particular day (never having noticed it 
before).  
According to Coleridge, he and Wordsworth viewed such transformations or 
enchantments as “the poetry of nature.”  In his Biographia Literaria, Coleridge describes this 
poetry: 
During the first year that Mr. Wordsworth and I were neighbours, our 
conversations turned frequently on the two cardinal points of poetry, the power of 
exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature, 
and the power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colours of 
imagination.  The sudden charm which accidents of light and shade, which 
moonlight or sunset diffused over a known and familiar landscape appeared to 
represent the practicability of combining both.  These are the poetry of nature.137 
Coleridge’s final, italicized, statement is delightfully ambiguous.  It is difficult to designate what 
“these” might refer to, or whether the poetry “of” nature refers to poetry about nature or poetry 
by nature.  Two possible, differing, readings of the line are that accidental natural phenomena are 
nature’s poetry, and that faithfulness to and imaginative modification of nature produces the best 
poetry about it.  The two readings are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, though Wordsworth and 
Coleridge may have differed somewhat in their understanding of “imagination,” there is a 
consistency in these passages and others in their recognition that the role of imagination in 
composing poetry and the role of accidental phenomena in composing effects in nature are the 
same:  that both produce “impressive effects out of simple elements.”  In his note to “The 
Thorn,” Wordsworth notes that imagination is the faculty that has the power to produce these 
impressive effects, and that he intended his “superstitious” narrator to have more than a usual 
share of it.  
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Throughout these passages by Wordsworth and Coleridge, the activity of the imagination 
is described as akin to the activity of a natural world that continually casts as novel its most basic 
and enduring elements, and that produces intangible, unrepeatable, yet noticeable effects.  As 
noted earlier, Wordsworth’s favoured term to describe these effects was “impressive:” the 
impressive effect, object, or event is one that leaves its shape, imprint, or indentation in the mind 
or material with which it interacts, but which may or may not itself be traced.  Throughout his 
writing of this period (in the Lyrical Ballads and in the two-part Prelude), Wordsworth describes 
the power of nature and its objects as “impressive,” a term he uses variously as adjective and as 
verb to refer to their relative importance and to the nature of their actions.   Thus, in 
“Expostulation and Reply” there are “Powers / Which of themselves our minds impress,” and, in 
“Tintern Abbey,” nature works to “impress” the mind with “quietness and beauty.”  In the two-
part Prelude, Wordsworth finds natural objects and forms that have been “impressed” with the 
“characters / Of danger or desire” by certain “Powers” and, alternatively, “Collateral objects and 
appearances” that have been impressed with “quaint associations” that become legible only after 
“maturer seasons” call them forth.  He finds in minds, words, and objects the impressions of 
other minds, words and objects in stunning circles of influence that reverberate between boys 
and their playthings, people and their environments, poems and their readers.  Wordsworth 
stresses that these impressions are often missed or forgotten, and that their transmission is often 
distorted, but he is nevertheless fascinated by them. 
“The Thorn” is itself an impressive examination of the relationship between objects, 
things, words, and passions.  In his “note” to “The Thorn,” Wordsworth explicitly considers 
words “not only as symbols” of passion, “but as things, active and efficient, which are of 
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themselves part of the passion.”138  Words become a working part of passion and thought, taking 
up space in the realm of feelings and ideas, not merely on the page.139  Giving words this space 
also makes them subject to further transformation by their placement in shifting associative 
networks of understanding.  Words become part and parcel, or "part and power" to use 
Wordsworth's phrase, of the discovery and creation of fresh understandings of how our ideas and 
feelings are related in the association of experiences, objects, feelings, and ideas.  As Frances 
Ferguson puts it in Wordsworth: Language as Counter-Spirit, 
The relationship between words and things and thoughts which underlies 
representational schemes of language shifts to become a relationship between 
things and word-things and thoughts because of Wordsworth's concern with the 
interest of the mind in words "as things, active and efficient." Words become 
themselves entities which the mind delights in, not merely vehicles through which 
the mind arrives at the entities of the world.140   
Word-things become not less expressive or mutable given their materiality, but more so.  Word-
things allow the poet's "nearly obsessive return" to them just as he returns to particular objects, 
events, and characters throughout Lyrical Ballads.  That return, as Ferguson points out, is to be 
seen "less as poverty than as an intensity which explores all aspects of the individual words and 
objects.”141  Wordsworth makes this return not only to particular words, but also to phrases and 
to particular associations he has made between words and ideas.  Near the end of the "Preface" 
he confesses that "sometimes from diseased impulses" he may have "written upon unworthy 
subjects" and that his language "may frequently have suffered from those arbitrary connections 
of feelings and ideas with particular words and phrases, from which no man can altogether 
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protect himself.”142  However, the same diseased impulses that Wordsworth claims led him at 
times to arbitrary connections in fact seems to have staved them off:  his "obsessive return" to 
words, objects, ideas, and experiences in Lyrical Ballads results not in the repetition of 
increasingly meaningless relationships between them, but in different, newly meaningful ones.  
It is this kind of repetition with a difference that Wordsworth claims in his "Note" to "The 
Thorn" he was attempting to illustrate.  "It was my wish in this poem," he says, to show how men 
"cleave to the same ideas; and to follow the turns of passion, always different, yet not palpably 
different, by which their conversation is swayed.”143  He goes on to admonish readers who 
"imagine that the same words cannot be repeated without tautology [ . . . ] virtual tautology is 
much oftener produced by using different words when the meaning is exactly the same.”144  His 
emphasis in both comments is on the repetition of words or ideas which, rather than bringing 
them further from revelatory power, brings them closer by illuminating the changes, however 
slight, their relationships undergo with repetition.  "The Thorn" directly approaches this 
phenomenon of associative or reflective thought, commingling words, objects, ideas, and feeling, 
in subtle, varying combinations. 
Wordsworth’s comment on words as “things, active and efficient” gives us insight not 
only into the nature of Wordsworth’s conception of words, but also into his conception of 
“things.”  Wordsworth’s use of the word “thing” is staggeringly inclusive.  It can seem, certainly, 
that anything Wordsworth considers might be referred to as a “thing.”  However, Wordsworth 
does not use “things” as a place-holder for more particular nouns like creature, being, power, 
leaf, or Lucy.  Instead, Wordsworth’s “things” defy categorization in ecologically and ethically 
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significant ways.  “Thing theory,” most closely associated with Bill Brown’s work and the study 
of eighteenth-century “it narratives,” is of limited usefulness in understanding the significance of 
“things” in Wordsworth’s work because Brown’s thing theory concerns primarily “made” 
objects—objects that are made by humans, whether that making comes about through industry or 
the objects’ accretion of  cultural histories and fetishes.  Conversely, as W.J.T. Mitchell points 
out in “Romanticism and the Life of Things,” “things” took on a “new life” in the romantic 
period as “new forms of archaic and modern animism and vitalism” sprang up and asserted 
themselves outside the realm of the human.  Mitchell cites Foucault’s The Order of Things, 
which describes the way things in the nineteenth-century gained a “historicity proper to them, 
which freed them from the continuous space that imposed the same chronology upon them as 
upon men.”145  In one sense, then, things were liberated from the human through an emphasis on 
their natural or geological history. 
Marilyn Gaull’s reading of Wordsworth adds another layer of complexity to the 
consideration of “things” in his work; she works to explain the difference between “objects” and 
“things.” In her article, “‘Things Forever Speaking’ and ‘Objects of All Thought’”, Gaull argues 
that the two categories were easily distinguished in Wordsworth’s lifetime, when “object” 
referred to inert, resistant materials, and “things” (as Wordsworth often described them), acted in 
more lively ways.   Gaull claims that objects and things were mutable, and could be converted 
from one to the other through the processes of perception and memory.  Gaull describes her 
concept of “thinging-ing”:  “taking a word, concept, object, even person out of its natural or 
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material setting and projecting human values, meaning, or explanations on it.”146  Merely 
perceiving an object, Gaull says, can turn an object into a thing.  Gaull also proposes that 
memory, “the other sacred faculty of Romanticism,” has the power to convert things back to 
“objects, collectables, valued for their history with people, or other objects, or where they were 
found or purchased.”147  In both cases of conversion (from object to thing or from thing to 
object) Gaull describes human processes of projection, explanation, and memorialization as the 
crucial active element, while the objects and things themselves seem to contribute relatively 
little. 
Despite my appreciation for Gaull’s distinction between objects and things, and her 
nuanced discussion of their making and unmaking, I believe that things in Wordsworth’s poetry 
are, in some sense, “given”:  they do not rely on human agency for their existence, animation or 
significance.  The abstraction of “thing” as Wordsworth uses it in fact defies the binary subject-
object relationship that allows one party (the subject) to bestow or revoke the significance of an 
other.  In “Wordsworth and the Ethics of Things,” Adam Potkay points out that things in 
Wordsworth’s work confound definition: “they bespeak the fusion of object and event, matter 
and energy, surface and depth, as well as generality and particularity, the categorical and the 
specific.”  Moreover, “Wordsworth’s things are things without objects, things anterior to and in 
excess of subject-object dualities.”148 
Potkay’s etymological inquiry into the word “thing” works through the word’s history 
from Old English to present-day usage.  Though Potkay finds that the word still bears traces of 
its original comprehensiveness, it became limited with industrial modernity to “a material and 
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noncognitive object, particularly a manufactured object.”149  Potkay argues that Wordsworth’s 
use of the word recalls the Old English use, where there was “no term, such as object, for a 
material entity,” when, by extension, “medieval Germanic-language speakers . . . did not in 
general conceive of material objects in a delimited physical sense, as separate from events, from 
the constitution and frame of that which is and comes to be, and from the transcendental 
conditions for knowing what little we can know of systems or stories that exceed our 
comprehension.”150 Though he acknowledges definitions by Samuel Johnson and William 
Blackstone attempting to limit the word to “Whatever is; not a person” (Johnson) and “being 
without life or consciousness; an inanimate object, as distinguished from a person or living 
creature” (Blackstone),  Potkay believes Wordsworth uses things in a way that “blurs distinctions 
between persons and non-persons, between entities and events.”151 
I find in Potkay’s etymological study traces of an argument made by Jane Bennett in 
Vibrant Matter, in which Bennett strives to evoke a “vital materiality” by testing what Jacques 
Rancière has called “the partition of the sensible” between dull matter (things) and vibrant life 
(living beings).  In doing so, she hopes to “absolve” things from their “long history of attachment 
to automatism or mechanism.”152  Bennett proceeds in her study with conceptions of “vitality” 
and what it means to be an “actant” that might help us read some of Wordsworth’s most 
interesting evocations of the vital materiality of things.  For Bennett, “vitality” is “the capacity of 
things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede or block the will and designs 
of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of 
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their own.”153  Bennett often refers to these “quasi agents” as “actants.”  Actant, a term she 
borrows from Bruno Latour, is “a source of action that can be either human or nonhuman; it is 
that which has efficacy, can do things, has sufficient coherence to make a difference, produce 
effects, alter the course of events.”154 
Although readings of Wordsworth’s work often stress his ability to make the world over 
in his own image, his poetry is also littered with “actants”:  things that “produce effects” and 
“alter the course of events.”  His poetry is in this way a dynamic space, where the speaking poet 
interacts with a world of things that are themselves active, creative, and expressive.  This is 
especially clear in a fragment written by Wordsworth in late 1798, probably in Goslar, Germany: 
There is an active principle alive in all things: 
In all things, in all nature, in the flowers 
And in the trees, in every pebbly stone 
That paves the brooks, the stationary rocks 
The moving waters, and the invisible air. 
All beings have their properties which spread 
Beyond themselves, a power by which they make 
Some other being conscious of their life155 
In this fragment, “all things” includes the material (trees) the immaterial (air) the mobile (water) 
the immobile (rocks) the living (flowers) and the nonliving (stones).  All these things, these 
“beings,” Wordsworth claims, are active; specifically, they act upon others, making those others 
“conscious of their life.”  The source of their activity, and their life, is ambiguous.  In the first 
line of the poem, the speaker cites “an active principle alive in all things.”  This “active 
principle,” which we might associate with a soul, is situated “in all things,” the default location 
of conventional spirituality.  But as the poem develops, the active principle Wordsworth first 
invokes is dispersed into “properties which spread / Beyond themselves,” multiplying and 
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dispersing the sources of aliveness and activity.  In other words, though Wordsworth begins with 
a single, unifying “principal alive in all things,” the fragment progresses towards what Jane 
Bennett might call an “agency of assemblages,” where multiple beings, each with multiple 
properties, reach out to affect many other beings.  This “active principle” through which “All 
beings have their properties which spread / Beyond themselves” also infuses the energy of 
Wordsworth’s poem, whose sentences spread from subordinate clause to subordinate clause and 
whose lines extend beyond themselves, reaching over enjambments within their flexible 
pentameter.  
The images this fragment evokes are of the “budding twigs” in “Lines Written in Early 
Spring,” who “spread out their fan, / To catch the breezy air,” and, even more nearly, Erasmus 
Darwin’s vegetable buds from Zoonomia, whose “anthers and stigmas are real animals, attached 
indeed to their parent tree like polypi or coral insects, but capable of spontaneous motions . . . 
affected with the passion of love, and furnished with powers of reproducing their species . . . fed 
with honey like the moths and butterflies, which plunder their nectarines.”156  Wordsworth’s 
powers by which things make “Some other being conscious of their life” also evoke the 
invitations for engagement extended by nonhuman things to Dorothy in her Alfoxden and 
Grasmere journals.  In many of the fragments William wrote around the same period, he 
eschewed the heavy abstraction of “powers” for playful engagement with an animated and 
interactive world of things.  In a series of such fragments, written between October and 
December 1800, Wordsworth was particularly preoccupied by the ways particular things, like 
leaves, might become agents of life or consciousness: 
When in the open space behind the h[    ] 
A tawny bunch of withered [?leaves], 
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Scarcely to be distinguish’d from a kite 
Or yellow falcon, wheeled itself about 
On that invisible whirlwind while the boy 
Shouted and shouted at the plant to see 
The playful life it led among the [        ] 
I guess it was 
Delight for which a happy [?man ?might ?pray]157 
Though many of the words of the fragment are missing, we can gather that the impetus behind 
this fragment was much the same as the one behind the thorn:  some accidental phenomenon (in 
the thorn, a storm, here, a “whirlwind”) has a transformative effect upon a simple object, and 
reveals it as impressive, lively, or simply delightful.  In this case, though the bunch of leaves is 
activated by the whirlwind, Wordsworth says the bunch “wheeled itself about,” displacing the 
agency of the rapidly moving wind and assigning it instead to the leaves themselves, which turn 
(through their comparisons to a kite and to a yellow falcon) from a bunch of inert and discrete 
things into a directed thing and finally into a lively being.  This obfuscation of agency might 
prompt us to reflect upon the nature of an agent, a thing Jane Bennett reminds us can refer both 
to a thing that has the power to act, and to a thing that acts on behalf of another, as an “agent” of 
transmission.  The transmission, dispersion, and consolidation of aliveness in the singular yet 
unspectacular phenomena Wordsworth describes disturbs our understanding of an agent (or 
subject) as singular, self-contained, and self-directed.  Moreover, the nature of the poem as 
fragment recruits the reader into participation in its activation, an activation enhanced rather than 
impeded by the omission or illegibility of particular words.  This is in part because the iambic 
pentameter drives the poem along without them, encouraging the reader to find suitable and 
more or less inferable substitutions.  In this way, the meter is a whirlwind that sweeps the reader 
up in the poem’s spontaneous production.      
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In other fragments of this period, Wordsworth expresses a similar interest in the 
dispersion of agency between actors and, particularly, between things that are not normally 
considered actors.  In the fragment following “When in the open space,” for example, 
Wordsworth describes  a “soft warm winter” morning, when a boy “by chance / Or wilfully . . . 
Unsettled with his foot a tuft of snow / Small as a sparrow’s egg,” which accumulates snow as it 
slides down a hill, gathering it up until it splits under its own weight and disperses into “a 
hundred tufts,” which collect more snow, until each in turn breaks “Into a thousand fragments . . 
. Splitting and gathering, / till the mountain seem’d / Raced over by a thousand living things, / 
Ten thousand snow-white rabbits of the cliffs.”158  This chain reaction (or, more aptly, reverse 
snow-ball effect) unfolds with delightful verbal slipperiness and rapidity, its various figures—the 
snow/egg/rabbits, the boy, his father, and their dog—assembled ambivalently around the action.  
Yet more wonderfully, the race of the snow-rabbits impresses upon the hill the form of a tree in 
the snow, to which the boy points:    
And when the Race was ended he would point 
Down to the form of that gigantic tree  
Which far beneath them by the devious tracks 
Left by the Runners in that elfin race 
Had been impress’d upon the snow and lay 
With trunk beginning at the Lad’s own feet 
And branches covering half the mountain-side. (22-28) 
The form impressed upon the snow at their feet has the characteristics of a Darwinian tree of life:  
its unfolding is spontaneous, undirected, generative.  The devious course of the snow-rabbits 
produces the recognizable form of the tree with the same lack of obvious agency or intent that 
typifies the other actors in the scene:  the father who stands “like a man / Robb’d of all purpose” 
(6-7), the boy who “by chance / Or wilfully” kick-starts the descent of the snow (7-8), and even 
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the dog who accompanies them, whose barks sleep among the snow and receive no echo, as if 
the dog had been “defrauded of his voice” (35).  And yet this assembly of figures and elements 
ambivalently generate, in their congregation, a tree and (a fragment of) a poem. 
 
Chance Collisions and Quaint Accidents 
The possibility that natural objects and things lead playful, creative lives recalls 
Coleridge’s supposition, in the Biographia Literaria, that nature might have a poetry of its own.  
Coleridge offers the appearance of natural objects under the influence of accidents of light and 
shade as one example of this poetry, but there are many other ways in which Wordsworth seems 
to have strained to elicit voices and images of nature that might in some way be considered 
given:  creative productions of a world capable of self expression.  In yet another fragment of 
late 1800, Wordsworth traces the voice of a small stream: 
Thou issuest from a fissure in the rock 
Compact into one individual stream, 
A small short stream no longer than the blade 
Of a child’s coral; then, upon the face 
Of the steep crag diffus’d, thou dost flow down  
Wide, weak and glimmering, and so thin withal 
Thy course is like the brushing of a breeze  
Upon a calm smooth lake.  A few bold drops  
Are there,—these starting regularly forth 
Strike somewhere on the rocks and stones beneath 
And are thy voice, for thou wert silent else.159 
Like the fragments quoted above, this fragment traces the agency of a body that is both one and 
many.  Like the group of leaves, or the gathering and splitting balls of snow, the stream of water 
is at once a single entity or agent and also multiple ones.  Like the snow and the leaves, the 
stream also changes form, narrowing and widening, breaking apart, and otherwise responding to 
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the pressures of its environment.  In this case, the water is compelled through a “fissure in the 
rock” into a concentrated stream, which becomes “diffus’d” upon the crag’s face.  “Wide, weak 
and glimmering” upon that face (in an alliteration that enhances the sense of one and many in the 
poem), it is possible to read the stream as a stream of tears, where a “few bold drops” spring out 
to produce a voice by striking the rocks and stones beneath them.  This delicate attribution of a 
face to the stream and crag gestures toward a tradition of poetic references to the “face of 
nature.”  In his reading of the ethics of things in Wordsworth, Potkay suggests that this tradition 
referenced not simply the visible surface of the world, but also the “nonnarrative fullness of 
things” underlying that surface.  Potkay suggests philosopher Silvia Benso’s The Face of Things 
as a good revision of that tradition for contemporary environmental ethics.   
In The Face of Things, Benso stresses the difference between faces and what she calls 
facialities.  Potkay quotes some of Benso’s definition of “facialities” in his essay, and I quote it 
at fuller length here to emphasize some of the commonalities I believe it has both with Bennett’s 
work on the vitality of things and Donna Haraway’s work on the potential for things to evoke an 
ethical response: 
Faces express a specific content, a defined contour, an individuated existence.  
Facialities invoke the intimation of signification of a face, and yet the vagueness 
of a cluster of meaning the demarcation of which remains blurred, fluid, porous to 
a continuous, osmotic exchange between inside and outside that mobilizes 
boundaries, and therefore definitions; that runs the risk of continuous slippage 
away into the night of the indistinct, undifferentiated, anonymous; that creates 
zones of shadows, ambiguities, perplexities, contradictions, and therefore 
richness.  Facialities evoke the possibility of the existence of faceless faces, 
which, despite their facelessness, are yet endowed with the intimating power of 
the face to demand an ethical response.160  
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Benso’s description of faciality resonates with Bennett’s on the indistinctness of agency and also 
Haraway’s work on the ability of nonhuman creatures and things to invite the engagement of 
their human spectators.  Benso is more strident in saying that facialities “demand” an ethical 
response, but all three thinkers on the power of things would certainly agree, with Wordsworth, 
that “All beings have their properties which spread / Beyond themselves, a power by which they 
make / Some other being conscious of their life.”  Even when those beings do not have a face, 
like the stream above, they often do seem to speak, project images, cast shadows, or otherwise 
engage creatively with the poet.  Unlike his sister Dorothy, who was careful to attend to natural 
objects and appearances that appeared in any way to invite her attention, William seemed 
particularly fascinated by those environmental phenomena that seemed to demonstrate or 
emulate creative activity of a human kind and especially the creative activity of his own poetic 
line. 
Put differently, Wordsworth valued most the objects, things, and appearances with which 
he could interact in terms of poetic sound and image, even when the sounds or images those 
things projected were incomprehensible or strange.  These odd engagements (part indulgence, 
part struggle, like all forms of play) are catalogued most memorably in the spots of time, their 
haunting aspects backlit by the seeming transgressions of a boy against nature.   In 
“Wordsworth’s Rhetorical Theft,” Timothy Bahti argues compellingly that the transgressions 
Wordsworth describes in the spots—the nest robbery, the boat stealing, and other, more 
ambiguous thefts and offences—are acts that “steal from nature in acts that metaphorize natural 
objects but also, ultimately, the self that would have a literal story of its ‘natural’ and proper 
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coexistence with nature.”161  Guilt over this metaphorical theft—the theft of a “proper 
coexistence with nature” in the service of poetry and metaphor itself—may indeed have affected 
Wordsworth as he expanded and revised The Prelude.  Nevertheless, the Two-Part Prelude takes 
a different approach to the play of figure and ground, immaterial and material.   
In Accident:  A Philosophical and Literary History, Ross Hamilton explores the role 
Wordsworth’s treatment of accident may have had in his understanding of this play between 
figure and ground, between pliant and resistant matter.  Hamilton’s account of accident in the 
spots of time has interesting resonances with accident as I have tracked it thus far.  Hamilton 
considers “accident” as it applies to the inessential qualities of things, to mishaps, and to 
unforeseen, chance events.  In his chapter on Wordsworth, “The Accidental Sublime,” Hamilton 
credits Wordsworth with transforming “details in nature or mundane objects into signs of 
philosophical import” and with transmuting “the inessential into the essential.”162  What is 
interesting about Hamilton’s account in this chapter is the durability of the accidental objects and 
events Wordsworth describes in the spots of time:  “what remained accidental was the transitory 
observations and fluctuating feelings that became attached to memories; what he recognized as 
substantive was the preservation of such accidents of experience in the form of eternal 
images.”163  As Hamilton puts it, the images of the spots of time become “substantial” over time:  
they become substances that matter, possess their own kind of stubborn materiality, despite the 
shifting associations that cling to them and their accidental, phenomenal origins. 
This is an arresting claim that might help explain the pull of the spots of time in our 
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thinking about objects, things, and the environment more generally in Wordsworth’s poetry and 
prose, even though those episodes turn on transitory events, special effects, and a nature that is 
different from one moment to the next.  In the Two-Part Prelude, the boy in the poem meets a 
world that is material and in some sense stable, yet not inert, and the poet writing meets images 
of that environment that are fixed, yet subject to changes in the poet’s series of associations 
regarding them.  In both these realms—of the boy at play in the lakes and the poet-narrator 
reflecting upon that play—there is the potential for creative engagement with a world that 
presents figures of itself that both inspire and frustrate the boy in those episodes and the poet 
writing them.  In the nest-robbing episode, for example, the boy is framed in contradistinction to 
a “naked crag” and moved by a “strange utterance.”   As the scene opens, the boy is seemingly 
aligned against and supported by the crag.  The speaker describes his precarious position 
Above the raven’s nest, by knots of grass 
Or half-inch fissures in the slipp’ry rock 
But ill sustained, and almost as it seemed, 
Suspended by the blast which blew amain 
Shouldering the naked crag…164  
The physicality of the language used in this passage, the contraction of “slipp’ry,” the sliding “s” 
sounds in quick collision with the hard sounds of “slipp’ry rock . . . sustained . . . almost,” and 
“blast,” as well as the arrangement of lines, with “Or” and “But” creating a skip and a lurch into 
theirs, and the opposite forces of suspension and support compelling theirs, ground the 
experience in material conflict; the boy, the blast, and the crag are caught in a similar dynamic of 
support and suspension.    In this intractable position, the wind speaks to or around the boy, but 
its “utterance” is incomprehensible:  
While on the perilous ridge I hung alone 
With what strange utterance did the loud dry wind 
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Blow through my ears; the sky seemed not a sky  
Of earth, and with what motion moved the clouds!  (63-66) 
As it swirls out of focus, the sky obtains an otherworldliness that is familiar from Dorothy’s 
journals, but William accentuates it here with a communication that passes through the boy 
powerfully without communicating anything in particular to him.  Although the “loud dry wind” 
is anthropomorphized as a “strange utterance,” that utterance blows through the boy’s ears 
without his comprehension—it may even move in one ear, and out the other without proper 
registration by the mind or senses.  The force of the “utterance” recalls that word’s etymological 
history not only as speech, but also as “a degree which surpasses bounds or goes beyond measure 
in respect of severity,” and that implies “immoderate force or violence” and “excess” (OED).  
This meaning of the word alone seems to call out for a reading of the episode as sublime.  
Wordsworth’s own rubric for the sublime, which he would later describe in an essay on “The 
Sublime and the Beautiful,” does resonate with the episode.  As the boy hangs upon the cliff, 
suspended by the wind and sustaining the cliff, he seems to “participate in the force which is 
acting upon” him and, in the second part of the verse, the boy becomes “absorbed in the 
contemplation of the might in the external power.”  Insofar as he is conscious of himself, he is 
also conscious of an “external Power at once awful & immeasurable.”  In this episode, the boy 
grasps at a meaning he cannot get or, in Wordsworth’s words (again on the sublime), his mind is 
called to “grasp at something towards which it can make approaches but which it is incapable of 
attaining.”165 
This is the nature of engagement with the natural world in Wordsworth’s work, where 
that world depends for its energy and activity upon its engagement with spectators that will 
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entertain its shifting faces and temporary, other-worldly pronouncements, without necessarily 
understanding or successfully interpreting them.  Like Benso’s faceless faces, the utterance 
without comprehensible speech seems to demand a response, even if that response is little more 
than consciousness of its being.  Like those facialities, the utterance seems significant, yet its 
meaning is “blurred, fluid, porous to a continuous, osmotic exchange between inside and outside 
that mobilizes boundaries, and therefore definitions; that runs the risk of continuous slippage 
away into the night of the indistinct, undifferentiated, anonymous.”  The sky and the clouds that 
move within it swirl beyond the boy’s grasp, but the wind has communicated one of those 
“rememberable” things Wordsworth says imbue “Collateral object and appearances” with 
significance through “chance collisions and quaint accidents.”  The extremity of the boy’s 
situation and the incomprehensible utterance that blasts through his ears in this episode seems to 
preclude the kind of playful engagement I suggest is at work in the spots of time and more 
broadly in Wordsworth’s poetry, but this “severer intervention,” as Wordsworth puts it in the 
following verse of the two-part Prelude, is part of a larger collection of sounds and images that 
prove themselves variously amenable to and needful of the poet’s interventions. 
Wordsworth does not present the images and utterances of objects and things in the spots 
of time as readily interpretable.  Nevertheless, the scenes he describes afford a model for oblique 
engagement with worlds that will never, in the words of the “Immortality Ode,” be “realized.”  
When Wordsworth cuts “across the shadow of a star” in the skating scene, for example, his 
skates bisect a fluid boundary between a thing (a star, the very symbol of a thing that exists more 
vibrantly as idea than as empirically verified fact) and an image of itself, the shadow that gleams 
in the boy’s path, inviting his departure from his mates.  The play of boys on ice, the sharp 
hissing of their skates and the din of their voices resounding in the surrounding precipices, yields 
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to the solitary vision of the boy, who sets the world in motion by stopping short his own: 
  Not seldom from the uproar I retired 
Into a silent bay, or sportively  
Glanced sideway, leaving the tumultuous throng, 
To cut across the shadow of a star 
That gleamed upon the ice.  And oftentimes 
When we had given our bodies to the wind, 
And all the shadowy banks on either side  
Came sweeping through the darkness, spinning still 
The rapid line of motion, then at once 
Have I, reclining back upon my heels 
Stopped short—yet still the solitary cliffs 
Wheeled by me, even as if the earth had rolled 
With visible motion her diurnal round. 
Behind me did they stretch in solemn train, 
Feebler and feebler, and I stood and watched 
Till all was tranquil as a summer sea.  (170-185) 
The sequence of events in this scene is characteristic of other spots of time, particularly in its 
emphasis on happenstance (the appearance of the “shadow of a star” in the boy’s sight-line as he 
looks away) and a sudden switch in sensory attention.  In this case, the primary sensory mode 
transitions from the auditory to the visual as the boy exchanges the “uproar” of his playmates for 
the silent glimmer of the star on the ice.  The boy’s glance “sideway” also has a certain 
rakishness, as though his sudden decision to leave the game of his friends is a way of indulging a 
different form of play.  It is this play, the one that cuts sideways across the world, engaging its 
temporary, phenomenal communications, that figures Wordsworth’s composition of and 
intervention in the poetry of nature, which is properly neither material nor immaterial.      
The “shadow” of the star is the starlight’s reflection, its image presented on the smooth, 
mirroring ice.  In subsequent drafts, Wordsworth would substitute “image” and “reflex” for 
“shadow.”  A note to editors Jonathan Wordsworth, M.H. Abrams, and Stephen Gill’s edition of 
the poem claims the final, 1850 selection of “reflex” has “an indefinable rightness.”  The note 
does not offer any explanation for why the word seems correct, but it could simply be due to its 
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precision (a “reflex” is a “reflection of light”). The word may also seem “right” because a reflex 
can also be “a glance” or “sidelong look” (OED).  In that sense, the “reflex” of the star is not 
only a reflection, but also a gesture that returns the boy’s sideways glance; the “reflex” of the star 
implies its engagement with the boy in the spirit of the games from which he recently turned.   
Wordsworth’s original selection for the passage—“shadow”—is also wonderfully 
suggestive.  “Shadow,” used commonly to mean a reflection, also carries with it an implied 
dichotomy:  that between substance and shadow, the material and the immaterial.166  Thus, 
when167 the boy cuts across the shadow of a star, he could be said to be splitting the difference:  
accepting that the “shadow,” as an immaterial appearance, cannot impede his progress across the 
ice, while also acknowledging its presence as a given marker in space, with which he can engage 
physically and symbolically.  The boy’s next game—stopping short to let the earth spin by his 
dazed vision—is a variation on this engagement.  When the boy halts his own motion, he hands 
it off (as in a game of tag) to the scenery around him, which wheels past him “even as if the 
world had rolled / With visible motion her diurnal round.”  Wordsworth’s “as if” allows that the 
world does not ordinarily roll with visible motion, but the image produced nevertheless reveals 
something true about the world—the underlying fact of its motion and its diurnal round.  That is, 
the boy’s engagement with the apparently inert landscape allows that landscape to suggest to him 
                                                
 
166 In “Deep History:  Association and Natural Philosophy in Wordsworth’s Poetry,” Ross Hamilton 
claims that Wordsworth’s use of the word shadow “adverts to the old language of natural philosophy 
which distinguished between immutable form (which Aristotle’s Christian commentators turned into a 
soul) and mutable matter.” The “shadow” of the star brings it—an “immaterial and immutable thing”—
into the realm of the material world.  In Hamilton’s reading, “an aura of the spiritual invades the material 
world to provide a liberating experience grounded in his perception of nature,” European Romantic 
Review, October 2001, Vol. 18 Issue 4,  467.   
167 As Reeve Parker points out, this “when” might more properly be an “if”;  the boy retires from the 
uproarious play of his friends “To cut across the shadow of a star,” but we can not be sure that he actually 
does so (the speaker cites only the boy’s intention).  If read as the expression of whimsical intent alone, 
the potential interplay of glance and reflex between boy and star becomes an exchange of possibility 
merely, an engagement of ideas. 
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something about itself.  The play of the boy and poet with a world that is both substantial and 
suggestive produces this truth of seeming and being.  
The “poetry of nature” in these passages arises out of the playful interactions of the 
figures described with the temporary, phenomenal interventions of wind, light, and sound.  The 
verse takes up the playful, dynamic features of these interactions, emulating and expressing their 
lively being.  In these passages, Wordsworth the poet considers “man and the objects that 
surround him as acting and reacting upon each other,” a consideration he cites in his Preface to 
Lyrical Ballads as the business of a poet.  In so doing, his objects become dynamic subjects, 
collaborating in his poetic endeavours.  As my closing reading of Wordsworth’s first draft of the 
Boy of Winander passage demonstrates, however, the terms of this collaboration are not entirely 
conceived or enforceable by the poet; Wordsworth’s nonhuman objects, things, creatures, and 
appearances resist being easily or completely synchronized, composed, or directed. 
 
 
The Boy of Winander passage dramatizes the potential and variable responsiveness of 
nonhuman beings memorably by bringing nonhuman animals into play.  The owls’ 
responsiveness as animals has largely been overlooked because they have consistently been read 
as representatives of a generalized nature or simply a generalized material world.  In this reading, 
the verse might be considered an example of the “reality testing” Geoffrey Hartman has 
described, and the test the boy of Winander puts to reality rides upon the response of the owls to 
whom he calls.  A reading of the episode that privileges the diverse set of players in the scene, 
however, casts the scene differently. It moves beyond the boy’s apparent expectation for a game 
of call and response played out between agents whose soundings do not signify but are 
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nevertheless identifiable as voices, towards the communications of natural agents that borrow, 
then seem to withhold, those voices.  It also prevents us from uncritically folding the owls of the 
passage into their surroundings.  
It is possible to read the landscape Wordsworth invokes in the Boy of Winander passage 
as a stage set, a background for the drama that unfolds between the boy and the owls to whom he 
calls.  As in many Wordsworth poems, however, background and foreground seem to exchange 
places over the course of the scene, and the cliffs, stars, and trees that stand as witnesses emerge 
as actors.  In some ways, this transposition solves the problem Christine Kenyon Jones has 
identified in Wordsworth’s treatment of nonhuman animals.  In “‘Minute Obeisances’: Beasts, 
Birds, and Wordsworth’s Ecological Credentials,” Jones argues that despite Wordsworth’s “ease 
in bestowing a voice upon inanimate, physical features, such as mountains, woods and rivers,” he 
struggled to employ various kinds of literary artifice to present the voices of nonhuman 
animals.168  Though I disagree with Jones’s claim that “Wordsworth’s hills, rocks, rivers and 
other physical features and forces are made to express directly and relatively unproblematically 
the emotion which the poet invests in them,” I agree that animals in Wordsworth’s poetry are a 
special case, presenting unique challenges to the author’s attempts to engage with them 
creatively.169  The owls, with forms of agency different than those available to the boy or to the 
cliffs and hills upon which their hoots redound, insist that the speaker engage with the problems 
of speaking for, with and about nonhuman creatures that have their own voices and their own 
power to respond to the human voice.  Echoes, the work of the cliffs and hills that seem merely 
to constitute the scene’s surroundings, are also at play, and further complicate the verse’s 
                                                
 
168 Christine Kenyon Jones, “‘Minute Obeisances’:  Beasts, Birds and Wordsworth’s Ecological 
Credentials,” Romanticism, 2001, Vol. 4 Issue1, 74-89. 
169 Jones, 77.  
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exploration of agency, cause, and effect:   
There was a Boy, ye knew him well, ye Cliffs 
And Islands of Winander! many a time, 
At evening, when the stars had just begun 
To move along the edges of the hills,  
Rising or setting, would he stand alone, 
Beneath the trees, or by the glimmering lake, 
And there, with fingers interwoven, both hands 
Press’d closely palm to palm and to his mouth 
Uplifted, he, as through an instrument, 
Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls 
That they might answer him.170  
The speaker’s initial address to the cliffs and islands of Winander seems to place him at the 
scene he describes, even as Wordsworth’s displacement of the human figure at its center from 
himself (the poem was originally written in the first-person) to the boy removed the speaking “I” 
from it.  As a result, the speaker stands apart from the scene from or to which he seems to speak, 
and the human figure he invokes—the “boy”—becomes a member of the scene the speaker 
describes rather than it’s seeing I/eye.  The imprecision of the speaker’s description of the 
environment, alongside his enumeration of its many possible members and arrangement, evoke a 
scene whose parts—the lake, the stars, the hills, the trees, the boy—are moveable and variable, 
yet significant in the fact of their being what they are.  Thus, when the boy stands “there” in the 
seventh line, we do not know precisely where he stands (he could be beneath the trees, or beside 
the lake), or at what time of day (he could be there when the stars are “rising or setting”), but we 
know that he does so in relation to these things, that his position and actions are in relation to 
their own.   
When the boy lifts his hands to his mouth to blow “mimic hootings to the owls / That 
                                                
 
170 I quote here the 1798 draft of the poem composed in Goslar, found in Lyrical Ballads and Other 
Poems, The Cornell Wordsworth, 139, ll. 1-11.  However, the passage floated between poetic contexts 
and also between the first and third persons, changes that echoed the series of substitutions and deferrals 
described and evoked in the verse. 
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they might answer him,” he does so in recognition of this variable relationality, and his 
expectation that they will answer hangs on the enjambment between the two lines.  The 
enjambment of the lines, and the apparent redundancy of the speaker’s clarification that the boy 
hoots to the owls “That they might answer him,” mark the intensity of that expectation.  It is an 
expectation not only that the owls will respond to his call, but that, in doing so, they accept his 
“mimic hootings” as authentic.  Philosophers like Daniel Dennett, who attempt to mark a 
difference between the human and the animal, might read this attempt to bamboozle the owls as 
exclusively human.  Though animals might engage in behaviours that mislead other creatures, 
Dennett believes, animals are not conscious of their ability to deceive or of their pretense as 
such; only humans are conscious of this ability and are conscious of their ability to make 
representations of themselves and others to others.   In his essay, “Thinking Other-Wise:  
Cognitive Science, Deconstruction and the (Non)Speaking (Non)Human Subject,” Cary Wolfe 
takes issue with this argument via a reading of Derrida’s increasingly well-known, posthumously 
published “And Say the Animal Responded?”171  Wolfe argues that Dennett falls back upon the 
Cartesian position he claims to refute by attempting to argue for a difference between reaction 
and response, with animals capable only of reaction to stimuli and humans capable of genuine 
response by virtue of our ability to use concepts and representations, and our ability to 
distinguish signifying and signifying about signifying.172  In “And Say the Animal Responded?” 
however, Derrida calls into question our ability self-consciously to wield representations and to 
draw such distinctions.  Every pretense, no matter how simple, presupposes “taking the other  
                                                
 
171 Cary Wolfe, “Thinking Other-Wise:  Cognitive Science, Deconstruction and the (Non)Speaking 
(Non)Human Subject,” in Animal Subjects: An Ethical Reader in a Posthuman World, ed. Jodey 
Castricano (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008).  Derrida’s “And Say the Animal Responded?” 
appears in Derrida’s posthumously-published  The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, 
trans. David Wills (New York:  Fordham University Press, 2008). 
172 Wolfe, 134.  
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into account” Derrida argues; “it therefore supposes, simultaneously, the pretense of pretense—a 
simple supplementary move by the other within the strategy of the game.  That supplementarity 
is at work from the moment of the first pretense.”173 
The boy of Winander seems at first to expect a reaction from the owls of Winander, one 
perhaps akin to the echoes he invokes in An Evening Walk, where the echoes reliably return his 
own song (“a happy child,” he taught the echoes of the rocks to return “[his] carols wild”).174  In 
short order, however, the owls prove that they are differently response-able to his call.  Their 
shouts evolve and build, transmuting the boy’s original hoot and mocking the very notion of a 
self-possessed voice or of simple call and response (action-reaction): 
And they would shout 
Across the wat’ry vale and shout again, 
Responsive to his call, with quivering peals, 
And long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud 
Redoubled and redoubled, a wild scene 
Of mirth and jocund din.  (11-16) 
The owls’ responsiveness, their expected shouts, ratchet up in intensity from shouts to “quivering 
peals” to “long halloos” to “screams,” until the owls are finally dispossessed of their voices, their 
sounds taken up by the hills around them, amplified, “redoubled and redoubled.”  The 
transmission of voices the boy expected in the form of call and response (action-reaction) instead 
moves in an unexpected relay, with successive parties taking up and wilding the original voice:  
the boy’s call is taken up by the owls, escalated, warped and terrifyingly transmuted from peal to 
halloo to scream, until these sounds are finally taken up by the atmosphere itself, the surround 
                                                
 
173 Quoted in Wolfe, 134.  An in-depth reading of the Boy of Winander passage with Derrida’s work on 
animals, which I have not developed here, would take into account Derrida’s conversation with Lacan in 
“And Say the Animal Responded?”  I raise the issues of reaction, response, and pretense here only 
cursorily to suggest that Wordsworth shares Derrida’s skepticism that any fundamental distinction can be 
drawn between the ways humans and animals engage in these fluid activities, a skepticism Wordsworth 
dramatizes wonderfully in this passage. 
174 In The Major Works, 1, ll. 19-20. 
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sound of environmental echo, on a seemingly endless reverb.  I believe we can read this chorus 
of dissonant sounds, sounds that seem to both merge into and bounce off one another, as the 
effect not of a single agent or even dual agents responding to one another, but of what Jane 
Bennett calls “congregational agency.”  Congregational agency, which Bennett compares to shi 
in the Chinese tradition, refers to the way “people, animals, artifacts, technologies, and elemental 
forces share powers and operate in dissonant conjunction with each other.”175 
Thinking of the shouts, halloos, screams, and echoes described not as a simple matter of 
call and response (or call and reaction), but as the dissonant, joyful (mis)communications of 
multiple actors, helps us read the silence and what follows it not as the absence of a response, but 
as a reminder of its possibility in a world of creatures capable not only of reacting or responding 
to one another, but of surprising one another: 
          And, when it chanced 
That pauses of deep silence mock’d his skill, 
Then, sometimes, in that silence, while he hung 
Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprise 
Has carried far into his heart the voice 
Of mountain torrents, or the visible scene 
Would enter unawares into his mind 
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks, 
its woods, and that uncertain heaven, receiv’d 
 Into the bosom of the steady lake.     (16-25) 
In the silent moment described, the background becomes foreground, and the familiar hand-off 
of energy from one player to another described in the other spots of time is repeated.  In this 
case, that handing of power or energy comes as “a gentle shock of mild surprise” because it takes 
forms the boy had not expected.176  In the first instance, of the silence upon which the boy hangs, 
                                                
 
175 Bennett, 34. 
176 In her reading of the poem, Anne-Lise Francois calls our attention to De Quincey’s account of waiting 
with Wordsworth at midnight for the Courier to arrive, in which De Quincey records Wordsworth’s 
reflections upon noticing an unusually bright star.   Francois describes Wordsworth’s insight into “the 
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it is necessary to imagine the owls not as absent, but as present somewhere in the trees, blinking 
perhaps—silent, but not unresponsive.  It is the boy’s feeling of surprise at this realization (that 
the owls and the echoes of Winander do not only or merely react to him) that carries the voice of 
mountain torrents and the visible scene into his heart and mind.   
The voice of mountain torrents and the scenic imagery that come forward unsolicited in 
the poem do so as reminders of nature’s independent, nonhuman, and enduring presence.177  But 
they also, importantly, present representations of themselves and others,  proof not only of the 
existence and persistence of the nonhuman outside the human, but of the expressivity and 
creativity of the nonhuman outside the human.  If the boy is chastened, it is because the 
communications he receives are outside the province of his own creative endeavours.  The hoots 
of the owls and the echoes of their cries expertly warp the call and response the boy intended, 
developing it into the true play of creative, collaborative agents.  By contrast, the voice of the 
mountain torrents and the image of the surrounding environment put the boy in the position of 
witnessing and receiving a representation of the world in which he has played no part;  the scene 
transitions from figuring communication with the natural world as call and response, to the free 
play of dissonant but conjoined actors, to the mere reception of messages we need not co-sign.  It 
is these messages, not the things themselves, that are transmitted to the boy:  not mountain-
torrents, but the “voice” of mountain torrents; not rocks and woods and sky, but their “solemn 
imagery” reflected in the face of the “steady lake.”  These are creative productions:  transitory, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
turning back of anticipatory energies reversing the ratio between expectations and their fulfillment such 
that something is received into consciousness only with the recession of expectant attention—in this case 
a “star,” a visual phenomenon that, at once infinitely far and near, substitutes for an expected aural 
perception of the arrival of news of distant events.” Open Secrets:  The Literature of Uncounted 
Experience (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
177 Geoffrey Hartman characterizes the cliffs, falls, ands woods of the scene this way in an interview with 
Cathy Caruth published in Studies in Romanticism, Vol. 34, No. 4, Essays in Honor of Geoffrey H. 
Hartman (Winter, 1996), 630-52. 
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unstable expressions of a world that is not fixed, but that can nevertheless be received as a spot 
of time, as the poetry of nature deposited into a human mind and heart that will keep it there until 
they, too, are absorbed into the evolving landscape.       
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CHAPTER 3 
Shadows of Taste:  John Clare’s Tasteful Natural History 
 
 
 
‘a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush’ well every one to his hobby178 
     – Clare 
 
 
The hand John Clare’s publisher, John Taylor, had in shaping Clare for public reception 
as “the peasant poet” is well known among Clare scholars.179  However, this was not Taylor’s 
only attempt to shape Clare’s life and work in the literary marketplace.  Lesser-known 
aspirations of Taylor’s were to place Clare among the legion of late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth-century essayists, poets, and philosophers writing on the sublime and beautiful, and to 
introduce him as a unique, collaborative voice in the period’s popular natural history.  Clare 
approached the task of writing on the sublime and beautiful and publishing his natural history 
letters with enthusiasm, but expressed concern to Taylor in both cases that his own tastes were 
not likely to conform to established models.  Indeed, Clare’s approach to the sublime and his 
understanding of what natural history must be were utterly unique and turned entirely upon the 
matter of Clare’s taste in particular, and on his understanding of taste more generally as a mode 
of guiding all creatures—insects and authors alike—into meaningful relation with one another. 
In 1831, shortly before Clare proposed a new collection of poems, to be called The 
Midsummer Cushion, Taylor suggested that Clare produce a set of essays on "the Sublime and 
                                                
 
178 John Clare, ‘Natural History Letter III’, in Natural History, 38.  Further references to The Natural 
History Prose Writings of John Clare will be cited parenthetically by page number within the text. 
179 In "Clare and the Place of the Peasant Poet," Elizabeth Helsinger explores the various ways that Clare 
attempted to inhabit his role as a "Peasant poet," a term Helsinger points out was "a contradiction in terms 
from the perspective of English literary history." Critical Inquiry, vol.  13, no.  3, Politics and Poetic 
Value, (Spring, 1987). 
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Beautiful in Poetry."  Instead of producing any essays, however, Clare replied to Taylor's request 
with a scornful letter, declaring that he "could give this sheet full of specimens of bombastic 
fancy that critics are daily stringing as pearls of sublimity . . . but not one specimen can I point 
out as to what I think time will occupy in his consception of sublimity."180  Indeed, it is only if 
we think of the sublime as something other than a "series of bomb bursting images tagged 
together by big sounding words" (just what "other people often bring forward as specimens of 
the sublime," Clare wrote), that we can begin to think of the sublime as a category worth 
exploration in Clare's poetry.  Far from "bomb bursting” or “bombastic,” Clare's sublime has 
elements of lastingness and tastefulness we do not often associate with sublimity or, for that 
matter, with natural history.  The energetic stability and unique propriety of Clare’s sublime is 
due in part to his extension of aesthetic faculties like “taste” to nonhuman forms and processes 
and his privileging of the associative abilities of a figure he calls the “man of taste,” a naturalist 
poet whose experiences in the world ring with lively associations.  In this sense, as Sarah 
Houghton points out in “‘Enkindling ecstasy’:  The Sublime Vision of John Clare,” Clare’s 
sublime is better characterized as sympathetic than as egotistical.181  The rich associative abilities 
of the man of taste activate Clare’s sublime, imaged in his poetry in scenes swarming with life.  
The flexibility and sustainability of these forms of life and thought in the face of loss and 
destruction, a topic I will address in the latter part of this chapter, depends upon Clare’s richly 
developed sense of changing literary, historical, and environmental contexts.  His favored images 
teem with the tasteful activities of birds, insects, men of science, and men of taste.  It is these that 
we might usefully explore as sublime. 
                                                
 
180 From a letter almost certainly addressed to John Taylor, written after Friday, 15 April, 1831.  From 
The Letters of John Clare, ed.  Mark Storey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 539. 
181 Sarah Houghton, “‘Enkindling ecstasy’: The Sublime Vision of John Clare,” Romanticism: The 
Journal of Romantic Culture and Criticism, 9.2 (2003), 176-95.   
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Merely to say that Clare’s treatment of nature in his poetry involved the kind of aesthetic 
reflection we associate with the Romantic sublime or theories of taste is to speak against a 
pervasive strand of criticism that considers Clare’s close attention to particular details of the 
natural world and his affection for “descriptive rhyming”182 as inhibiting his production of the 
kind of visionary poetry associated with his Romantic contemporaries.  Indeed, upon reading 
draft manuscripts for the Shepherd’s Calendar provided by Taylor (their mutual publisher), John 
Keats himself observed that “the Description too much prevailed over the Sentiment.”  In a 
subsequent letter to Clare, Taylor attempted to clarify Keats’s criticism by saying, “I think he 
wished to say to you that your Images from Nature are too much introduced without being called 
from by a particular Sentiment . . . his remark is applicable only now and then when he feels as if 
the Description overlaid and stifled that which ought to be the prevailing Idea.”183  Keats and 
Taylor’s comments echoed the reviews of Clare’s first collection, Poems, Descriptive of Rural 
Life and Scenery, which almost universally balanced praise for Clare’s “minute observation of 
nature, delicacy of feeling, and fidelity of description” with doubts about his ability to frame 
“sustained or lofty flights.”184  While his poems contain “true and minute delineations of external 
nature, drawn from actual observation” our knowledge of the biographical facts of Clare’s life is 
a necessary “apology for the absence of that transcendent excellence which more favoured poets 
                                                
 
182 Clare describes his poetry this way in his autobiographical writings, collected by editors Eric Robinson 
and David Powell in John Clare by Himself (The Mid Northumberland Arts Group: Carcanet Press, 
1996), 11. 
183 Quoted in John Barrell, The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840: An Approach to the 
Poetry of John Clare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 130. 
184 Octavius Gilchrist’s first introduction of Clare in the London Magazine, called “Some Account of John 
Clare, an Agricultural Labourer and Poet” 1820.  Gilchrist was actually one of Clare’s first and longest 
supporters.  From Clare:  The Critical Heritage, ed.  Mark Storey (London and Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973), 40.   
118 
 
have attained,” an anonymous reviewer states in 1820.185  The question of whether or not Clare 
‘belongs’ among those Romantic poets we favor today, as James McKusick points out in 
“Beyond the Visionary Company:  John Clare’s Resistance to Romanticism,” still turns upon the 
extent to which Clare’s poetry can be considered visionary in “a tradition of aesthetic idealism 
initiated by Kant and Schiller and characterized by a view of the creative process as a free play 
of intellect, unconstrained by objective circumstances.”  By not engaging the biographical and 
historical contingencies of Clare’s life, McKusick says, Romantic critical theory manifests “an 
unwillingness to acknowledge those features of Clare’s poetry . . . that resist the 
transcendentalising impulses” latent within the theory itself.186  Elsewhere, in his book Green 
Writing: Romanticism and Ecology, McKusick also argues vigorously against a conception of 
Clare’s relationship with the natural world as either economically or aesthetically inflected.187  
McKusick’s consistent pairing of the economic and aesthetic implies a conception of the 
aesthetic narrowly aligned with the version of the picturesque mode presented by John Barrell in 
his important book on Clare, The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place, which describes the 
picturesque viewer as a consumer of landscape.  Nevertheless, as Barrell makes clear, it seems 
that Clare’s way of looking at nature was different and also aesthetic in a very particular way.  
Without seeing Clare’s close relationship with nature as a laborer and rural dweller either as an 
“apology” for a lack of aesthetic reflection or as a necessary protest against it, then, I believe we 
can usefully consider the extensive attention Clare paid in his letters, notes, and poems to 
looking at nature together with his vigorous interest in ways of looking at nature.   While it is 
                                                
 
185 From an unsigned review, New Monthly Magazine, March 1820, xiii, 326-30, qtd.  in The Critical 
Heritage, 68. 
186 James McKusick, “Beyond the Visionary Company: John Clare’s resistance to Romanticism,” in John 
Clare in Context, eds.  Haughton, Phillips, and Summerfield (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 230.   
187James C.  McKusick, Green Writing: Romanticism and Ecology (New York: St.  Martin’s Press, 2000). 
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tempting to say, with John Middleton Murray, that “there is an intrinsic impossibility that vision 
of [Clare’s] kind, so effortless and unparading, should ever pass beyond itself” because it is “too 
perfect,”188 it is clear upon reading Clare’s many reflections upon vision that he made an effort to 
differentiate between various ways of seeing and campaigned vigorously for forms of poetry and 
natural history informed by his undeniably aesthetic understanding of the natural world. 
Shortly after reading Elizabeth Kent’s Flora Domestica, a book published by their shared 
publishers Taylor and James Hessey, Clare began reflecting upon what an ideal natural history 
might look like and began writing a natural history of his own.  In 1824 he started sending 
entries to Hessey as contributions to “A Natural History of Helpstone,” which he later decided to 
call “‘Biographys of Birds & Flowers’ with an Appendix on Animals & Insects.”  As Margaret 
Grainger notes in her edition of these and other writings, The Natural History Prose Writings of 
John Clare, most of the letters that Clare intended to contribute to “A Natural History of 
Helpstone” were never completed, and Hessey did not publish them.   Nevertheless, these prose 
notes, poems, and letters (including his response to Kent’s Flora, which further embeds many of 
the flowers Kent mentions in the book within their contexts in Helpstone folklore and Clare’s 
reading and observation) tell us much about how Clare imagined and practiced his own form of 
natural history. 
For Clare, writing natural history was a way of accounting for and celebrating the 
peculiarities of taste among birds, flowers, insects, and men.  I take “Shadows of Taste” to be an 
especially important poem in Clare’s account of the relationship between taste, the sublime, and 
the practice of natural history.  This relationship can be difficult to track in part because Clare’s 
descriptions of “the man of taste” and a series of variously related figures—ranging from the 
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“man of science” to the “man of feeling”—differ so widely.  In “Shadows of Taste” Clare 
presents the associative activity of the man of taste as an alternative to the collecting and 
cataloguing of the traditional man of science or natural historian.  In “Shadows of Taste” (a 
poem in which the meanings of “shade” and “shadow” are multiple) the man of taste exercises 
his taste through “associations sweet” that set natural objects and creatures within various 
environmental and literary contexts.  His ability to do this depends upon the creatures being left 
in the homes their own “shades” of taste have led them to choose.  By contrast, the isolating 
vision and practices of the traditional natural historian remove his specimens from their homes, 
evacuating the shades of taste that characterize them and leaving them shadows of themselves. 
Taste was a fraught matter for Clare.  In “Sketches in the Life of John Clare” and letters 
to Taylor, Clare expressed his belief that his own taste was “peculialy” his own.  In the 
“Sketches” he describes the way he “try’d” his friends’ taste as a child “by pointing out some 
striking beauty in a wild flower or object in the surrounding senery”: 
I often wondered that, while I was peeping about and finding such quantitys of 
pleasing things to stop and pause over, another shoud pass me as carless as if he 
was blind I thought sometimes that I surely had a taste peculialy by myself and 
that nobody else thought or saw things as I did189 
 Clare expresses a similar sentiment ten years later in a letter replying to Taylor’s request that he 
write a series of essays on the sublime and beautiful.  Clare’s letter begins by saying, “I fear you 
overate my abilities . . . I so seldom see other peoples judgments who are considered not only 
men of taste but men of unerring critisism coinciding with mine that I feel I am only an 
individual indulging in an erroneous fancy,” but he continues more confidently by inveighing 
against both the “bomb bursting images” others present as the sublime and the “unnatural images 
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cloathed in the pomp of illused words” that others describe as beautiful.190  Clare, who 
considered these examples the “vagaries of taste,” viewed fashions in taste with contempt; his 
contempt for fashionable taste and fashionable men of taste seems twinned with a faith in his 
own taste and his own version of sublimity, however peculiar, and a commitment to developing 
these in his poetry and natural history.   
 
Taste and Association 
In “Shadows of Taste,” Clare links taste with a variegated way of viewing nature, and he 
associates lack of taste with blindness.  “The man of science and of taste” Clare invokes in the 
poem “Sees wealth far richer” in the meadows and fields than do the “vulgar hinds” Clare 
contrasts him with: 
 the low herd, mere savages subdued,  
With nought of feeling or of taste imbued 
Pass over sweetest scenes a carless eye 
As blank as midnight in its deepest dye191 
Clare’s description of the eye as “blank as midnight in its deepest dye” reminds us of his related 
description of the Linnaean classification system as a “hard nick-namy sy[s]tem of unuterable 
words” that only overloads botany “in mystery till it makes darkness visable.”192  In both 
descriptions, Clare emphasizes that the object of perception is obscured rather than illuminated 
by the faculty of perception or system of organization used to observe it:  the blankness of the 
“carless eye” of the low herd is as deeply dyed as midnight and obstructs rather than facilitates 
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sight, just as the mystery with which the Linnaean classification system overloads botany 
obscures the lack of real knowledge it provides with a Miltonic, visible darkness.  These forms of 
darkness block from view not only the sweet scenes through which the low herd passes and the 
plants the Linnaean man of science classifies, but also the many associations Clare claims such 
scenes and plants inspire in the man of taste.  Like the shadows that feature prominently in 
Clare’s prose and verse sketches of the natural world and the paintings of DeWint he admires, 
the literary, historical, and environmental associations of the man of taste play around the objects 
of his perception, providing a shifting contextual background for them rather than obscuring 
them in darkness as the careless eye and the Linnaean classification system do.  I believe these 
associations are the “shadows of taste” for which the poem is named and that the lively 
associational activity of the man of taste (and, as we shall see, of the plants, animals, and insects 
that also exercise taste) produces a richly contextualized form of natural history like that Clare 
strove to write. 
In a letter that Clare may have intended for his autobiography, he introduces the “poetic 
feeling” with which he regards nature: 
I love to look on nature with a poetic feeling which magnifys the pleasure I love 
to see the nightingale in its hazel retreat & the cuckoo hiding in its solitudes of 
oaken foliage & not to examine their carcasses in glass cases yet naturalists & 
botanists seem to have no taste for this poetical feeling they merely make 
collections of dryd specimens classing them after Leanius into tribes & familys & 
there they delight to show them as a sort of ambitious fame with them ‘a bird in 
the hand is worth two in the bush’ well every one to his hobby193 
Clare might as well have said, “to each his own” or even “there’s no accounting for taste” when 
he says “every one to his hobby,” but instead he seems concerned to emphasize that the naturalist 
has “no taste” for the “poetical feeling” Clare claims for himself and for the man of taste.  Clare 
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acknowledges that he is as happy as the naturalist or botanist in “finding a new spieces of field 
flower or butter flye” he has not seen before, but he protests that he has “no desire further to dry 
the plant or torture the Butterflye by sticking it on a cork board with a pin.”  Instead, he says, he 
would prefer that the “fluttering butterflye . . . settle till [he] can come up with it to examine the 
powderd colours on its wings.”194  Here Clare’s taste is for a living butterfly rather than a dead 
one whose demise he imagines as painful, but it is also a preference for context, a context visible 
to the “poetic eye.”  In sticking the butterfly upon a corkboard, the naturalist or botanist Clare 
envisions shakes off the coloured pollen that might stick at the moment of its observation and 
isolates it in a new and barren environment.  The specimen is thus stripped of its context and 
abstracted into an environment that approaches contextlessness—perhaps with a Linnaean label 
that only makes “darkness visable.” 
In this letter, as in “Shadows of Taste,” there are at least two varieties of contextual 
darkness.  Clare distinguishes the time the “rustic” or “clown” spends in nature from that spent 
by the botanist, but believes that both walk with blinders of sorts:  the rustic, despite seeing a 
plant in its original setting, sees it only as a plant while the botanist or naturalist, taking it out of 
context, sees it only as a particular type of plant.  The poetic eye of the man of taste, by contrast, 
sees the plant in various contexts—environmental, historical, and literary.  In the same letter, 
Clare writes about the literary associations that arise in the man of taste when experiencing 
nature:  
a clown may say that he loves the Morning but a man of taste feels it in a higher 
degree by bringing up in his mind that beautiful line of Thompsons ‘The meek 
eyd morn appears mother of dews’ The rustic sings beneath the evening moon but 
it brings no associations he knows nothing about miltons description of it195 
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The key difference between the rustic, the man of science, and the man of taste, then, is the man 
of taste’s ability to associate natural objects with literary passages.  While the rustic “turns an 
eye” on flowers and “plods bye,” “the man of taste looks upon the little Celadine in Spring & 
mutters in his mind some favourite lines from Wordsworths address to that flower.”196  This 
associative ability, more than allowing the man of taste simply to see the flower before him, 
allows him to see it as it is illuminated and enlivened by its literary context.  The man of taste 
synthesizes the environmental, historical, and literary contexts of the objects he views into an 
associational, contextual field.  As Clare proclaims near the end of the letter, “If I had the means 
to consult & the health to indulge it I shoud crowd these letters on Natural History with lucious 
scraps of Poesy from my favourite Minstrels & make them less barren of amusment & more 
profitable of perusal.”197  Clare’s “scraps of poesy” convey life-giving context to accounts of 
natural objects, suggesting that natural and literary histories cannot be separated except to their 
mutual detriment.  He presents the associational activity of the man of taste (here himself) as a 
mode of productivity that shares more with the tasteful activities of the birds and plants he 
describes in “Shadows of Taste” than it does with the blank carelessness of the rustic or the 
classification schemes of the naturalist. 
 
Clare and Kent:  A World of Associations 
Clare’s ruminations on the associational skill of the man of taste appear in the second 
letter of a series Clare wrote Hessey in response to Elizabeth Kent’s Flora Domestica, which 
resembles not a little the ideal natural history Clare proclaimed he would like to write.  Taylor 
and Hessey forwarded Clare a complimentary copy of the first, anonymously authored, Flora in 
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anticipation of an expanded second edition.  Clare quickly discovered that they shared similar 
sensibilities regarding the intimate relationship between botanical specimens and poetic ones.  
Indeed, Wordsworth’s address to the Celandine is quoted at length in Kent’s entry on that flower, 
and many passages from Clare’s own poetry appear in pages of the Flora along with lengthy 
“specimens” and “extracts” from various other poets including Spenser, Cowley, and 
Wordsworth.  Clare’s initial appraisal of the book in an earlier letter to Taylor—that “the 
account” of the flowers Kent catalogues “is poetry”—is both a literal synopsis and  a compliment 
of Kent’s prose.   Kent’s book is also in some sense itself the “portable flower-garden” of her 
subtitle;  it is a garden run riot with literary reference, historical anecdote, etymology, and 
botanical instruction.  Clare himself plays with the notion of the book as “garden” throughout his 
initial response to it, perhaps riffing on Kent’s description, in the introduction to the Flora, of 
Clare’s volumes of poetry as “a beautiful country, diversified with woods, meadows, heaths, and 
flower-gardens.”198  In valuing the diversity of one another’s prose and poesy, the compliments 
Kent and Clare payed each other attest to their shared interest in promiscuously mixing natural 
and literary tropes and natural and literary history, while their chosen metaphors for that 
diversity (a garden for Kent’s work and a rich, wild ecosystem of “woods, meadows, heaths, and 
flower-gardens” for Clare’s) indicate the differing backgrounds and differing concerns of the two 
authors.   
As Daisy Hay details in her article, “Elizabeth Kent’s Collaborators,”199 Kent came to 
Taylor and Hessey as a writer already linked to an expansive literary network through her 
brother-in-law, Leigh Hunt.  His associations with the “Cockney School” informed the 
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underlying political aims of the Flora and explain the prominence of quotations by Hunt and 
Keats in the Flora (a circumstance that at first disappointed Clare, who believed that earlier 
authors were given somewhat short shrift).  As Hay explains, even Kent’s choice to speak 
primarily about potted-plants for indoor use (a choice that Kent foregrounds in the Preface to her 
book), identified her as a defender of the ideals of suburban luxury developed by Hunt and his 
circle, and thought by some, including an anonymous reviewer in Blackwood’s “On the Cockney 
School of Poetry,” to be a vulgur affectation and a waste of poetic energies on “flowers seen in 
window-pots.”200  Hay reads Kent’s Flora as a response to the unnamed Blackwood’s reviewer, 
and indeed Kent introduces the book as the result of her resolution to disseminate information 
that might lead others (who, like herself, lived in town) to pursue and maintain a “portable 
garden in pots.”  Her selection bias was for flowers considered “most desirable for beauty of 
form or colour, luxuriance of foliage, sweetness of perfume, or from interesting or potential 
associations with their history.”201  It is these luxuries of form and color, and the literary and 
historical associations each bloom brings with it—rather than recommendations regarding light 
and water and so forth—that command Kent’s most vibrant interest in each of her alphabetized 
entries. 
Despite her intention to share an enjoyment of flowers with a wider audience, Kent, like 
Clare, makes a distinction between the kind of seeing employed by “common eyes” and the kind 
of seeing enjoyed by the poet, which “gives new charms to every object on which it gazes!”  Her 
description of the poet and his way of seeing the world bears a striking resemblance to Clare’s 
later description of the poetic eye of the man of taste: 
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A poet sees in a flower not only its form and colour, and the shadowing of its 
verdant foliage—his eye rests upon the dew-drop that trembles on the leaf; a 
gleam of sunshine darts across, and gives it the sparkling brilliancy of a diamond.  
He sees the bee hovering around, buzzing its joyous anticipation of the honey he 
shall draw from its very heart; and the delicate butterfly suspended as it were by 
magic from its silken petals.  His imagination, too, brings around it a world of 
associations, adding beauty and interest to the object actually before his eye.202   
Each entry in Kent’s Flora presents such a “world of associations,”—a flower brought to life by 
the play of light at the moment of its observation, the creatures that share its space and whose 
lives depend upon each other, and the associations that “world” the flower yet again in literary 
and historical contexts, adding immeasurably to the interest and imaginative palpability of the 
“object actually before” the poet’s eye.  Kent’s own world of associations—those that compose 
themselves around the figure of a flower studded with dew and buzzing with bees—takes three 
pages and quotations from ten authors, including Keats, Herrick, and Montgomery, to properly 
compose.  Clare could not but be pleased. 
It was in anticipation of this pleasure, perhaps, and with a canny sense for the shared 
sensibilities of the two authors, that Taylor and Hessey sent Clare the Flora in hopes that he 
might make some contribution to its second edition.  The Flora was already an impressive 
collaborative document informed by a variety of discourses, but to Kent’s concentration on the 
“Gardenesque” aesthetic of the Cockney school and the tastes of a new urban middle-class, Clare 
seems to have hoped to add a hint of wildness and the names, songs, and superstitions of the 
rural poor.  Clare’s notes on the Flora indicate that though he agreed with Kent’s practice of 
natural history in spirit, his own stake in it was slightly different.  His notes, which he sent to 
Taylor and Hessey, included his disclaimer that they could hardly be of use to the as yet 
anonymous author of Flora Domestica since Clare himself was “no botanist” and could describe 
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flowers “no better,”203 but they nevertheless carefully modify and fill out Kent’s descriptions 
with an especially local form of natural history.  Where Kent’s descriptions excel in the kind of 
associational activity across time and natural and literary fields that Clare admired, he was 
concerned to make notes on the wild varieties of the flowers Kent described in terms of their 
numerousness and prominence over time in his own community and also, especially, on their 
common names in Helpston. 
Despite Clare’s protestations against the way of seeing (or not seeing) employed by the 
“rustics” or “clowns” in his passages on taste, and his interest in the local names for flowers (and 
the village rhymes that use them) attest to a corresponding respect for what a commonly used 
name might reveal to a person of taste about the relationship between people and the plants and 
insects with which they interact.  In a separate letter to Taylor, Clare connects taste with a 
preference for common names.  In defense of his use of the name “Woodseers” for a species of 
insect, Clare argues, “wether it be the proper name I don’t know tis what we call them & that you 
know is sufficient for us.”  Though the us refers clearly enough to the people of Clare’s locality, 
it also rather winningly includes Taylor.  Several sentences earlier in the letter Clare writes that 
Taylor is a man whose “taste is preferable to any [Clare has] witnessed” because he is “a man of 
feeling that looks on faults with indulgence & never willfuly passes by a blossom he may chance 
to find on his journey.”204  Clare’s confidence in Taylor’s ability to recognize “woodseer” as the 
only appropriate term for the insect springs from his flattering identification of Taylor as a man 
of taste and feeling who cares little for the judgments of other men and does not overlook the 
natural history a word like “Woodseers” might contain and reveal (as Clare notes in the letter, 
the woodseer was “one of the shepherds weather glasses,” believed to foresee by the turn of its 
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head the arrival of fair or wet weather). 
It is in this spirit, perhaps, that Clare wonders at the omission of a number of different 
humble wild flowers and their common names in Kent’s Flora.  He expresses “wonder,” for 
example, that “our tastful author did not put [the common field Scabious] in his garden.”  Not yet 
knowing Kent’s name or gender, Clare nevertheless identifies her as a “tastful author” and 
incorporates her into their circle of writers and editors; “our tastful author,” Clare assumes, 
should be no more likely than Taylor to wilfully pass by any blossom he might encounter.205  
The list of additions and modifications Clare sent Taylor and Hessey seems to be an effort to 
redress what Clare felt to be these unexpected omissions, and to draft a Flora with a rural 
emphasis—one that would not only be about wild flowers and country customs, but that might be 
priced within the reach of rural dwellers.  And while the commodification of nature in the Flora 
(through which plants are discussed as “symbols of happiness, and of a widely available 
luxurious domesticity”), might be linked to the trend in container gardening in the early 
nineteenth century amongst the urban middle-class, which allowed individuals literal possession 
of plants,206 Clare’s wild Flora was to be a book in which flowers were linked to local songs and 
superstitions and belonged in some sense to those who gave them this particular cultural 
surround and sought to maintain it.  Thus Clare refers to flowers with possessive pronouns:  “our 
‘Old-mans-beard,’” and “my ‘ragged robin,’” for example, sometimes claiming particular 
varieties or sorts of flowers as “ours” or “mine.”  In other cases, Clare distributes the ownership 
of particular blooms amongst their primary admirers and the people who maintain their myths.  
Clare’s account of the Celandine is a particularly telling example: 
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this is my ‘crow flower’ & ‘buttercup’ the childen often call them ‘golden 
daiseys’ some of the common people know them like wise by the name of ‘pile 
wort’ but none by the name of ‘little celadine’ the large one or major is calld ‘wart 
weed’ & the yellow juice emitted when the stalk is broken is applyd to warts as a 
certain cure & I myself have known it succeed often—my mother has a poetical 
superstion about them she calls (I mean the major Celadine still) them Dane weed 
as they grow plentifully in a field at her native place were it is said the danes & 
redshanks fought a desperate battle & on that day which is said to be Whit Sunday 
she assures me for certain tho she never tried it herself that they emit a red juice 
instead of a yellow I have never had the curosity to travel so far to contradict her 
& she will not be persuaded by the contrary at home for she is certain they are not 
the same flower & that her Dane weed owns its wonderful property still—what 
belief is stronger than superstion207 
Clare’s celandine—the “crow flower”—is different from Wordsworth’s “little celadine” and 
from his mother’s “Dane weed,” but Clare seems to revel in the diversification of the common 
yellow plant.  His short paragraph performs in little what Kent’s four-page entry on the flower 
does, but while Kent seems almost dutiful in her citation of the appearance of the celandine in 
various literary and cultural contexts, Clare’s interest in the appropriation of the flower by 
children and his own superstitious mother seems somewhat more playful and theoretically 
interested; it is concerned not so much with the number and quality of references to the flower as 
it is on the nature of naming and belief.  Not believing his mother’s superstition for a moment 
and not having the curiosity required to prove her wrong, he nevertheless recites the myth of 
Whit Sunday and thinks of it as a particularly “poetic” one. 
In his article, “John Clare’s Dark Ecology,” Timothy Morton reads Heidegger’s 
description of Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of female peasant’s shoes.  Heidegger’s description, 
Morton says, “poetically renders the way in which these humble things gather together the entire 
environment, the social and natural place, of the peasant woman.”208  Heidegger’s description 
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calls forth the “earth” of the peasant’s shoes—their earthy dirtiness and resistance to 
instrumentalization—while allowing them protection by the “world” of cultural and historical 
instruments.  Morton believes the gesture is a futile one, characteristic of Romanticism, which 
counters “the displacements of modernity with the politics and poetics of place…a cry of the 
heart in a heartless world.”209  I believe Clare sees his mother’s superstition as such (as one 
possible response to a world without a heart or a sense of place), but that he nevertheless respects 
her “poetical superstion” as representative of the powers and pleasures of poetry.  I do not mean 
to suggest that Clare is complacent with or unquestioning of this sheltering power—indeed, he 
plays with it to the point of satire in poems like “The Lament of Swordy Well”—but I do mean 
to suggest that Clare sees the “worlding” capacities of art, culture, and belief as part of a greater 
network of possibilities through which we can interact with an “earth” that is not necessarily 
separate from those worlds, as Morton insists. 
 
Taste’s Many Hues 
Clare’s various notions of taste, especially as they inflect literary and natural history, 
converge in “Shadows of Taste,” a poem that refuses to pass by any blossom in its accounting of 
taste as something as substantial and embedded in its environmental context (no matter well 
hidden) as any blossom.  Taste is also a faculty as likely to be held by an insect or plant as a 
person.  Within the first six lines of the poem, taste is both something that we see and something 
that we see with; it is visible in the world and a faculty of choice that all beings inherit: 
Taste with as many hues doth hearts engage 
As leaves & flowers do upon natures page 
Not mind alone the instinctive mood declares 
But birds & flowers & insects are its heirs  
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Taste is their joyous heritage & they  
All choose for joy in a peculiar way (1-6) 
Taste in these lines is something inherited and declared by its possessors.  As the poem 
progresses, it becomes clear that this taste can nevertheless only be recognized by a viewer who 
also has taste.  Clare sets up this recognition as a form of reading by invoking nature as a page, 
but he immediately expands reading beyond the province of the human mind:  “Not mind alone 
the instinctive mood declares, / But birds and flowers and insects are its heirs—.”  Thus the 
flowers “upon nature's page” that might engage our taste themselves practice taste as a faculty of 
choice that is nevertheless tied to their natural history or “joyous heritage.”  The first two thirds 
of the poem is a rich, tasteful natural history of birds, flowers, and insects whose various shades 
of taste lead them to “choose for joy in a peculiar way” by making their home in “leaf-darkened 
woods,” streams, or “barren roads.”  By suspending the creatures’ faculty of taste between the 
ability of each creature to “choose for joy” freely and the practice of their “joyous heritage,” 
Clare urges us to refrain from deciding whether these home-making choices are free or 
determined.  While joy infuses each of these impulses, their suspension between freedom and 
determination is an important component of Clare’s conception of natural history as made up of 
the peculiar choices all creatures freely make within a continuous, inherited framework.  In John 
Clare and Picturesque Landscape, Timothy Brownlow defines “natural taste” in Clare as the 
refinement of inherited instincts in the face of particular circumstances.  He quotes Jay 
Appleton’s thesis in The Experience of Landscape:  “the individual creature interacts with its 
environment in a manner which, in the most general sense, is common to its species, but in detail 
is peculiar to itself.”210  Brownlow offers birdsong, which, as Clare knew, is generally similar 
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within a species but particular to any one member of that species.  However, Brownlow does not 
raise the issue that Clare’s primary interest in “Shadows of Taste” is to explore the way taste 
operates in the homemaking choices of individual creatures (thus “Birds own [taste] in the 
various spots they choose” (7)).  “Shadows of Taste” explores how creatures embed themselves 
within particular contexts by choosing their homes, and this decision, the result of a fine balance 
between inheritance and choice, reveals—and produces—the taste of each homemaking creature.   
In The Open:  Man and Animal, Giorgio Agamben employs the work of ecologist Jakob 
von Uexküll to explain the ways in which all creatures create their own environments, whose 
scope and primary features are determined by the particular perceptual capabilities and point of 
view of each creature in particular contexts.  Uexküll calls the primary features that matter to 
each creature within their environment “carriers of significance;” these carriers of significance 
vary in their signification depending upon the environment of which they are a part.  Agamben 
gives the stem of a flower as an example.  Depending on whether it is observed in the 
environment of “a girl picking flowers for a bouquet to pin to her corset, in that of an ant for 
whom it is an ideal way to reach its nourishment in the flower’s calyx, in that of a larva of a 
cicada who pierces its medullary canal and uses it as a pump to construct the fluid parts of its 
elevated cocoon, or finally in that of the cow who simply chews and swallows it as food,” the 
stem of the flower is differently meaningful.211  As such, there is no one objectively constituted 
version of the stem of the flower and, by extension, there is no one objectively constituted, fixed, 
version of a larger environmental system, such as a forest.  There is only the stem of the flower-
for-the-girl, or for-the-ant or for-the-cow.  Likewise, as Agamben points out, there is only a 
forest-for-the-park-ranger, a forest-for-the-hunter, a forest-for-the-nature-lover, etc.  Clare also 
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connects the ways the creatures he observes constitute their particular environments through the 
tasteful choices they make and the associations they draw between “carriers of significance” and 
the environment-constituting choices and associations of humans. 
Amidst the parade of these creatures and their “unnumbered hues” are the shades of taste 
manifested in the various men of taste who populate the poem.  At the centre of “Shadows of 
Taste” is a man of taste who reminds us of Clare himself, who liked to look at nature with a 
“poetic feeling.”  The poetic associations of this man of taste provide a second home for the 
creatures he observes, embedding them within a literary context with the same “wisdom of 
creative choice” that characterizes their home making.  In this sense, “Shadow of Taste” is not, 
as Jonathan Bate has suggested of Clare’s work more broadly, “the record of his search for a 
home in the world,” so much as it is the record of his search for a home for the world in his 
poetry.212 
Clare describes the lasting quality of the relationship between poetry and nature, which 
he calls at its best the “true sublime,” in terms that echo Keats's “Ode on a Grecian Urn” in their 
invocation of ceaseless activity.  In a poem, the poet says: 
A blossom in its witchery of bloom 
There gathered dwells in beauty & perfume 
The singing bird the brook that laughs along 
There ceasless sing & never thirsts for song 
A pleasing image to its page conferred 
In living character & breathing word 
Becomes a landscape heard & felt & seen 
Sunshine & shade one harmonizing green 
Where meads & brooks & forests basking lie 
Lasting as truth & the eternal sky 
Thus truth to nature, as the true sublime 
Stands a Mount Atlas overpeering time (67-78)  
                                                
 
212 Jonathan Bate, The Song of the Earth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 153. 
135 
 
This invocation of poetry as a lasting residence for elements of the natural world (it is there that 
blooms are gathered and there that birds perpetually sing, Clare emphasizes with the anaphora 
that highlights “There . . . There . . . Where”) seems to be integral to his understanding of the 
potential of natural history and the “true sublime.”  The expression of nature in poetry and the 
expression of poetry in nature is sublime and lasting insofar as it is true, and this truth is 
predicated upon a larger sense of order or fitness in the world between its inhabitants’ creative 
activity (their tasteful choices) and their contexts.  Clare thus radically extends Wordsworth’s 
belief that, 
the individual Mind 
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less 
Of the whole species) to the external world 
Is fitted; and how exquisitely too— 
Theme this but little heard of among men— 
The external world is fitted to the mind213 
For Clare this fitness is not restricted to the “individual Mind” or even to the “progressive 
powers . . .  / Of the whole species,” but is available to all creatures, for whom taste or instinct is 
a creative activity that the poet recognizes as akin to or even identical with his own:  “Not mind 
alone the instinctive mood declares / But birds and flowers and insects are its heirs—”(3-4). 
We can analogize this kind of fitness, as W.  John Coletta does in “Ecological Aesthetics 
and the Natural History Poetry of John Clare,” to the ecological understanding of the 
“interdependence” of elements in natural communities.  Coletta points in particular to Clare’s 
prescient illustrations of what ecologist Eugene Odum has called mature, or climax, 
communities, and adapts Odum’s definition of “interdependence” as “a measure of a system's 
ability to adapt to circumstance or even to adapt circumstance to itself” to Clare’s notion of taste.  
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Coletta believes it is possible to translate “the ecological concept of interdependence … into an 
aesthetic principle of the interdependence of images . . . [which] may all ultimately be seen as 
part of an interdependent ecological and aesthetic whole” in Clare’s poetry.  Coletta goes on to 
describe “Clare’s ecology of mind . . . in which the inner and outer landscapes are fitted to one 
another as organism is fitted to environment.”214  The fitting of inner and outer landscapes 
Coletta describes as Clare’s ecology of mind is analogous to the interdependence, or fit, he sees 
between ecology and aesthetics in Clare’s poetry.  Coletta suggests that this interdependence 
strengthens and sustains the poetry despite the diversity of images it presents.  Indeed, the series 
of images in “Shadows of Taste” depend for their significance upon the interdependence of their 
parts.  Each object and association in the system of images, seeming to vie for position in the 
busy scene, can also be seen to depend upon every other and to fit together. 
John Barrell views the relationship of images in Clare’s poetry as a more competitive 
one, and in many ways more conventionally sublime one, than Coletta’s chosen term, 
“interdependence,” might imply.  In Barrell’s discussion of Clare’s presentation of complex 
landscapes, Clare’s attention is constantly torn between his awareness of the particularity of 
objects and their multiplicity within the larger scene.  The particularity of objects, Barrell says, 
calls for Clare’s attention and separates them from their background as “too striking to be 
contained in a properly composed landscape.”  At the same time, such objects are so multiple 
that “we have the sense always that outside the poem are hundreds of images hammering to be 
admitted.”  Their “overwhelming multiplicity,” Barrell says, is a threat to Clare’s desire to attend 
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to each one of them.215  But it is just this hammering of images, apparently without end, that 
sustains the shifting network of associations that comprise the man of taste’s sublime natural 
history.  
The objects in “Shadows of Taste” never stand alone.  They are a breeding—and 
feeding—ground for the associations and ideas of the man of taste:  “Associations sweet each 
object breeds / And fine ideas upon fancy feeds” (133-34).  Moreover, these associations depend 
less upon the objects themselves than they do upon the objects’ environments:  the man of taste 
doesn't love flowers “because they shed perfumes,” or butterflies for their “painted plumes” or 
even birds for their singing alone.  Instead, he loves their home, the “wild and meadow lea”:  
“There hath the flower its dwelling place & there / The butterfly goes dancing through the air” 
(139-40).  And although Clare opens up his notion of “taste” in “Shadows of Taste” to include a 
wide spectrum of shades—“taste runs riot in her every grade” (48)—the cohesion of these shades 
seems to depend upon the associational activity of the man of taste, who is able to see the shades 
in their present environmental context as parts of a larger, shared natural and literary history.  His 
ability to do this, the speaker warns at the close of the poem, is dependent upon natural objects 
being left in their homes:  
Associations sweet each object breeds  
& fine ideas upon fancy feeds 
. . .  
But take these several beings from their homes 
Each beautious thing a withered thought becomes  
Association fades & like a dream  
They are but shadows of the things they seem (133-4, 147-50) 
In some sense, the title “Shadows of Taste” also refers to this de-contextualized form of natural 
and literary history, one in which the shades of taste described in the poem become shadows of 
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themselves:  the butterfly with the pollen shaken off its wings, the celandine without 
Wordsworth’s beautiful mention of it.   
In additionally drafted lines for the poem, Clare explicitly connects such shadows of taste 
(objects deprived of their tastes and the associations of the man of taste) with the traditional 
activities of the natural historian, including the collection of specimens and their classification.  
He does so within a larger discussion of the associations that inspire joy in the man of taste: 
 The man of taste in fine ideas feeds 
Assosiations that give birth to joys 
. . . 
But take the orchis from its mossy steeps 
& buttey flyes to entemoligize 
Classd in choise boxes 
& birds encaged to sing a prisoners song 
The man of taste half looses all he felt 
The joys of freedom & they all their own 
Their choice & joy creates the like in him 
& pleasure there inspires in him the joy 
Joys principal[e] exist with them 
& he recieves the interest as his due216 
The “fine ideas” that feed the associations that “give birth” to the joys of the man of taste depend 
upon and take their cue from the ability of the creatures he observes to make choices freely in the 
environments they have formed for themselves precisely through these choices.   
Clare closes “Shadows of Taste” and strings his images together both ecologically and 
aesthetically with his presentation of a “warped and punished trunk of stunted oak,” which has 
been “Freed from its bonds” of ivy by a thunder-stroke.  The oak’s survival facilitates its use as a 
home for birds and also, it seems, as a home for the string of images that precede it, which seem 
to owe their lively being to its perseverance in the “desolate neglected spot / That seems in 
labour's hurry left forgot,” a place noticed and appreciated only by the man of taste (141-42).  By 
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choosing to highlight the perseverance of the oak and its transformation into a lively habitat 
rather than emphasizing the “bomb bursting” image of the thunder-stroke that felled it (a more 
likely candidate for the type of sublimity we associate with Burke, especially), Clare privileges 
the preservative potential of the sublime as he conceives it, a potential I will pick up later in a 
further discussion of the importance of thunder-struck trees, dotterel stumps, and rotting wooden 
gates in Clare’s poetry.   
 
Beautiful’s Sublime:  Taste and Repetition through Time 
First, I return to what is probably Clare’s most forceful expression of his version of 
sublimity, in the line “ truth to nature as the true sublime / Stands a Mount Atlas overpeering 
time.”  The lines are a distillation of many of his ideas regarding the possibility of a “true 
sublime” that might stand against the “specimens of daily caterers for public decision.”217   In his 
letters to Taylor and his autobiographical writings, Clare is as concerned to differentiate his own 
taste from that of the London critical community with which he had limited contact as he was to 
differentiate himself from the “low herd.”  In his autobiographical writings, quoted above, he 
describes feeling estranged in matters of taste from his childhood playmates, who could pass by 
“quantitys of pleasing things” Clare had paused to linger over “as carless” as if they were 
“blind,” causing him to wonder if he had a “taste peculialy by [him]self.”   Nevertheless, Clare 
claims not to have let this experience change the expression of his taste in his poetry.  Aside 
from his parents, whom he depended upon to alert him to passages in his poetry that were not 
sufficiently “natural,”218 he chose to show his first attempts at poetry only to the one childhood 
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companion whom he was confident shared his own way of seeing: “he was a strict observer of 
nature and acquainted with most of her various pictures  this recommendation was plenty for me 
as I found his eyes viewd things as mine did and his notice observed them as I expressd them.”219  
Though this friend did not express particular pleasure in Clare’s verses, Clare claims to have 
been satisfied enough with his merely understanding them, and in this way testifying to their 
truth to nature. 
When presented with Taylor’s request to prepare a series of essays on the sublime and 
beautiful, Clare’s doubts regarding the universality of his taste flared up again, with an equal 
insistence upon the propriety of his own peculiarities, which he attributed to a faithfulness to 
those expressions of nature that are themselves faithful to nature.  Though Clare’s letter begins 
by saying, “I fear you overate my abilities . . . I so seldom see other peoples judgments who are 
considered not only men of taste but men of unerring critisism coinciding with mine that I feel I 
am only an individual indulging in an erroneous fancy,”  he continues by inveighing against both 
the “bomb bursting images” others present as the sublime (mentioned at the outset of this 
chapter) and the “unnatural images cloathed in the pomp of illused words” that others describe as 
beautiful, in which admittedly gorgeous, but outrageously unnatural landscapes “colored with 
blue foliage & a green sky” are lauded as the “superexcellent in song.”  The draft letter ends with 
the pacific assertion that while “the vagaries of false taste” and fashions last only for a season, 
“nature will be herself again & nature will out live them all.”220 
Despite his confidence in the triumph of nature over fashion, however, Clare’s own 
confidence in his abilities falters again months later.  Clare’s particular disappointment is with a 
volume of poetry collected by Southey called Selected Works of the British Poets, from which 
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Taylor had expected Clare to extract instances of the sublime and beautiful and to comment on 
them in the margins.  “[H]ow is it I cannot find the sublime & beautiful which I expected[?]” 
Clare asks Taylor, complaining that the selections for the collection seem to have been made by 
a printer rather than by a poet.  Clare throws the disappointment of the collection up into his 
larger “drawbacks and disappointments”: “I live in a land overflowing with obscurity & 
vulgarity far away from taste & books & friends . . . I see things praised that appear to me utterly 
worthless & read criticisms in the periodicals when I do see them that the very puffers of 
Blacking & Baersgreese would be very ashamed of.”221 
In the midst of his profound ambivalence regarding his role in any community of taste, 
Clare clings to his characterizations of the beautiful and sublime as simple, true, lively, and 
lasting.  It is difficult to tell to what extent Clare felt the beautiful and sublime worth 
distinguishing from one another.  While his attention to aesthetic categories seems more careful 
than that with which Barrell credits him (Barrell seems to me to have oversimplified Clare’s 
treatment of the aesthetic by lumping the picturesque, sublime, and beautiful together), he does 
not seem as exercised by their potential indistinctness as Edmund Burke, whose widely 
circulated and discussed Enquiry on the subject Clare seems to acknowledge when he notes that 
the desired effect of the “bomb bursting images” many people present as the sublime is to 
represent “shadows or creations of the terrible” (though they have “no more effect on the mind as 
terrible then the unmeaning rant of a maniac”).222  Instead, Clare’s conception of sublimity more 
often seems to coincide with or exceed beauty in its simplicity.  In discussing the book of Job, 
for example, Clare notes that “the simple sublimity of the poetry is more then beautiful.”223  
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More important than simplicity or truth in conveying the sublime or beautiful, however, seems to 
be Clare’s rather more radical, usually implicit, claims that time is the only true test of sublimity, 
and flesh and blood liveliness the only passing measure of that test.224  It is an expectation of 
liveliness that belies Clare’s characterization of the true sublime as a stony “Mount Atlas 
overpeering time,” but which is fully in keeping with his admiration of those poetic extracts in 
which natural objects seem to live and grow and with those passages in his own poetry we might 
usefully consider as examples of a natural-historical sublime that vigorously moves and breathes. 
Perhaps the greatest threat to the living landscape of Helpston as Clare knew it was 
enclosure.  As Barrell describes it in The Idea of Landscape, enclosure de-localized Helpston 
with devastating effects for Clare, whose entire system of knowledge, he says, was local.  The 
identity of the places Clare described and Clare’s own identity, Barrell explains, depended upon 
things staying the way they were, where they were.225  This may account for the difficulty of 
distinguishing between a nostalgia for childhood and a nostalgia for Helpston before enclosure in 
Clare’s poetry of loss.  As Sarah Zimmerman points out in her work on Clare, it is also difficult 
to attribute such losses to any one cause, which can seem alternately to be the simple passage of 
time, natural events, or enclosure.226  The difficulty of fixing or accounting for such losses made 
them no less bitter for Clare.  Taylor often found himself in the position of managing Clare’s 
sharp responses to particularly unjust forms of loss, urging Clare to delete lines of his verse that 
Clare’s patron Lord Radstock might find ungrateful and even thematizing Clare’s response to 
loss in his introduction to The Village Minstrel to make it appear to his advantage as a poet: 
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The regret of a poet for the loss of some object in nature, to which many of the 
dearest recollections of his earliest and happiest days had attached themselves, is 
always vehement; but who can wonder at or condemn it? If an old post had such 
attractions for Pope, surrounded as he was with comfort and luxury, what 
allowance ought not to be made for the passionate regard of poor CLARE for 
things which were the landmarks of his life, the depositaries of almost all his 
joys?227   
Taylor includes below this preface an extended portion of an 1821 letter Clare wrote him 
mourning the immanent loss of two favourite elm trees behind his home to the “savage” owner 
who wished to sell them.  The portion Taylor excerpts ends with an apology of sorts, in which 
Clare offers up as a mere “indisposition” his wish that everything boys might find “would remain 
in that state till they died.”  Though Taylor doesn’t mention the result of their negotiations about 
the trees in his introduction to The Village Minstrel, they did continue, with Taylor offering to 
get Octavius Gilchrist to purchase the trees and save them.  Clare’s reply was appreciative, but 
bitter:  “I thank you heartily for your honest liberality in wishing to purchase the Elms for me & 
shall certainly never forget it—but you shall not buy them < ? > –let them dye like the rest of 
us.” 228  Three lines are heavily deleted in the space mark.   
Clare encounters these trees and others with a forceful ambivalence about how to 
approach their loss and destruction.  Battered, broken, and traumatized trees, in particular, appear 
throughout his work.  As Tim Fulford points out in his article, “Cowper, Wordsworth, Clare: The 
Politics of Trees,” trees were for Clare both landmarks and “selfmarks,” that were more properly 
the property of the poet in his intimate relationship with them than of the land owners who often 
flagrantly destroyed them.  Fulford claims that in his treatment of them Clare “dramatize[s] loss 
and destruction without a compensatory discovery of a remaining power and unity in [his] own 
mind”; his language “operates according to an aesthetics of weakness—an intimation of loss, 
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dismemberment and oblivion rather than immortality.”229  But as often as Clare’s descriptions of 
broken trees seems to accord with this “aesthetics of weakness” (Clare’s last letter to Taylor on 
the doomed elms might seem at first to suggest such an aesthetic) they also sometimes lead the 
poet to reflect upon their continued life in some form or another or upon their continued ability 
to provide shelter to the people and animals whose lives they share.  Running alongside the 
“indisposition” that Clare says caused him to wish that trees might remain in the same state as 
when they were first spotted in childhood and his bitter appraisal of the losses incurred through 
enclosure, Clare develops an aesthetic strain of natural continuances through which loss is 
imagined as a sublime confirmation of change and repetition in a natural history that absorbs and 
shelters human history.  This gain through a loss is familiar to us in structures of sublimity, but 
here operates as an ecological, rather than egotistical, triumph. 
Instances of people running for shelter from the rain under the leaves of trees, boys 
huddled inside the trunks of huge dotterel trees eating juicy wild peas, and animals escaping the 
hunt beneath tree roots abound in Clare’s poetry.  In a short prose passage headed “TASTE,” 
Clare notes that there is “excessive rapture . . . in contemplating an autumn Landscape” and that 
“there is happiness in lolling over the old shivered trunks & fragments of a ruined tree destroyed 
some years since by lightening & mossing & wasting away into everlasting decay.”230  Through 
the “poetic eye” that lingers over broken trees, Clare encounters and re-imagines a natural 
environment as a literary text; this attention develops an aesthetic strain of natural continuances 
through which environments or contexts thrive despite change.  In fact, these changes register the 
evolution of contexts that unfold as natural history itself unfolds.  Put differently, 
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interdependence makes the evolution of contexts possible because it refuses to abandon any of its 
parts, each part being critical to every other. 
In another poem from The Midsummer Cushion, “The Moorhen's Nest,” Clare calls up an 
image of a “broken tree” that persists despite disaster.  The speaker of that poem declares:   
tis wealth to me  
Wild heaths to trace, and note their broken tree   
Which lightning shivered and which nature tries   
To keep alive for poesy to prize (37-40)   
The radical form of interdependence Clare describes in these examples crosses the boundaries of 
the non-human and human, the natural and the poetic.  His understanding of their relationships is 
closer to sublime understanding than it is to a naïve confusion of art and world, or the facile 
forms of “interdependence” Morton associates with weak forms of eco-criticism and ecological 
land art.  In fact, Clare’s nearest kinship in the world of land art today may be with Andy 
Goldsworthy.  In Rivers and Tides, a documentary about his work, Goldsworthy expresses an 
understanding of art as implicated in natural processes.  As the tide disassembles a large nest of 
driftwood Goldsworthy has constructed along the water’s edge, he watches the structure come to 
pieces as it follows the tide’s circular drift—an echo of the nest’s form—out to sea.  “Doesn’t 
feel at all like destruction,” Goldsworthy notes.231 
Shivered and broken trees and the poems that prize them illustrate the way sublime 
ecosystems of mind and nature live and move continuously through time, as a hold against loss.  
This is the case for another tree in “The Moorhen's Nest,” which withstands a sudden disaster or, 
in Eugene Odum's language, adapts itself to circumstance, when a bank is washed away from 
under it by a flood.  The poet describes happening upon this tree in the course of a walk during 
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which he has encountered a number of natural and man-made objects, “little pictures passing 
by”: 
Then comes the meadows where I love to see 
A flood-washed bank support an aged tree 
Whose roots are bare, yet some with foothold good 
Crankle and spread and strike beneath the flood, 
Yet still it leans, as safer hold to win 
On t'other side, and seems as tumbling in, 
While every summer finds it green and gay 
And winter leaves it safe as did the may.  (79-86) 
Clare's image here of a submerged network of roots resonates with his other characterizations of 
stable communities, where the landscape is richly stratified both horizontally and vertically, as 
Coletta points out, into various, smaller niche communities.  Clare gives us here a set of images 
that invoke several of those layers both in place and time:  the bank once washed by water, 
beneath it the roots extending down beneath the remaining water and, above all, the trunk and 
branches of the tree, whether green or grey with the seasons, extending out over the river in 
perfect security.   
The complex image of the lightning or flood struck tree repeats throughout the poetry in 
which Clare seems to be working out his own natural aesthetic, giving it the status, in some 
ways, of Wordsworth's spots of time.  Nevertheless, Clare's lively, swarming, linked images 
seem to function differently in his work than the spots do in Wordsworth's.  In “The Structure of 
Romantic Nature Imagery,” Paul de Man describes the Romantic sublime of Rousseau, Holderin, 
and Wordsworth as springing from a “nostalgia for the object,” like an “earthly and pastoral 
flower,” that swiftly becomes “a nostalgia for an entity that could never, by its very nature, 
become a particularized presence.”  This movement away from natural objects as the source of 
ontological priority ultimately leads the poet to acknowledge “a possibility for consciousness to 
exist entirely by and for itself, independently of all relationship with the outside world, without 
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being moved by an intent aimed at a part of this world.”232  The Romantic sublime as de Man 
describes it is therefore a movement away from the material world as the source of priority, or 
eternity, and towards some un-particularized entity or even, over and above that, towards one's 
own faculty of reason.   
Clare's sublime is not quite of this variety.  Eternity, for Clare, is rooted in material nature 
to some degree.  Poetry, insofar as it has “truth to nature,” as Clare points out in “Shadows of 
Taste,” has this quality also, and in its ability to perpetually replay the activity of nature (as in the 
Keatsian passage cited above) is also expressive of it.  Thus the sublime in nature and poetry 
(and, importantly, nature in poetry) is characterized in Clare's work “in terms of an inevitability 
of repetition or citation.”233   This “pre-eminent worthiness of being cited” is the quality that 
inheres in scenes like the lightning-struck oak in Clare's poetry.  In Clare's poetics, the repetition 
of such images is a form of sublime quotation much like that Suzanne Guerlac describes in 
“Longinus and the Subject of the Sublime,” in which she argues that the force of the sublime is 
“maintained through the act of citation.”234  The force of sublime transmission in Guerlac’s 
account of the Longinian sublime also causes a confusion of speaker and listener, subject and 
object, such that “the destinateur gets ‘transported’ into the message and the destinataire 
achieves a fictive identification with the speaker.”235  This seems an apt description of sublimity 
as Clare might conceive it given his positioning of himself as nature’s interlocutor.  Clare 
consistently, with more or less seriousness, portrays nature as an acting subject.  He gives a piece 
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of land a voice in his protest poem “The Lamentations of Round Oak Waters” and elsewhere.  In 
a letter written to Taylor in anticipation of his move from Helpston to Northborough, in which he 
says he has had “some difficulties to leave the woods & heaths & favourite spots that have 
known me so long,”236 he inverts our expectations regarding a relationship we expect to be one-
sided.  Under Guerlac’s model of sublime transport, the speaking voice of nature would be 
absorbed into its message, or poem, and the listener, whether we think of him as Clare or as a 
reader of the poem, would be transported into an identification with that speaking voice.  Clare 
seems to imagine such an exchange in a sonnet called “November” for The Shepherd’s 
Calendar, in which he describes sheltering from a storm: 
I love the wizard noise & rave in turn 
Half vacant thoughts & self imagined rhymes  
Then hid me from the shower a short sojourn  
Neath ivied oak & mutter to the winds 
Wishing their melody belonged to me 
That I might breath a living song to thee237 
Though Edward Strickland provides this segment of the poem in his article, “John Clare and the 
Sublime,” as further evidence in a case he makes for Clare’s evasion of the sublime (apparently 
because Clare runs for cover beneath the oak tree),238 I believe the passage does more to indicate 
Clare’s persistent interest in the topic.  While the verse might not seem characteristic of Clare, it 
does seem to participate in the more interestingly developed strain of sublimity Clare described 
elsewhere, in the Biography of Birds and Flowers and other poems for The Midsummer Cushion.  
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The ivy covered tree as a place of safe harbor for creative activity seems to play an important 
role in Clare’s changing formula.   
Thus, in “The Progress of Rhyme,” another poem for The Midsummer Cushion, Clare 
reflects upon a grove of “ancient limes / That into roofs like churches climb, / Grain intertwisting 
into grain.” The grove shimmers with a “screen” of “summer’s luscious leaves,” and respires 
with the song and breath of insects and flowers.   It is a place where, Clare says, “All I beheld of 
grand, with time / Grew up to beautiful’s sublime.”  
In “The Eternity of Nature” Clare explicitly explores the potential of natural continuances 
through sublime quotation.  In that poem, which begins “Leaves from eternity are simple things / 
To the world's gaze — whereto a spirit clings / Sublime and lasting,” Clare invokes the perpetual 
freshness of his favourite inhabitants of nature — the birds and bees and flowers — linking them 
as ‘partners’ with time.  Cowslips are one of many elements which, like the daisy, “lives and 
strikes its little root / Into the lap of time”: 
Cowslips' golden blooms 
That in the closen and the meadow comes 
Shall come when kings and empires fade and die, 
And in the meadows as time's partners lie 
As fresh two thousand years to come as now, 
With those five crimson spots upon its brow.  (27-32) 
The “five crimson spots” upon the eternally blooming cowslip are picked up again, or quoted, 
later in the poem as the first of a number of slightly different iterations of the number five in 
nature: 
With the odd number five, strange nature's laws 
Plays many freaks nor once mistakes the cause; 
And in the cowslip-peeps this very day 
Five spots appear, which time ne'er wears away 
Nor once mistakes the counting — look within 
Each peep, and five, nor more nor less, is seen.  (77-82) 
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Characteristically, the poet urges us to get close to the material world to recognize these 
repetitions that associate tiny natural forms with one another.  In “The Eternity of Nature,” the 
poet conveys a spirit “Sublime and lasting,” through the sheer multiplicity of natural objects at 
the ground level that repeat the number five, defying the poet to find any, “Count which [he] 
will,” that do not “make the number right” (94).  The sublime in Clare's poetry most often occurs 
at this scale of natural vision, whether the subject is standing upon a riverbank or kneeling down 
to better view an insect or bird's nest; visions of landscapes that seem to melt into the sky from 
the perspective of a subject standing upon an eminence are absent.  Instead, repetitions and 
transpositions through time and space prompt them.   
In his “Essay on Landscape,” Clare invites us to view the landscapes of De Wint: “Look 
at them they are the very copys of nature,” he marvels.  Nature rewards her worshippers, he goes 
on to say, by revealing “her own imaginings” rather than the “mountains & rivers & cataracts” 
the fanciful imagine where they are not, he says, ticking off a laundry list of formations 
conventionally associated with the sublime (none of which, incidentally, Clare would have seen 
in Helpston).  The lover of nature makes the best use of nature’s imaginings “by reflections as 
true & as light as a rushy common with its summer tract of a brook & old dotterel trees,”239 Clare 
says, advocating a form of reflection that gains its life from its likeness to nature and the 
“Shadows of Taste” that give it its lightness.  Clare’s own taste settles upon a tree, a “dotterel,” 
whose top has been lopped off for harvest or scorched by lightning and turns it into “a Paradise,” 
a haven for sublime understanding. 
It is not simply the “Eternity of Nature” — its “pre-eminent worthiness of being cited” ad 
infinitum in its various forms and the poetry in which it makes its home — that makes up Clare's 
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sublime.  Rather, this endless iterability is paired with an appreciation of taste as a kind of 
freedom of creative choice, or, to return to Coletta's words, as “a measure of a system's ability to 
adapt to circumstance or even to adapt circumstance to itself,” that makes the “Eternity of 
Nature” sublime and lasting in ways that survive the sudden thunder and lightning and make new 
invitations to all creatures to “choose for joy.”  
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CHAPTER 4 
Natural History in a New Sense 
 
 
 
I thynke for to touche also 
The worlde whiche neweth everie daie, 
So as I can, so as I maie. 
   – John Gower, Thoreau’s epigraph to “Monday,” A Week on  the Concord  
   and Merrimack Rivers 
 
It bloomed and dropt, a Single Noon— 
The Flower—distinct and Red— 
I, passing, thought another Noon 
Another in its stead 
 
Will equal glow, and thought no More 
But came another Day 
To find the Species disappeared— 
The Same locality— 
   – Emily Dickinson  
 
 
In 2008, researchers at Harvard and Boston Universities published the results of their 
study of the impact of climate change on the phenology (the timing of seasonal activity) of a 
wide variety of flowering species in and around Concord, Massachusetts.   Based on data 
spanning 150 years and originating with the data-set of Henry David Thoreau, the researchers 
found that species are now flowering an average of seven days earlier than they did in the mid-
nineteenth century.240  Plant species whose flowering time is most sensitive and responsive to 
temperature change have fared best under warming trends, perhaps because these plants are 
better able to maintain important relationships of synchronicity with other plants, pollinators, and 
predators.  
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Researchers Abraham J. Miller-Rushing and Richard B. Primack’s choice of this passage 
from Thoreau’s journals as the epigraph for the publication of their findings in the journal 
Ecology is canny:   
It is astonishing how soon and unexpectedly flowers appear, when the fields are 
scarcely tinged with green.  Yesterday, for instance, you observed only the radical 
leaves of some plants; to-day you pluck a flower.241 
Thoreau’s reflection on the ghostly swiftness of seasonal change, through which plants come into 
flower seemingly overnight, is thrown into a much larger time scale in the context of Miller-
Rushing and Primack’s study.  Employing Thoreau’s own careful records of the times of the 
first-flowering of individual plant species, the study identifies a small, but overwhelmingly 
significant shift in the life histories of those plants.  Yesterday (in Thoreau’s time) Thoreau may 
have observed only the leaves of the larger blue flag on June 15th; today (in our own) we can 
indeed pluck its flower on that same date.   
 Perhaps most worrying is the fact that we no longer witness the life cycles of a 
staggering number of the plant species Thoreau observed in Concord, Massachusetts.  Miller-
Rushing and Primack found that 27% of the species that Thoreau observed no longer exist in 
Concord at all (when Thoreau observed them, they were already what ecologists call “ghost 
species” within their region—species whose place-faithful lives were quickly becoming 
untenable because their climate was changing around them).  Their disappearance came despite 
the fact that Concord is, by modern measures, a remarkably well-preserved environment.  In fact, 
about 60% of the area Thoreau roamed in Concord appears roughly the same as it did in his day, 
as undeveloped space (40% of that space is explicitly protected).  The authors of the flowering-
time study take this as evidence that “a more global approach to conservation prioritization is 
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necessary to minimize future species loss” and that developing appropriate conservation 
strategies will necessitate including “information not only on species life history, but on their 
evolutionary history as well.”242 
As with so many ecological and evolutionary principals, Thoreau himself discerned that 
particular plant species might have not only a uniform and endlessly repeating life history and set 
of characteristics, but also an evolutionary history that might inform our understanding of the 
relationships that determine its changing character.  Characteristically, he did so through close 
observation.  On August 21st, 1851, Thoreau reported in his journal: 
I have now found all the hawkweeds.  Singular these genera of plants—plants 
manifestly related yet distinct— They suggest a history to Nature—a Natural 
history in a new sense.243 
Thoreau’s conception of natural history “in a new sense” was born of his ability to distinguish 
tiny differences as well as important resemblances,244 and, crucially, to distinguish between 
natural histories over vastly different time scales; from his location in Concord in the mid-
nineteenth century, Thoreau could imagine natural history as a spirit of change involving the 
lives of hosts of individual plants and animals over large swaths of time rather than as a record of 
static matter.     
As Thoreau frames it in his journal, his interest in botany arose not from any generalized 
study of plant species, but from a desire to “know my neighbors, if possible,—to get a little 
nearer to them.”245  He recalls looking out on a swamp at one point, and wondering if he could 
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ever possibly become familiar enough with its flowers to identify them all according to 
Bigelow’s “Plants of Boston and Vicinity” (his first book of botany).  Eventually he did, but he 
gained this knowledge not through a laborious and artificial process of memorization but, rather, 
through an increasing acquaintance with individual plants reachable on foot: 
I soon found myself observing when plants first blossomed and leafed, and I 
followed it up early and late, far and near, several years in succession, running to 
different sides of the town and into the neighboring towns, often between twenty 
and thirty miles in a day.  I often visited a particular plant four or five miles 
distant half a dozen times within a fortnight, that I might know exactly when it 
opened, beside attending to a great many others in different directions and some 
of them equally distant, at the same time.246 
The activity Thoreau describes in this segment of his journal resulted in the records Miller-
Rushing and Primack engage in their study; despite its length and wide-ranging significance, that 
study is composed of the minute observations of multiple individuals observing hundreds of 
individual plants belonging to hundreds of distinct plant species over time.  For seven years 
(beginning the year Thoreau commented on the varieties of hawkweed in his journal), Thoreau 
scanned the woods of Concord, observing and carefully recording the date upon which he first 
observed the flowering of more than five hundred plant species.  For fifteen years, in 1878 and 
from 1888-1902, Edward Hosmer (a shopkeeper and amateur botanist) did the same, and 
between 1963 and 1993 Pennie Logemann recorded the times of first-flowering of plants on her 
property to develop a reliable calendar for her landscaping business.  Each of these observers 
might have expected the times they recorded each year to be roughly the same, differing slightly 
only in response to variations in seasonal temperatures and weather patterns from year to year.  
Together with the observations of the researchers themselves from 2003 to 2006, however, the 
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data tell a different story on a different scale.  On average, species are now flowering a full week 
earlier than in Thoreau’s time.247        
Thoreau’s natural history writing anticipates and articulates the issues raised by Miller-
Rushing and Primack’s study in surprising ways.  Diurnal, seasonal, and generational changes 
underlie his understanding of natural history and structure most all of his narratives—even those 
that are not generally considered natural history.248  Despite the apparently consistent repetition 
of such cycles over time, Thoreau’s depiction of natural history is never predictable, in part 
because he was aware of a fundamental dissonance at the heart of humans’ environmental 
experience:  that of our participation in, but necessarily partial coincidence with, the history of 
life on earth.  Writing from Walden pond in his journal, Thoreau reflected upon humans’ ability 
to embrace within their life span the shorter lives of other material things, and to be embraced by 
those natural phenomena that appear fixed, unchanging, and enduring.  He expresses that 
relationship of different time scales spatially, as a matter of nearness and distance: 
     All material things are in some sense man’s kindred, and subject to the same 
laws with him.   
     Even a taper is his relative—and burns not eternally, as some say of lamps 
found burning in ancient sepulchres—but only a certain number of his hours. 
     These things belong to the same dynasty or system of things.  He witnesses 
their wasting and decay as well as his own.  What mans experience does not 
embrace is to him stationary and eternal.  Whether he wakes or sleeps the lamp 
still burns on and burns out—completing its life within his own. 
     He sees such objects at a very near angle.  They have a very large parallax to 
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him—but not so those tapers the fixed stars which are not both lit and burnt out in 
the life of a man—yet they too are his distant relations.249 
Here, the human life span is a distorting mechanism, one that brings material things with shorter 
lives than humans near to us, and that takes those things with longer life spans further from us.  
In their alienation from human time scales, these things seem “stationary and eternal,” an illusion 
that makes those tapers in the sky—the stars—seem very far (both in space and in time) from 
their kindred, the tapers upon our tables. 
Thoreau’s ability to imagine the finitude of all material things despite their existence in 
different time scales sprung from a very recent acceptance within the scientific community of the 
fact of species extinction.250  Even as natural history catalogues swelled to accommodate newly 
discovered plants, animals, and cultures, naturalists struggled to accept the history of life on 
earth and of humans’ experience of it as proscribed and marked by unrecoverable losses.  Thus 
though Thoreau asks, in Walden, “Why do precisely these objects we behold make a world? 
Why has man just these species of animals for his neighbors; as if nothing but a mouse could 
have filled this crevice?” he was also sceptical that just those objects we behold at any given 
moment in time offer us a complete world.251  Writing in his journal in 1856 in response to the 
newly acknowledged disappearance of animals such as the cougar and wolverine in the 
Northeast he speculates: 
Is it not a maimed and imperfect nature that I am conversant with? . . . When I 
think what were the various sounds and notes, the migrations and works, and 
changes of fur and plumage which ushered in the spring, and marked the other 
seasons of the year, I am reminded that this my life in nature, this particular round 
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of natural phenomena which I call a year, is lamentably incomplete . . . I take 
infinite pains to know all the phenomena of the spring, for instance, thinking that I 
have here the entire poem, and then, to my chagrin, I learn that it is but an 
imperfect copy that I possess and have read, that my ancestors have torn out many 
of the first leaves and the grandest passages, and mutilated it in many places.252 
This, “my life in nature,” Thoreau laments, is marked by omissions, mutilations, losses 
unimaginable.  One such loss, a much more personal one, would prompt him to begin his study 
of natural history. 
 
“Natural History of Massachusetts” 
Thoreau began his formal engagement with natural history in late winter 1842.  He did so 
at Emerson’s urging, in the midst of what was, for both of them, a period of mourning.  In 
January 1842, Thoreau’s brother John died suddenly and unexpectedly after cutting his face 
while shaving on New Year’s Day.  Later that month, Emerson’s young son Waldo contracted 
scarlet fever.  He also died.  Laura Dassow Walls (who has edited and written about Thoreau’s 
natural history writing), suggests that Emerson assigned Thoreau the task of reviewing the state 
of Massachusett’s natural history survey as a distraction from their grief.  As such, Emerson’s 
cheerful “Preliminary Note” to the resulting essay (which appeared in The Dial in July), seems 
oddly glib: 
We were thinking how we might best celebrate the good deed which the State of 
Massachusetts has done, in procuring the Scientific Survey of the 
Commonwealth, whose result is recorded in these volumes, when we found a near 
neighbor and friend of ours, dear also to the Muses, a native and an inhabitant of 
the town of Concord, who readily undertook to give us such comments as he had 
made on these books, and, better still, notes of his own conversation with nature 
in the woods and waters of this town. 253  
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The impersonality of Emerson’s address—his us of the royal (in this case editorial) “we” and his 
off-the-cuff manner—is somewhat jarring given that he was perhaps less concerned with 
celebrating the good deeds of Massachusetts in conducting a scientific survey than he was with 
distracting his neighbour and friend from his very recent loss.  The note continues, though, with 
a slight gesture towards the other losses possible if Thoreau had not written the essay: 
With all thankfulness we begged our friend to lay down the oar and fishing line, 
which none can handle better, and assume the pen, that Isaak Walton and White 
of Selborne might not want a successor, nor the fair meadows, to which we also 
have owed a home and the happiness of many years, their poet. 
The trope of relinquishing one thing and taking up another as a matter of letting loose one’s grip 
or unhanding (in the stated case, unhanding the oar and fishing line), or taking something in hand 
(in this case, the pen of the poet) is one Emerson and Thoreau engage repeatedly in their writing 
on the (im)balance of loss and gain.  Here, the assertive gesture of taking the pen of the poet in 
hand prevents a loss to naturalists Walton and White of a successor and to the meadows of a 
poet.  Presumably, Thoreau had neither oar nor fishing line in hand when Emerson made his 
request (the already lost object, instead, was his brother, John).  Thoreau’s own health suffered 
during this period; it is indeed possible that the meadows would have lost their poet if Thoreau 
had not picked up his pen and collected material from his Journal for the essay.   
For Thoreau, sympathy, loss, and estrangement are fundamentally experiences of the 
body in a particular environment—experiences that recalibrate the relationship between subjects 
and objects, as well as between soul and substance.  Though the “Natural History of 
Massachusetts” is not an elegy, or even noticeably elegiac in its tone; it is marked by its 
attendance to forms of sympathy and estrangement, with which he had a radical encounter that 
January. When John experienced lockjaw after cutting himself shaving Henry, too, experienced 
symptoms of the infection to a degree that made his family fearful for his life.  As Walls points 
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out in Seeing New Worlds, this radical sympathy was followed upon John’s death by Henry’s 
feeling that sympathy with anything, even his own body, was henceforth foreclosed: 
     I must confess there is nothing so strange to me as my own body.  I love any 
other piece of nature, almost, better. 
     I was always conscious of sounds in nature which my ears could never hear—
that I caught but the prelude to a strain.  She always retreats as I advance.  Away 
behind and behind is she and her meaning.  Will not this faith and expectation 
make to itself ears at length.  I never saw to the end, nor heard to the end; but the 
best part was unseen and unheard.254 
In the “Natural History of Massachusetts,” Thoreau looks to fish, foxes, and loons for the 
sympathy he has lost, and turns to “natural rhymes” for evidence that parts of nature sympathize 
with one another.  Yet, Thoreau’s desire for sympathy in nature does not lead to easy 
conversation with it (despite Emerson’s optimism).  Instead, Thoreau’s essay tugs gently at the 
questions and themes that would drive his natural history writing throughout his life, including 
his longed-for sympathy with nonhuman creatures and things, and the limits of that sympathy in 
contemplating beauty, comprehending animal minds, and practicing natural history.   
Thoreau engages the explicit occasion of his writing (“Reports—on the fishes, Reptiles, 
and Birds; the Herbaceous Plants and Quadrapeds; the Insects Injurious to Vegetation; and the 
Invertebrate Animals—of Massachusetts”) only cursorily.  Instead, he avers at the essay’s outset 
that “much more is adoing than Congress wots of” and asks, “What journal do the persimmon 
and the buckeye keep, and the sharpshinned hawk?”255  Wondering at this question, 
contemplating natural beauty and its serenity—to one who does these things, Thoreau asserts, 
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“no harm nor disappointment can come.”256  Natural history itself is an “elixir,” an antidote to 
the “din of religion, literature, and philosophy, which is heard in pulpits, lyceums, and 
parlors.”257  Several privileged figures—a solitary rambler, a sailor, an Indian—stride through 
the text, cutting a swath through this noise in their attendance to the infrequent cries of winter 
birds, the lonely notes of loons, and the essences of the muskrat.  The “man of science” does 
have a place here, but he too learns about the world not through “inference and deduction and the 
application of mathematics to philosophy,” but by his “finer organization,” one that allows him 
to “smell, taste, see, hear, feel, better than other men.”  We learn, Thoreau concludes, “by direct 
intercourse and sympathy” and not through “contrivance and method.”258 
Thoreau demonstrates his own finer organization by sounding and sighting his way 
through the Massachusetts landscape, cataloguing birds and other creatures by first marking their 
introduction to his senses:  a note here, a track there, the luster of scales through the water.  In 
this way, even entomology “extends the limits of being in a new direction, so that I walk in 
nature with a sense of greater space and freedom.”259  “With pleasure,” he explores “the sources 
of the myriad sounds which crowd the summer noon, and which seem the very grain and stuff of 
which eternity is made.”260  Yet, with these invitations for engagement (the sounds and sights 
that catch Thoreau’s notice), comes a certain call for reserve in particular situations.  The “direct 
intercourse and sympathy” Thoreau advocates is rather indirect in the specific instances he 
records.  They are inflected, instead, by an appreciation for privacy in a scene where observer 
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and observed are alone, together: 
When I detect a beauty in any of the recesses of nature, I am reminded, by the 
serene and retired spirit in which it requires to be contemplated, of the 
inexpressible privacy of a life,—how silent and unambitious it is.261  
In Thoreau’s statement on “privacy” the subject of privacy is ambiguous; it is unclear whether 
the privacy belongs to the observer in the scene, or the beauty he observes.  The “inexpressible 
privacy of a life” seems to belong to both:  the “beauty” in its recess, and the observer who must 
assume an analogous “retired spirit” to contemplate it.  The two sympathize precisely through 
their retirement or recession from one another, their retreat becoming what they hold in 
common.262   
Thoreau also highlights a certain reserve in the act of observation; in fact, the observer is 
not said to observe at all—only to detect and to contemplate.  The scene as sketched omits the 
moment or moments of observation; Thoreau glosses over the intrusive act of looking, moving 
immediately from the detection of some beauty (an insect, a fox, a moss, perhaps) to 
contemplation of it.  It is unclear whether the contemplation he describes takes place 
immediately after that initial detection or some time much later, but the curious omission of a 
period of observation—of staring or scrutiny—implies a respect for the thing observed, 
manifested by a certain retreat from it into the kind of inward thoughtfulness associated with 
contemplation.  Later, in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, Thoreau would 
speculate that the primary occupation of the natural historian (like that of  the fisherman), is not 
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in obtaining “new genera or species” but in obtaining “new contemplations.”263  The 
displacement of the object of attention, from the animal or phenomenon sighted to the 
contemplations it inspires, is familiar to us from the natural history of Clare.  The shift is a 
necessary one, and a polite imaginative gesture, that recognizes and respects the privacy of other 
creatures while engaging them. 
Thoreau structures his essay loosely around an account of the seasons and remarks on 
several creatures within each major category covered in the Massachusetts’s Reports.  He spends 
little space simply naming resident animal species, preferring instead a number of enigmatic 
narratives detailing the characteristics of particular animals.  As Lawrence Buell points out in 
The Environmental Imagination:  Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American 
Culture, Thoreau’s attention to and minute description of the characteristics of animals was not 
unique during this period in American natural history writing, when “profiles” or “cameos” of 
animals were common.  These profiles generally included all the minute details a zoologist might 
require, such as a species’ dimension, weight, colour, diet, and range, but they also often 
included an eclectic collection of short travel narratives, hunting tales, amusing anecdotes, and 
personal asides.  After describing the features and colours of the American wild cat, for example, 
John James Audubon and John Bachman move on, in their Vivaporous Quadrupeds, to describe 
its habits and character: 
It is . . . generally cowardly when attacked, and always flies from its pursuers, if it 
can, and although some anecdotes have been related to us of the strength, daring, 
and fierceness of this animal; such as its having been known to kill at different 
times a sheep, a full-grown doe, attack a child in the woods, &c; yet in all the 
instances that have come under our own notice, we have found it very timid, and 
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always rather inclined to beat a retreat, than to make an attack on any animal 
larger than a hare or a young pig.264 
Throughout the book Audubon and Bachman use all manner of sources to flesh out their 
accounts, gathering up rumour, registries, letters and personal experience to detail what a 
particular animal species always does, has been known to do, and has done in their experience. 
For Buell, the “intermixture of fact, narrative, and autobiography, even the tonal 
interweave of reportage and playful mock-epic pedantry” in Thoreau’s animal sketches does not 
“differ in kind from many natural history publications designed for general audiences” like 
Viviparous Quadrupeds (which he cites as characteristic of that genre).265  Yet, it seems to me 
that Thoreau’s sketches of animals do in fact depart from this model in ways that are apparent 
from his first attempts at such sketches in “The Natural History of Massachusetts.”  Instead of 
speaking generally about what animal species do, supported cursorily by anecdotal evidence, 
Thoreau highlights in detail his interactions with particular animals.  These are themselves 
anecdotes, but their emphasis is not on the general character of a species at large, but upon the 
writer’s interaction with a particular animal, at a particular moment in time.  These moments of 
interaction are shaped by a delicacy I find absent from the narratives included in Viviparous 
Quadrupeds.  The privacy of any one wild cat in any one interaction is not a concern for 
Audubon and Bachman.  Neither do they seem to have suffered any impulse to sympathize in 
some way with their subjects, a desire Thoreau expresses repeatedly in “The Natural History of 
Massachusetts” and throughout his natural history writing.  On one hand, Thoreau’s animal 
sketches are marked by his respect for the “inexpressible privacy of a life in nature.”  On the 
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other, they are born of Thoreau’s will to explore “the limits of being,” to sympathize with the 
unlikeliest creatures:  “Methinks I have need even of [a minnow’s] sympathy, and to be his 
fellow in a degree.”266  Entomology, ichtheology:  the study of insects and fishes held all the 
fascination marginal subjects would hold for Thoreau throughout his life.  With the same relish 
in perversity with which he imagines sinking into the depths of the most “impermeable and 
unfathomable bog,”267 he imagines fellowship with a particular fish in a particular brook. 
Thoreau dedicates his profile of the fox to a particular fox, with an even greater degree of 
specificity.  It is, in fact, the passage’s oscillation between a narrative intended to illustrate 
something about all foxes and its fixation, nevertheless, on a particular encounter and a particular 
fox, that make the passage such an enigmatic one.  In the “serene and retired spirit” Thoreau 
advocates, Thoreau the observer in this passage plays no part, to the point of ceding the earth to 
his animal subject.  The passage, which stands out as the essay’s most graceful, manages to 
address at once the general or expected behaviour of foxes while speaking of “a fox,” a non-
specific yet singular animal whom he depicts running across the snow in a moment that achieves 
a certain spectral and timeless quality: 
When I see a fox run across the pond on the snow, with the carelessness of 
freedom, or at intervals trace his course in the sunshine along the ridge of a hill, I 
give up to him sun and earth as to their true proprietor.  He does not go in the sun, 
but it seems to follow him, and there is a visible sympathy between him and it.268   
The transcendental moment Thoreau describes, in which the sun seems to follow the fox in a 
moment of sympathetic identification, seems utterly unique, yet his opening phrase, “When I see 
a fox . . . ” suggests that such sightings are regular.  In this, Thoreau treads a peculiar course:  he 
seems to speak about the characteristics of foxes in general, while attending to the liberty and 
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specificity of an individual fox in a particular situation.  Moreover, Thoreau removes himself 
from that situation.  In his words, he gives the scene up to the fox, eschewing sympathy with it 
for an acknowledgment of sympathy between the fox and its environment.  The scene—the 
sun—seems to follow the fox, and the observer is left outside it. 
After presenting this picture, Thoreau inverts the dynamic to place the reader in the scene with 
the fox:      
Sometimes, when the snow lies light and but five or six inches deep, you may 
give chase and come up with one on foot.  In such a case he will show a 
remarkable presence of mind, choosing only the safest direction, though he may 
lose ground by it.  Notwithstanding his fright, he will take no step which is not 
beautiful.  His pace is a sort of leopard canter, as if he were in no wise impeded 
by the snow, but were husbanding his strength all the while.  When the ground is 
uneven, the course is a series of graceful curves, conforming to the shape of the 
surface.  He runs as though there were not a bone in his back.  Occasionally 
dropping his muzzle to the ground for a rod or two, and then tossing his head 
aloft, when satisfied of his course.  When he comes to a declivity, he will put his 
fore feet together, and slide swiftly down it, shoving the snow before him.269 
Thoreau teaches his reader how to read the animal’s movements in this passage, which slips 
between tenses and between hypothetical and descriptive modes, encouraging the reader to see in 
her mind’s eye the tracks of the fox, his movements, and the movements of his mind.  Earlier, 
Thoreau notes that he can tell “which way a mind wended” by attending to a fox’s tracks, noting 
the direction they face, the interval between them, and the rapidity of pace indicated by the depth 
of each print’s impression in the snow.  The passage above leads the reader through the process 
of reading the animal’s mind in its movements:  the fox is frightened, but has “a remarkable 
presence of mind;” he conserves his strength, takes pleasure in his course, and is responsive to 
the terrain.  In Thoreau’s description, the animal takes its course purposefully, and also playfully, 
in the matter of art.  Indeed, Thoreau remarks upon the expressiveness of the sound the fox’s 
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steps produce, noting that “he treads so softly that you would hardly hear it from any nearness, 
and yet with such expression that it would not be quite inaudible at any distance.”270  
“Expression,” here, seems to imply artfulness, character, or sentiment; the expression of the 
fox’s tread is a form of communication.  Thoreau is reluctant to transcribe the content of the 
expression, focusing instead upon the delicacy of its transmission and reception:  it is easy to 
miss, yet available to all, “at any distance.” 
The tread of the fox is an enigma:  that it can just barely, but always, be heard at any 
nearness or distance indicates that its transmission is not dependent upon its proximity to a 
recipient, but instead upon the availability of that recipient to its expression.  In the “Natural 
History of Massachusetts,” the availability of a naturalist or “true man of science” to the gestures 
and expressions of the natural world relies upon his ability to cultivate an “eye unprejudiced by 
the short term of human life” and a longing for a sympathetic relation to his subjects constrained 
by that prejudice.271  The image of the fox running in the sun figures forth an image of 
sympathetic relation outside that prejudice by declining to distinguish between two very different 
material objects living out lives of radically different duration (the fox and the sun), and in 
nevertheless allowing them a sympathetic relation because, at this moment, they exist together:  
the fox “does not go in the sun, but it seems to follow him, and there is a visible sympathy 
between him and it.”272 
A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers and Walden (written and revised together 
during Thoreau’s two years on Walden pond) were prompted by the “short term of human life.”  
A Week, in particular, can be read as a response to the short term of John’s life and as a memorial 
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to Henry’s time with him.  Both are also attempts to describe the world “unprejudiced” by the 
short term of human life and in so doing to recalibrate Thoreau’s sympathetic relation to 
elements in space and time.  Just as A Week folds two weeks into one, Walden folds two years 
into one, and both include excerpts from the journal Thoreau kept throughout his life.  The 
journal was chronological and clearly dated, but the excerpts he selected from them float out of 
that framework to join, in A Week, the narrative of two weeks spent by Henry and John on a 
canoe trip together and all the affiliated fragments of time that Thoreau picked up on that river, 
from the original naming of the Concord river to John’s death, which is not mentioned but which 
nevertheless pervades the text.  
 
Merrimacking 
[S]uch sympathy have [the elements] ever with our race, that all Nature would be affected, and 
the sun’s brightness fade, and the winds would sigh humanely, and the clouds rain in tears, and 
the woods shed their leaves and put on mourning in midsummer, if any man should ever for a 
just cause, grieve.273 
 
 
According to Jonathan Bate in Romantic Ecology, elegies and the eighteenth century 
poems of inscription to which Geoffrey Hartman has linked them in the development of the 
Romantic lyric operate under a system of gains and losses through which the loss of a particular 
person, moment, or feeling results in the gain of the poem written about the loss.  Bate also 
believes that there is a profound doubleness about poems like Wordsworth’s “Poems on the 
Naming of Places” that register the loss of a moment that is “irredeemably past,” but 
simultaneously recover those moments through their recurrence in the minds of the poems’ 
readers (93).  Bate’s particular political claims regarding “Wordsworth and the Environmental 
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Tradition” (his book’s subtitle), nevertheless rest upon yet another sense of gains and losses that 
requires that we consider the places described in Wordsworth’s “Poems on the Naming of 
Places” as places that exist in the physical world, not just the world of the poems.  Bate’s work is 
“dedicated to the proposition that the way in which William Wordsworth sought to enable his 
readers better to enjoy or to endure life was by teaching them to look at and dwell in the natural 
world” (4).  Given this dedication, Bate’s claim that “Wordsworth’s ‘Poems on the Naming of 
Places’ inscribe, guard, protect, and preserve secluded bowers and sacred places,” does not apply 
merely to a guardianship and preservation of place that is limited to the space of the poem.  Bate 
means that, in a very real way, Wordsworth’s readers ought to feel motivated to ensure that 
secluded bowers and sacred places remain secluded and sacred (107).  In this way, the poems 
preserve the landscapes they describe, despite their inability to preserve the moments and 
persons inscribed therein in a similarly material way.  This is certainly true, to some extent, of 
the places Thoreau described, most especially Walden Pond itself, which one can still visit.  
Additionally, as John McPhee details in his introduction to A Week, it is still possible to take the 
boating trip Thoreau describes in that work.  As McPhee points out, however, the places Thoreau 
described are significantly different today, both because of additions (like traffic noise) and 
omissions (of particular flowering plants, for example).  This was, in fact, Thoreau’s own 
experience of these places, places that are never what they once were, or will someday be.274  It 
is always already a “maimed and imperfect” nature with which Thoreau converses, a poem that 
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is merely an “imperfect copy” of itself, with some leaves missing and mutilated. 
If Bate’s hope that literary works might help ensure that the places they describe stay 
forever green therefore seems an oversimplification of the natural world as Thoreau encountered 
it, we might turn to Paul Fry’s response to Bate, in which Fry asserts that “poetry is an epitaph, 
not a landscape” –a fact that will become even clearer, he believes, if all the secluded bowers and 
sacred landscapes Bate invokes are destroyed.  According to Fry in his article, “Green to the 
Very Door? The Natural Wordsworth,” the continuance of the particular material world 
described in a poem is not only not necessary for the poem’s success or appreciation, it is not 
possible.  Fry goes so far as to add his own tag line to the conclusion of Romantic Ecology, in 
which Bate implores readers of Wordsworth’s Boy of Winander episode to remember that it is 
about “a boy alone by a lake at dusk blowing mimic hootings to unseen owls. Which are there to 
answer him.”275  Fry’s addition—“And then to stop”—might seem an undue savaging of Bate’s 
concluding message, but it is in accordance with the only reading of “nature” that Fry believes 
will allow him to continue to refer to Wordsworth as a “nature poet” (something he wishes to 
do).  Like the “stone-colored criticism” with which Fry counters Bate’s environmentalist green 
criticism, the version of “nature” in Wordsworth’s poetry Fry chooses to discuss is one in which 
the human and nonhuman realms of being intersect to reveal something about the “widest 
commonality” of being.276  It is this form of nature, Fry argues, that persists when the owls of the 
                                                
 
275 Bate, quoted in Paul Fry’s “Green to the Very Door?  The Natural Wordsworth.”  The Wordsworthian 
Enlightenment:  Romantic Poetry and the Ecology of Reading.  Edited by Helen Regueiro Elam and 
Frances Ferguson (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
276 Fry takes his language about the “widest commonality” of being from Walter Pater’s “Wordsworth,” 
in Selected Writings of Walter Pater, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Signet, 1974).  According to Fry, 
fluctuations in the proportion of human to nonhuman things and the persistence of particular forms of 
being cannot change this widest commonality of being.  My chapter, with Thoreau, nevertheless argues 
for the relevance of particular forms of being and the specificity of forms of evolutionary change for 
171 
 
Boy of Winander passage fall silent.  And while Fry, like many others before him, also reads that 
silence as an intimation of the boy’s death, he does so because he believes that the scene reveals 
an “ontology of nature” in which the inanimate precedes the animate and “nature is our own 
nonhuman existence, forgotten once named.”277 
By contrast, Thoreau writes of owls in Walden that also express something about the 
widest commonality of being, but that do so without drawing sharp distinctions between the 
human and the nonhuman, the living and the nonliving.  Thoreau’s owls, which seem to screech 
“oh-o-o-o-o- that I never had been bor-r-r-r-n!” express a “dismal scream” indeed, yet Thoreau 
loves to hear their “regrets and sighs”: 
They are the spirits, the low spirits and melancholy forebodings, of fallen souls 
that once in human shape night-walked the earth and did the deeds of darkness, 
now expiating their sins with their wailing hymns or threnodies in the scenery of 
their transgressions.  They give me a new sense of the variety and capacity of that 
nature which is our common dwelling . . . It is a sound admirably suited to 
swamps and twilight woods which no day illustrates, suggesting a vast and 
undeveloped nature which men have not recognized.278 
“That nature which is our common dwelling” is various and capacious, Thoreau discovers, not 
simply because of what it currently contains, but because of what it has contained and continues 
to carry with it.  The “vast and undeveloped nature” which men have not recognized carries 
within itself, curiously enough, history.  It is itself both landscape and epitaph, continually 
memorializing everything it has ever been.279  Thoreau’s own writing practices reproduce that 
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activity of memorialization without bounds.  A Week is astonishing in its capaciousness and 
scope, incorporating writing from his journals, descriptions of his journey with his brother, 
profiles of plants and animals, and anecdotes collected from his reading of historical records.  A 
Week is their common dwelling, a residence for the living and the dead, for all things whose 
tenure on earth is only more or less temporary. 
After a lengthy reflection on the past lives of the Concord river, once the Musketaquid, or 
Grass-ground River – and in some ways forever the Grass-ground River (or at least “as long as 
grass grows and water runs here,” he muses) – Thoreau launches himself on the bosom of the 
river, to “float whither it [will] bear” him.  “[W]e seemed to be embarked on the placid current of 
our dreams, floating from past to future as silently as one awakes to fresh morning or evening 
thoughts,” he announces upon the commencement of this journey.280  Like Thoreau’s passage 
along panoramas of the Rhine and Mississippi rivers in “Walking,”281 His water passage along 
the Concord and Merrimack Rivers in his Week is as much an account of the passage of time as it 
is of his passage through the landscape.  As the riverbank scenery passes before him, Thoreau 
reads the landscape for the traces of its past.  Often, these traces come in the form of physical 
reminders, pipes or arrows, of a history of the native people who lived there.  Nevertheless, 
Thoreau’s resources are multiple, including not just physical artifacts but also accounts of local 
historians, local legends, recovered letters, and his own fanciful word etymologies.   Common to 
all Thoreau’s accounts of the rivers’ past lives, though, is his insistence upon their 
continuousness: in Thoreau’s account, all who have inhabited a place are in some way 
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contemporaries.  
Thoreau seems to have organized his ideas for A Week under a similar principle, so that 
all manner of reflections find a place somewhere within it: as James Russell Lowell pointed out 
in his review of the book, “[t]he leaves of [Thoreau’s] portfolio and river-journal seem to have 
been shuffled together with a trustful dependence on some overruling printer-providence.”282  It 
is Lowell’s position that Thoreau’s many diversions are “out of proportion and out of place” and 
“mar our Merrimacking dreadfully,” but Thoreau seems, rather, to have put his confidence in the 
providence of a landscape and a conception of a week that might stretch to contain anything.  
Thus “Thursday” quietly expands to contain an extra week off-river, in which Thoreau and his 
brother hike to the summit of Agiocochook. The presence of Thoreau’s brother is itself a hidden 
presence within the work; his brother is almost always absorbed into the plural “we,” aside from 
his periodic appearance as the “other” in Thoreau’s descriptions of activities requiring the work 
of two persons acting independently.  Nevertheless, one gets the distinct impression in reading A 
Week, especially given the dates of its composition and the verse invocation Thoreau places as its 
opening (“Be thou my Muse, my Brother –”), that A Week is Thoreau’s memorial to his brother.   
Like the other chapters of A Week, “Thursday” (which I focus on here because of its 
special status as an expansive and privileged enclosure, a week secreted within A Week) is 
littered with white space, original verse, verse quotations, historical anecdotes, and philosophical 
reflections.  Many of the irruptions in “Thursday” seem to be especially concerned with the 
protective potentialities of the landscape that surrounds the two travelers and the status of the 
journey on foot enfolded into what is otherwise the limit of their voyage.  This unfolding of a 
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journey within a journey is reminiscent of Wordsworth’s “Elegiac Stanzas” and also of the 
memories within memories to which Hartman turns his attention in “Nature and the 
Humanization of the Self in Wordsworth.”  In that essay, Hartman turns to a passage from book 
two of The Prelude, in which Wordsworth’s memory of a horse ride with friends melts into a 
memory, within the first, of an old church in which the song of a wren can be heard “So sweetly 
‘mid the gloom” of recent showers that there, in that comfortless place, Wordsworth remembers, 
he could have made his “dwelling-place.”  In Hartman’s account, the first memory “yields as if 
spontaneously” to the second, which is more inward, and embraces it.  Within that embrace, 
Hartman says, the poet lingers and almost brings the poem to a halt.   What Hartman marvels at 
in the passage as particularly Wordsworthian, though, is that the displaced memory is continuous 
with the first and “remains within the frame of its matrix.”283 
“Thursday” (the week within the matrix of A Week) begins on just such a gloomy, rainy 
day, in the scant enclosure of the brothers’ tent-fold.  The two wake to the sound of raindrops 
falling on their roof, “as if the whole country wept, the drops falling in the river, and on the 
alders, and in the pastures.”284  Though the sound of the rain—“deliberate and ominous”—
carries with it a mild yet threatening undertone, its omnipresence and apparently sympathetic 
tears also link it to a more explicitly friendly rain shower Thoreau would describe on Walden 
pond in a moment of loneliness, when—for once—“to be alone was something unpleasant.”  The 
feeling, Thoreau writes, was of temporary insanity, but as a sudden rain began to fall he became 
aware, “in the very pattering of the drops, and in every sound and sight around my house” of “an 
infinite and unaccountable friendliness all at once like an atmosphere sustaining me . . . Every 
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little pine needle expanded and swelled with sympathy and befriended me.”285  In A Week, as 
well, the rain seems to consolidate the atmosphere, gathering it around the tent in a curious 
embrace. 
Once the brothers set out, they are obliged to feel and scent their way through an 
atmosphere that is heavy with fog and oddly porous, with “occasional brightenings in the mist, 
when the trill of the tree-sparrow seemed to be ushering in sunny hours.”286  Thoreau alternates 
between the past and the present tense in his account of their journey.  Use of the present tense in 
some portions of “Thursday” is concurrent with a seeming consolidation of the atmosphere, as 
when the travelers stop to rest under the dripping twigs and leaves, which “enhance the sense of 
inward comfort and sociableness” they draw from reflection on the wild oats, bushy hill, 
gathering clouds, and the waning breath of the wind that make up their environment.287  
Immediately following these observations in prose, Thoreau spins them into verse in a ten stanza 
poem that makes mention of all the previous details and more.  The message of the poem is not 
unlike that of Wordsworth’s “Expostulation and Reply,” which calls us to heed those things in 
our environment we “cannot chuse but see” and give ourselves over to a faith in “wise 
passiveness.”  In Thoreau’s lines, Shakespeare and Homer are discarded on a rainy day for his 
“business” with a drop of dew: 
I am well drenched upon my bed of oats; 
But see that globe come rolling down its stem, 
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Now like a lonely planet there it floats, 
And now sinks into my garment’s hem.288 
This neat collapsing of the “lonely planet” into Thoreau’s hem seems paradigmatic of A Week, a 
text that seems to cover broad swaths of space and time even when its actors are at rest, even 
when the only time mentioned is “now.” 
In fact, Thoreau’s account of what might be expected to be the book’s grandest 
landscape, a view of the woods and rivers surrounding Agiocochook (Mount Washington) from 
its summit (which seems to have been the destination of the land journey in “Thursday” or even, 
perhaps, of the entire expedition, though Thoreau nowhere presents it as such), is simply not 
there.  Instead, Thoreau follows his assertion that they “were enabled to reach the summit of 
AGIOCOCHOOK” with white space and, floating in that white space, a stanza from Herbert’s 
“Vertue”: 
Sweet days, so cool, so calm, so bright, 
The bridal of the earth and sky, 
Sweet dews shall weep thy fall to-night, 
   For thou must die.289 
The rest of A Week is an account of the brothers’ return trip.  Here, in the pause before that 
happens, it seems possible to read a faint tremble in the blank landscape atop Agiochook and in 
the intimations of mortality in the sweet days of the Herbert stanza—perhaps a trace of the form 
of the absent John.  We can also trace the weeping of the sweet dews that mourn the death of 
sweet days in “Vertue” back to the opening of “Thursday” and the sounds of rain drops hitting 
the Thoreau’s cotton tent, rain falling from the trees as if “the whole country wept.”290  
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Getting and Spending, Having and Holding 
In many ways, Thoreau’s account of a world that seems retrospectively sympathetic to 
the loss of his brother is in stark contrast to the world as Emerson describes it in his essay, 
“Experience.”  In that essay Emerson presents an Indian he says is representative of us all: 
The Indian who was laid under a curse, that the wind should not blow on him, nor 
water flow to him, nor fire burn him, is a type of us all.  The dearest events are 
summer-rain, and we the Para coats that shed every drop.  Nothing is left us now 
but death.  We look to that with a grim satisfaction, saying, there at least is reality 
that will not dodge us. 291   
For the Indian under a curse, as for everyone, Emerson believes, conditions do not touch us, and 
despite Emerson’s final reiteration of a surmise we all make with "grim satisfaction," we suspect 
(as the tone of the passage suggests) that reality will likely fail to touch us even in death.  Indeed, 
Emerson's subject in "Experience" is a death that has failed to touch him.  The tale of the Indian 
follows closely on his only direct reference to it within the essay:  "In the death of my son, now 
more than two years ago," he says baldly, "I seem to have lost a beautiful estate,—no  more.  I 
cannot get it nearer to me.”292 
It is difficult to read this assertion without being troubled by the speaker’s detachment and by its 
position in the essay as, apparently, a passing remark.  In her consideration of it, Barbara Packer 
remarks: 
I have never yet read a commentary on it that I thought did justice to the peculiar 
kind of shock it administers to the reader who is encountering the essay for the 
first time.  The casual brutality of the sentence in which Emerson introduces the 
death of his son as an illustration is unmatched by anything I know of in 
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literature, unless it is the parenthetical remark in which Virginia Woolf reports the 
death of Mrs. Ramsay in the "Time Passes" section of To The Lighthouse.293 
Indeed, it is difficult to read the first paragraphs of Emerson's essay without wondering at what 
Packer later calls their troubling "tonelessness."294  Commentators have attempted to explain it—
and the absence of any further direct discussion of Waldo's death after the third paragraph—by 
discussing "Experience" as a primarily philosophical text with philosophical concerns,295 or as an 
elegy in which the elegiac concerns of the text become as imbedded as the child may in what, in 
psychoanalytic terms, would be Emerson's introjection of him.296   In any case, the "casual 
brutality" of Emerson's introduction of his son's death does not in fact seem out of place in most 
of "Experience."  As he says, "We thrive by casualties.  Our chief experiences have been 
casual.”297  
The possibility that loss—casualties, even—could be experienced as casual is due in part, 
Emerson explains, to the remoteness of experience in general; when the possibility of ever really 
getting and holding on to anything in the first place is foreclosed, imagining anything like loss or 
renunciation is impossible.   He claims, "[a]ll I know is reception; I am and I have; but I do not 
get, and when I fancied I had gotten anything, I found I did not."298  The form of “getting” 
Emerson describes is akin to the "grasping" Emmanuel Levinas has described as the primary 
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gesture of consciousness itself.  Emerson, whose consciousness is under the influence of the 
opium he says is "instilled into all disaster," describes a slippery world defined by loss that 
makes such grasping, or clutching, impossible or ineffectual.  Thoreau’s initial response to his 
brother’s death also evokes this feeling of a world estranged from oneself and just out of reach, 
“of sounds in nature which . . . ears could never hear,” whose meaning is always “away behind 
and behind.”299  
Success in grasping reality or coming to full consciousness would mean only that, in 
Levinas' words, everything in our experience (even everything we lose) could be “understood, 
justified, pardoned.”300  While Emerson half laments, then, that Nature "likes that we should be 
her fools and playmates” and will allow us “the sphere for our cricket-ball, but not a berry for 
our philosophy,”301 it also seems that the apparently anesthetic, “unhandsome” world he 
describes (in which we are merely Nature's bewildered playmates), is the only one in which we 
can experience having and not having outside a relatively more straightforward economy of wins 
and losses, of getting and spending, and even of any static notion of conservation and sacrifice. 
For Emerson, experience is a series of near misses, through which we fail to get objects, 
events, and conditions truly near to us.  The "evanescence and lubricity of all objects," he says, 
"which lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest" is "the most unhandsome 
part of our condition.”302  This clutching seems closely related to what Geoffrey Hartman, in "A 
Touching Compulsion," calls Wordsworth's reality-testing, an act of literal grasping Wordsworth 
describes in the Fenwick note to "Intimations of Immortality":  "I was often unable to think of 
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external things as having external existence, and I communed with all that I saw as something 
not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature.  Many times while going to school 
have I grasped a wall or tree to recall myself from this abyss of idealism to the reality.”303  But in 
“Experience,” such a recollection with regard to reality is impossible and, perhaps, undesirable.   
The wall or the tree we clutch inevitably slides away from us, figuratively and literally.  
The world, in other words, is not enough with us:  to quote Wordsworth, “Little we see in 
Nature that is ours.”  In fact, the world Wordsworth describes in the poem including those lines 
bears a striking resemblance to the one Emerson describes in “Experience.”  Preoccupied with 
"Getting and spending," the speaker of Wordsworth’s famed lines believes we nevertheless stand 
in a non-appropriative relationship to nature, having given even our hearts away: 
The World is too much with us; late and soon,   
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers:   
Little we see in Nature that is ours;   
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!   
This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon,           
The winds that will be howling at all hours   
And are up-gather'd now like sleeping flowers,   
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;   
It moves us not.—Great God! I'd rather be   
A pagan suckled in a creed outworn;    
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,   
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;   
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;   
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.304 
It is possible to read the giving away of our hearts as the cause of our inability to see in nature 
anything that is ours, as though we have somehow entered a series of bad transactions:  hearts for 
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nothing but the vapid exchange of further getting and spending.  If not as cause, however, it 
stands at least in kindred relation to our inability, or resistance to, appropriating nature.  This 
renunciation seems to be a way of acknowledging a world that is too little with us.  The sea, the 
winds, and the sleeping flowers of "The world is too much with us" slide off the poet like 
summer rain off the Para coats we are in Emerson's "Experience."      
The poet's longing to be "suckled in a creed outworn" expresses an impulse that runs 
counter to the speaker’s wistful acceptance of that lapsed state;305 it is a longing to inhabit a 
world where we can be touched, where glimpses of Proteus and Triton might carry with them a 
particular significance derived from a "creed outworn" that might place us, make us less forlorn.  
Thus might the sudden appearance of Proteus of the sea on a tract of British grassland be woven 
into an ordinary, fully-present sort of meaningfulness in which what we see correlates with what 
we want, and need, to believe. 
A previous essay by Emerson, “Compensation,” is built on such correlation.  Assertions 
of symmetry, perfect scale, and cause and effect, including “[E]ach thing is a half, and suggests 
another thing to make it whole,” “The world globes itself in a drop of dew” and “Every act 
rewards itself” reinforce the essay at every point.  Correlation, or compensation, is perhaps most 
reassuring in the final paragraph of the essay, in which Emerson reflects on the compensation we 
receive for loss, and seems to find it satisfactory.  He says: 
A fever, a mutilation, a cruel disappointment, a loss of wealth, a loss of friends 
seems at the moment unpaid loss, and unpayable.  But the sure years reveal the 
deep remedial force that underlies all fact.  The death of a dear friend, wife, 
                                                
 
305 The impulse is related to what Geoffrey Hartman, in "A Touching Compulsion," (Chapter 2, The 
Unremarkable Wordsworth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), calls the "counter-
obstinacy" with which Wordsworth responds "when the light of sense goes out, and intimations of the 
death or the blankness of nature arise" (24).   
182 
 
brother, lover, which seemed nothing but privation, somewhat later assumes the 
aspect of a guide or genius . . . 306   
As such, any break in the order of compensation is eventually ("somewhat later") assimilated.  
We are paid back for what we have given up, rewarded for our sacrifice. 
In "Experience," however, Emerson seems to lament this kind of totality despite loss.  
The "compensation for calamity" celebrated in the earlier essay is here beside the point. 
Reflecting on the calamity of Waldo's death, he says, 
If tomorrow I should be informed of the bankruptcy of my principal debtors, the 
loss of my property would be a great inconvenience to me, perhaps, for many 
years; but it would leave me as it found me,—neither better nor worse.  So is it 
with this calamity: it does not touch me: something which I fancied was a part of 
me, which could not be torn away without tearing me, nor enlarged without 
enriching me, falls off from me, and leaves no scar.  It was caducous.  (200) 
Various definitions of "caducous" resonate with moments in "Experience," but the one I would 
like to emphasize now is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a description for organs or 
parts that "fall off naturally when they have served their purpose," apparently leaving the 
organism total despite the loss.  
Just as Emerson figures a death as the loss of a limb that leaves no scar, Thoreau, in A 
Week, imagines our birth as a rending of the earth that leaves no mark.  As he does elsewhere in 
A Week and in the “Natural History of Massachusetts,” Thoreau presents this healing as an 
opportunity to see outside typical human prejudices: 
Perhaps no man is quite familiar with the horizon as seen from the hill nearest to 
his house, and can recall its outline distinctly when in the valley.  We do not 
commonly know, beyond a short distance, which way the hills range which take 
in our houses and farms in their sweep.  As if our birth had at first sundered 
things, and we had been thrust up through into nature like a wedge, and not till the 
                                                
 
306 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Compensation,” in Emerson's Prose and Poetry, edited by Joel Porte and 
Saundra Morris (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 149. 
183 
 
wound heals and the scar disappears, do we begin to discover where we are and 
that nature is one and continuous every where.307   
Thoreau describes a familiarization with our immediate surroundings that is possible only 
through alienation from them; so disruptive is our birth, at first, that we can see nothing in 
context and thus nothing properly in perspective.  When “the wound heals and the scar 
disappears,” however, we realize how little disruptive our presence has actually been:  “nature is 
one and continuous every where.”     
The very fine, almost indiscernible difference a human presence or absence makes is 
perhaps nowhere better evoked than in Wordsworth’s “A slumber did my spirit seal,” a poem 
that shares the tonelessness of “Experience,” as well as the shock of being jogged outside human 
perspective that Thoreau registers in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers.  According 
to Onno Oerlemans, who reads the poem in Romanticism and the Materiality of Nature, 
“imagining and comprehending death for Wordsworth begin by comprehending that matter is 
primary.”308  Oerlemans stresses that gaining this comprehension requires being able to see 
existence as “blankly as possible, without or beyond the screens of convention and signification 
that are inevitably involved with understanding human existence (as consciousness) and 
nature.”309   Imagining death requires stripping away the significations that otherwise accrue to 
the material world, obscuring a sense of our clear relation to it.   Nowhere is the stripping away 
of meaning in Wordsworth’s poetry more successful, Oerlemans says, than in “A slumber did my 
spirit seal.”  For Oerlemans, the poem’s two stanzas present versions of experience as, first, 
“absolute spirit,” and second, as “absolute matter.”  The white space between the two in this 
reading is both a figure for the girl’s death, and for the “absence of any narration which would 
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make meaningful for the speaker her passage from absolute life to absolute death, from spirit to 
matter . . . There is no resolution or consolation offered.”310  While I find this reading compelling 
in some ways, especially in its insistence upon the lack of resolution offered by the poem, it does 
not account for the atmospheric similarity of the two stanzas.  It seems worth reproducing the 
familiar poem here: 
A slumber did my spirit seal; 
 I had no human fears: 
She seemed a thing that could not feel  
 The touch of earthly years. 
No motion has she now, no force; 
 She neither hears nor sees; 
Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course 
 With rocks and stones and trees!311   
The stanzas are striking in their apparent independence:  each is its own, independent closed 
statement, each its own independent set of four lines with an alternating rhyme scheme and 
alternating iambs of four and three feet.  These features of independence and self-sufficiency 
also, of course, make the verses mirror images of one another, and it does not seem quite so easy 
to separate the two thematically, in terms of an opposition between spirit and matter or even life 
and death, as Oerlemans believes.   
The speaker and the “she” of the first stanza are alike in their alienation from human and 
earthly concerns (the ease with which we might misremember and transpose the phrases “human 
fears” and “earthly years” as “human years” and “earthly fears” suggests that these concerns are 
much the same).   The slumber that seals the spirit of the speaker also seems to seal the “she” off 
from feeling or touch, a sealing of sensation that persists in the second stanza.  “Rolled round in 
earth’s diurnal course / With rocks and stones and trees,” the she of the second stanza indeed 
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seems to have been absorbed into earth’s materials, as Oerleman’s argues, but the rolling motion 
of those materials caused by “earth’s diurnal course” also seem to reinstate her into a universe 
and cycle of time that is active despite her inactivity, whatever its cause.  Rather than registering 
a difference between “absolute matter” and “absolute spirit,” the poem instead seems resolutely 
to refuse distinguishing them at all.  In bringing “Lucy” together with “rocks and stones and 
trees,” and in describing these apparently stationary things not at rest, but as relentlessly active 
(“Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course”), Wordsworth insists that the human and the nonhuman 
alike, as well as spirit and matter are, as Thoreau would put it, “subject to the same laws,” that 
“All material things are in some sense man’s kindred.”312  
 
Outside to Time 
For Emerson, Wordsworth, and Thoreau the experience of loss calls into question the 
persistence and identity of all apparently remaining material things.  That these remainders 
constitute “all there is,” in some sense, also brings into sharp relief the nature of an environment 
and its constitution.  We might recall Thoreau’s query, “Why do precisely these objects we 
behold make a world?” reading it as:  “Why do precisely these objects we behold, and just these 
objects, make a world?”  Angus Fletcher, author of A New Theory for American Poetry: 
Democracy, the Environment, and the Future of Imagination, might respond that an environment 
is simply a “lot of things merely surrounding the observer” whose reason for being need only be 
that “they surround, they environ, and are felt to be significant by virtue of this 
circumscription.”313  Fletcher believes this is true not only in the outer world, but also in the 
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inner world of a poem.  In this way, a poem can be an environment in which the girl with the 
pitcher on her head, the sheep, and the gibbet of The Prelude, for example, are significant if only 
because they make up the environment of the poem.  Importantly, though, Fletcher sees any 
environment—outer or inner (“[f]or the outer world in its letter gives the coordinates of the inner 
world, with its thoughts”)—as a living system.314  Part of what makes environment poems 
themselves alive, Fletcher claims, is their ability to seduce the reader into “a search for the 
author, who emerges only through a crisscross motion within the mental space correlated to 
some physical space the poet describes.”315  Though Fletcher’s primary example of the 
environment poem is Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” it seems true that an environment poem need 
not concern only a search for the author of the piece, but might also include a search for other 
persons or things that are lost not only to the reader, but also in some sense to the author of the 
poem.  Indeed, although Fletcher does not directly address the place lost things might have in an 
environment poem, he does stress that the environment poem is motivated by an ever-widening 
circle of analysis on the part of the poet, who must study “boundaries, edges, hedges, and 
horizons” to discover what belongs in the poem and what does not. 
For Thoreau, determining what belonged in the environment of A Week and other works 
was as much a problem of space, requiring him to keep close to “boundaries, edges, hedges, and 
horizons,” as it was of time, requiring—or inviting—him to incorporate experiences that seemed 
in some sense “outside to time.”  In the first pages of A Week, Thoreau speculates, “As yesterday 
and the historical ages are past, as the work of to-day is present, so some flitting perspectives, 
and demi-experiences of the life that is in nature are, in time, veritably future, or rather outside to 
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time.”316  The demi-experiences Thoreau describes that are revealed as “outside to time” only “in 
time” may somehow avoid the fatality of experience, with its freight of expectations, causes, and 
results (as Emerson describes it in “Experience”).317  Thoreau’s language is also suggestive 
insofar as our “demi-experiences of the life that is in nature” might refer either to a noticing of 
the life of the natural world around us or to a demi-experience of being harbored in that life 
ourselves.  In this latter sense, whenever we feel ourselves inhabitants of nature (or, perhaps, 
discover ourselves to have been retrospectively) we are outside to time. 
An intimation of the life in nature outside to time may have prompted Wordsworth to 
return to his poem “When first I journeyed hither” both before and after the death of his brother 
John, finally publishing it in 1815 as “When to the Attractions of the Busy World.”  The poem 
describes a grove, a “favourite haunt” of Wordsworth at Grasmere for the harbour it could 
provide from snow showers (the grove is also, the poet notices, a safe harbour for a pair of 
thrush’s, who venture to build their nest very close to the ground within it).  The poet 
acknowledges that despite its attractions he loved the grove less than he wished because it 
provided him no clear passage for walking, but the “forsaken covert” is redeemed when he 
chances to notice a “hoary pathway traced around the trees” in a “natural opening” he had not 
before noticed.  At once, the poet says, he knew that by his “Brother’s steps it had been 
traced.”318  This unexpected crossing of paths in space if not in time (Wordsworth believes John 
wore the path in 1800 during his visit) becomes precious to Wordsworth initially because his 
brother has returned to sea since wearing the path, and the grove becomes a site of connection 
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through which they might pace together.  The sense in which the two meet in their pacing 
requires an interesting crossing of space and time: either they are both walking at the same time 
but in different places (William in the grove and John upon the ship), or in the same place (the 
grove), but at different times.  Wordsworth seems to have revised the poem before John’s death, 
and then again, afterward, by adding a footnote that explained that his wishes “for the day / 
When we, and others whom we love, shall meet / A second time, in Grasmere’s happy Vale” 
could not be granted because of John’s death by shipwreck.  The poem itself, of course, belies 
the footnote, offering itself up as a meeting place, a point of convergence where the brothers, 
their activities, and their histories come together in ways they never truly did in “Grasmere’s 
happy Vale.” 
Wordsworth’s poem on the grove thus becomes a safe harbour in its own right, in some 
way able to enfold the lost person it concerns and the experience of loss itself.  It was not 
originally designed to do so—the space of the poem simply expands to contain the loss within its 
horizon.  Similarly, A Week seems to contain not only Henry and John, but also John’s absence, 
making his presence within the text doubled, ghostly.  This certainly seems true of the physical 
landscapes and environments we inhabit.  Present or absent, the people and things we know seem 
to reside together in spaces that seem always, inexplicably, able to contain them. 
“Experience” gravitates toward an articulation of being and (non)being that takes into 
account our experience of this unity together with our inability to calculate it in terms of cause 
and effect, origin and destination:  
I should feel it pitiful to demand a result on this town and county, an overt effect 
on the instant month and year.  The effect is deep and secular as the cause.  It 
works on periods in which mortal lifetime is lost.  All I know is reception; I am 
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and I have: but I do not get, and when I have fancied I had gotten anything, I 
found I did not.319 
The “periods in which mortal lifetime is lost” in which Emerson's new version of cause and 
effect work are those unremembered, unrepeated, unpromised portions of life he has spoken of 
throughout his essay, and they also remind us of his child, the particular mortal lifetime lost from 
the world and, apparently, from the middle and last sections of "Experience."  Though Emerson 
has described those periods/persons as “lost,” they seem in some sense “outside to time.”   
Emerson describes “having” or “possession” as a reception of gifts.  “All I know is 
reception; I am and I have; but I do not get, and when I have fancied I had gotten anything, I 
found I did not,” he says near the end of the essay.  Moreover, he continues, the reception of gifts 
requires no compensation:  "When I receive a new gift, I do not macerate my body to make the 
account square, for, if I should die, I could not make the account square.”320  The reception and 
possible loss of a gift, as well as the impossibility of maceration of the body as payment brings 
us back to Waldo and the calamity of his death as “caducous,” a word that can refer not only to a 
body part that has fallen away, but also to “testamentary gifts which for some reason lapsed from 
the donee.”  In this way, Waldo's death seems comparable to those “obstinate questionings” 
Wordsworth speaks of in his “Intimations Ode” as “Fallings from us, vanishings; / Blank 
misgivings of a Creature / Moving about in worlds not realized” for which he sings thanks and 
praise.   It seems we may only have glimpses of the “worlds not realized” in which we move—
where what we have and do not have may reside—through the spaces of a world that otherwise 
seems too little with us.  We can neither grasp it nor hold it; it is a gift that we cannot “get.”  In 
like manner, Thoreau evokes the top of Ktaadn (“vast, and drear, and inhuman”) as “no man’s 
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garden, but the unhandselled globe.”321  A “handsel” is a gift:  offered at the beginning of a new 
relationship, it extends a promise of harmony.  The “unhandselled globe” makes no guarantees; 
as Thoreau recognizes in that terrifying moment of confrontation with “matter, vast, terrific” 
atop the mountain, the firmest matter—our bodies even—slips away from us.    
As Lawrence Buell notes in The Environmental Imagination, the "aesthetics of 
relinquishment" has long been an important concern of environmental writing.  Buell identifies 
two forms of relinquishment:  the relinquishment of goods, of “material trophies,” and the more 
radical relinquishment of individual autonomy, of the notion that anyone can be separate from 
his or her environment.322  In identifying just these two forms, Buell neglects another form of 
relinquishment that is as important to environmental writing:  the relinquishment of our ability 
ever to grasp, and hold, the people, places, and things with whom we inhabit the world at any 
given moment in time, at any given place in space.  This kind of relinquishment is in a sense 
more primary than those Buell mentions, in that it accepts that we cannot give up what we have 
not “gotten,” or expected to hold fast forever, in the first place.  Indeed, we might say that the 
nature of nature is change, and that that relentless change implies the passing away of everything 
we experience.  Experience, in this sense, is what we can not have and hold, and an 
environmental way of thinking about loss might be one that relinquishes our attempts to do so.  
In the A.R. Ammons poem Buell cites as exemplary of the aesthetics of relinquishment the 
speaker does not relinquish goods, trophies, or even an identity of his own.  Instead, the poem 
relinquishes getting, allowing sound and light and words to skip along its enjambments and be 
lost in its center: 
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A bird fills up the 
streamside bush 
with wasteful song, 
capsizes waterfall, 
mill run, and 
superhighway 
to 
song’s improvident 
center 
lost in the green 
bush green 
answering bush:  
wind varies: 
the noon sun casts 
mesh refractions 
on the stream’s amber 
bottom 
and nothing at all gets, 
nothing gets caught at all.323 
What is special about the texts described in this chapter is that they, too, seem able to exist as 
environments that contain objects—things that may just happen to be together but are 
nevertheless special in their particularity—and also moments, events and experiences that 
become “outside to time” in the space of the text and exist in that space contemporaneously. 
Angus Fletcher argues that the “environment poem” best conveys this sense of plenitude in terms 
of space and time.  It is a plenitude that gives us, in reading the poem, the sense of “entering and 
remaining inside a continuing moment-filled flow” that might allow lost persons and experiences 
a harbor in which they can be both present and absent, lost and found.324  The capaciousness of 
the environment poem might thus obviate the need to economize elegies in terms of gains and 
losses.   
It may also be the case that, in the environment poem, all experiences need not be 
fatalities.  In Emerson’s “Experience,” experiences fall away as quickly as they occur, and our 
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awareness of loss “threatens to absorb all things” in it “rapaciousness.”325  A reverse movement 
seems to motivate Wordsworth’s “When first I journeyed hither” and Thoreau’s Week, so that 
even losses are in some sense substantialized and sheltered by the environment with which they 
are surrounded in the space of the text.  That a text could provide such strange shelter—that it 
could be both landscape and epitaph at once—seems to depend not just on the existence and 
persistence of the material place the text describes but also, of course, upon the shaping influence 
of the author whose act of inscribing creates a temporary holding place out of infinite space; the 
text is, in a phrase both Emerson and Thoreau use to evoke the short duration of our lives on 
earth, “a tent for a night.”  Thoreau writes at the conclusion of “Thursday,”  “[t]he sky is curved 
downward to the earth in the horizon, because we stand on the plain.  I draw down its skirts.”326  
In this way, the human perspective Thoreau requires we abandon to better appreciate the varied 
time scales of natural history also gives it shape and allows us to discern within it the traces of its 
past. 
Though Thoreau was unaware of it at the time, his cataloguing of flowering times in 
Concord would allow researchers 150 years later to see ghosts in that landscape and to sketch a 
natural, evolutionary, history defined by loss and change.  “Properly speaking there can be no 
history but natural history,” Thoreau would write following his brother’s death, “for there is no 
past in the soul but in nature.”327     
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